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Only Through Moral Complexity:  
The Case of Supererogation 
Abstract 
The present research work will focus on two morally relevant 
issues: the nature of the experience of a moral agents and a 
possible account of the concept of supererogation. Even if, at a 
preliminary stage, these two subjects look to be unrelated, it 
will become clear how they both are expressions of the 
complexity typical of the moral domain. 
I will endorse, as a starting point, the approach of moral 
phenomenology as defined by Maurice Mandelbaum. A 
phenomenological study is then intended as the analysis of 
what it is like to perform a given act from the perspective of the 
first-person. Accordingly, the experience of the moral agent 
appears to be manifold and heterogeneous. On a normative 
level, the best moral account that allows the management and 
the comprehension of such complexity seems to be moral 
pluralism. In particular, I will distinguish between two sorts of 
pluralism: methodological pluralism (about the different ways of 
moral reasoning) and  axiological pluralism (about the different 
values that we take to have ultimate relevance). These 
denominations represent two ways of understanding morality 
in virtue of its complexity. As such, the approach of moral 
complexity relies on the acknowledgment of the manifold 
structure of morality. In this regard, I will consider the account 
offered by Charles Larmore in his Patterns of Moral Complexity. 
His admission of different and equally valid moral principles 
does not only explain something essential about our moral 
experience, but it will also become particularly helpful as I will 
try to apply his theory to the justification of supererogatory 
acts. 
Supererogation, as I will highlight, is a moral concept that 
relies on the existence of the many levels of morality and on the 
many possible achievements of the good. In this way, a clear 
distinction between the Right and the Good will provide the 
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theoretical space for this category of acts. I will define this as 
the need of complexity, that is, the need of a multilevel 
theoretical structure that resembles the distinction between 
precepts and concepts that gave birth to the concept in the 
Christian tradition. 
I will try to show how the loss of moral complexity is the first 
responsible of the theoretical struggles that the major monist 
theories (in particular Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics) face 
when confronted with the justification of supererogatory acts. 
These theoretical approaches usually tend to be anti-
supererogationists for a clear reason. When the level of the 
Right and the level of the Good merge into the same category 
there is no easy way to give an account of morally good acts 
that go beyond the call of duty. I believe that the endorsement 
of a pluralist system will solve the so-called problem of 
supererogation by reestablishing a clear distinction between the 
two faces of morality: the deontic and the evaluative. This is 
why, in the final chapter, I will introduce the Multiple Sources 
Dynamics as possible explanation, on a normative level, of how 
supererogatory acts can be performed. A system that provides 
multiple sources of the good has the tools to explain the 
establishment of our moral obligations and, at the same time, 
it can explain how we are able to see and foster some other good 
that lies beyond the level of requirements. 
In the present work, moral pluralism will be taken to be a 
sort of inference to best explanation of different morally relevant 
issues. This claim will be warranted by highlighting how moral 
pluralism can explain why our moral experience is so 
essentially complex (to the point of facing true moral dilemmas) 
and by showing how it can provide a satisfactory account of the 
concept supererogation. If these two subjects (which will be 
considered, at this point, directly related) are proved to hold 
true, the endorsement of a pluralist system will be considered 
the preferable option over the other normative systems.         
v 
 
Only Through Moral Complexity:  
The Case of Supererogation 
Abstract 
Il presente progetto di ricerca si concentrerà su due questioni 
di rilevanza morale: la natura dell’esperienza morale degli 
morali ed un possibile giustificazione del concetto di 
supererogatorio. Anche se, ad uno stadio preliminare, queste 
due questioni non sembrano essere in relazione, diventerà 
chiaro in secondo momento come esse siano entrambe 
espressioni di quella complessità tipica dell’ambito morale. 
 Come punto di partenza, seguirò l’approccio della 
fenomenologia morale come viene definita da Maurice 
Mandelbaum. Tale studio fenomenologico è quindi inteso come 
l’analisi, dalla prospettiva della prima persona, di cosa voglia 
dire fare una data azione. A questo proposito, l’esperienza 
morale dell’agente appare multiforme ed eterogenea. Ad un 
livello normativo, la miglior teoria che permette di affrontare e 
comprendere tale complessità sembra essere il pluralismo 
morale. In particolare, distinguerò due tipologie di pluralismo: 
un pluralismo metodologico (che riguarda i diversi modi di 
ragionare moralmente) ed un pluralismo assiologico (che 
riguarda i diversi valori a cui diamo una rilevanza assoluta). 
Queste due interpretazioni rappresentano due modi di 
comprendere la moralità in virtù della sua essenziale 
complessità. Come tale, l’approccio della complessità morale si 
fonda sul riconoscimento della struttura variegata della morale. 
A questo proposito, analizzerò la posizione di Charles Larmore 
come espressa nel suo Strutture di complessità morale. La sua 
identificazione di diversi principi morali egualmente validi, non 
solo spiegherà qualcosa di essenziale riguardo all’esperienza 
morale, ma diventerà particolarmente funzionale quando, 
nell’ultimo capitolo, farò riferimento alla sua teoria per la 
giustificazione degli atti supererogatori. 
Il supererogatorio, come evidenzierò, è un concetto morale 
che si fonda sull’esistenza dei diversi livelli della morale e sulle 
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molteplici modalità di conseguire il bene. In questo modo, una 
chiara distinzione tra il Giusto ed il Bene fornirà lo spazio 
teorico per questa categoria di atti. Definirò tale operazione la 
necessità della complessità, ovvero, il bisogno di una struttura 
teorica a più livelli che ricordi la distinzione tra precetti e 
consigli che ha dato vita al concetto nella tradizione cristiana. 
Cercherò di dimostrare come la perdita di complessità morale 
è la prima causa delle difficoltà teoriche che le principali teorie 
moniste (in particolare utilitarismo ed etica kantiana) si trovano 
a fronteggiare nella giustificazione degli atti supererogatori. 
Questi approcci teorici, infatti, tendono ad essere anti-
supererogazionisti per un motivo ben chiaro. Quando il livello 
del Giusto ed il livello del Bene si fondono nella stessa categoria, 
non resta alcun modo diretto di rendere conto degli atti 
moralmente buoni che vanno oltre il senso del dovere. Credo 
che l’adozione di un sistema pluralista risolverà il così detto 
problema del supererogatorio, ristabilendo una chiara 
distinzione tra le due facce della morale: il deontico e 
l’assiologico. Da qui il motivo per cui, nel capitolo finale, 
introdurrò la Multiple Sources Dynamics come una possibile 
spiegazione, ad un livello normativo, di come si diano le azioni 
supererogatorie. Un sistema che garantisca molteplici fonti del 
bene ha gli strumenti per fondare le nostre obbligazioni morali 
e, allo stesso tempo, per vedere e perseguire beni di altro genere 
che stanno oltre il livello degli obblighi. 
In questo lavoro il pluralismo morale viene inteso come una 
sorta di inferenza alla miglior spiegazione di diverse questioni 
moralmente rilevanti. Questa affermazione verrà giustificata 
evidenziando come il pluralismo morale possa spiegare perché 
la nostra esperienza morale è essenzialmente complessa (fino al 
punto di fronteggiare reali dilemmi morali) e dimostrando come 
si possa fornire una giustificazione soddisfacente del concetto 
di supererogatorio. Se queste due questioni (che a questo punto 
si danno come direttamente relazionate) sono verificate come 
valide, l’adozione di un sistema pluralista sarà considerata 
come l’opzione preferibile tra i vari sistemi normativi. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
MAPPING MORAL COMPLEXITY 
 
Interrogator: “Could machines ever think as human beings 
do?” 
Alan Turing: “Most people say no…”  
I.: “You are not most people…”  
A.T.: “Well, the problem is that you are…asking a stupid 
question. 
I.: “I am?”  
A.T.: “Of course machines...can't think as people do. A machine 
is different...from a person. Hence, they think differently. The 
interesting question is, just because something, uh, thinks 
differently from you, does that mean it's not thinking? Well, we 
allow for humans to have such divergences from one another. 
You like strawberries, I hate ice-skating, you... cry at sad films, 
I... am allergic to pollen. What is the point of-of different tastes, 
different...preferences if not to say that our brains work 
differently, that we think differently? And if we can say that 
about one another, then why can't we say the same thing for 
brains...built of copper and wire, steel?” 
It is with this dialogue that, in the movie The Imitation Game, 
Alan Turing is imagined to explain to the police officer the 
nature of thinking in regards to artificial machines1. The 
grounding argument has great philosophical appeal: just 
because there are different ways of thinking, it does not mean 
they are not all part of what we consider thinking. If we apply 
this idea to the moral domain, we can further appreciate the 
                                                          
1 Turing A. M., Computing Machinery and Intelligence, in ‘Mind’ 59(1950), 
no.236, pp.433-460.  
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intuitive allure of this point. The almost infinite number of 
variables that a moral agent faces in the everyday moral life and 
the resulting diversity of moral deliberations by different agents 
gives us a glimpse of the typical complexity of moral experience. 
Not only we acknowledge complexity, but also we consider it 
contradictory in nature as we see the large number of conflicts 
of value, opinions, rules of conduct that arise. However, we 
should not, for this reason, lose faith in finding a unifying 
feature among the different expressions of what we call 
morality. Rather, I believe that the answer to the question ‘how 
do we deliberate morally?’ can specifically help us to cast some 
light on another troublesome question: ‘what does it mean to 
live a good life?’. Again, if we take these questions seriously we 
cannot but acknowledge that human beings can bring about 
their moral choices differently. Just because we can identify 
different ways of reasoning, it does not mean that we cannot 
conceive all these ways of reasoning as constitutively moral. It 
is only by understanding how and why this is the case that we 
can strive for some desirable moral progress. 
In the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics morality was 
defined by Aristotle as the achievement of an end2 (te/lov), and 
this end is humans’ greatest good: happiness3 (eu0daimoni/a). 
Notice that conceiving morality as teleological subject does not 
entail a consequentialist theoretical framework. As we have 
briefly underlined, the final moral end (that of a life lived well 
and in communion with the others) can be achieved in many 
different ways and not only by paying attention to the 
consequences of our acts. Following the Aristotelian starting 
point, I believe that only by better understanding how we try to 
accomplish a given end, we will be able to realize it (no matter 
what that end might be). The present research work has been 
carried out with the belief that interpreting our moral capacities 
will help us to identify our final moral destination. As a 
consequence, if we recognize that human beings have different 
ways of moral reasoning, we will be willing to concede that, in 
life, we value different things in themselves. These are the two 
                                                          
2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a. 
3 Aristotle, ibidem, 1097b. 
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interconnected understandings of moral pluralism that I hope 
will become clear in the following chapters: a methodological 
pluralism (that describes the different ways of moral reasoning) 
and an axiological-pluralism (that describes the values to which 
we assign ultimate importance). If we analyze the first-person 
moral experience, such a variety of means and ends appears 
evident even in the same moral agent. This is the complexity 
typical of morality that will be the focus of the present work: 
we, as moral agents, do not deliberate in a unique way and 
neither always for the same end. I might help a friend because 
I have promised to do so (and I believe in the importance of 
promise-keeping per se) and, at the same time, I might decide 
to divide my birthday cake equally, because it is the act that 
maximizes a certain moral good. Again, moral reasoning is not 
subject to a single and unique source of moral value (axiological 
pluralism) and the different sources of value can be accounted 
for by different ways of moral reasoning (methodological 
pluralism). 
Certainly, the first and most fundamental sign of the 
complexity of our moral framework is the common distinction 
between the Right and the Good. The moral approach expressed 
by well-known works of W. D. Ross, while not explicitly 
addressed, have always been taken as source of inspiration 
from the outset4. The idea of a pluralistic morality that can 
distinguish between the realm of obligations and duties (the 
Right) and a broader category of intrinsic moral value (the Good) 
is not only a theoretical prerequisite of the moral concepts 
taken into account in present work, but also decisive for the 
soundness of most of the arguments in their favor. A moral 
complex approach to morality primarily means to acknowledge 
this distinction. A distinction that finds its intuitive appeal in 
the analysis of the first person moral experience.  
The fact that the concept of supererogation springs from the 
theoretical distinction between the Right and the Good is the 
reason why I have decided to analyze this peculiar category of 
acts. Moral complexity and supererogation are only apparently 
two separated issues. I think that once we realize how the 
                                                          
4 See Ross W. D., The Right and the Good, Oxford University Press, 1930. 
Ross W. D., The Foundations of Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1939. 
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former grounds the latter and, thus, how the latter is an 
expression of the former we will be able to appreciate the 
closeness of these two questions of ethics. I take the questions 
about moral complexity as metaethical questions about the 
structure of morality (meta-theoretical someone might say) and 
I consider the debate on supererogation a consequence, at the 
normative level, of the endorsement of a complex system. The 
aim of the present work, then, is twofold. First, I will try to show 
how the two subjects are mutually dependent, as we cannot 
make sense of supererogation without a complex moral system. 
Consequently, if we are willing to concede the existence of acts 
that are ‘good, but not morally required’ we cannot but 
acknowledge the complexity typical of morality. Second, if this 
relation really makes sense I will have obtained a second task: 
the demonstration of how these two questions of morality can 
suffice as mutual justificatory grounds. Nonetheless, this will 
make possible a parallel remark (but not a less important one), 
specifically about the nature of supererogatory acts. The 
advocacy of a complex and pluralist system of morality to 
ground supererogation wants to be, more generally, a 
contribution to the philosophical debate about the concept as 
it has raised since the late 50s of the twentieth century. If this 
secondary achievement is sound, I think we will have the tools 
to understand what this category of acts needs and, further, 
why the most widespread moral systems struggle to 
acknowledge it. 
The first chapter tries to highlight the reasons and the 
importance of a phenomenological approach to morality. These 
premises will focus on the overlooked work of Maurice 
Mandelbaum The Phenomenology of Moral Experience and its 
more recent development by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. 
Morality, they hold, is a subject that deals with human agency 
in the everyday experience. As such, the analysis of such first-
person experience cannot but be a preferred starting point. 
Because of this attitude to the study of morality, we disclose 
moral complexity.  
The second chapter, then, tries to define what moral 
complexity is. It will be claimed that it is primarily the 
acknowledgement of the multileveled structure of morality. I 
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will try to explain the normative consequences of this approach 
by focusing on the position offered by Charles Larmore in his 
Patterns of Moral Complexity and expanded it in The Autonomy 
of Morality. Larmore’s position is taken as a fruitful starting 
point to manage a pluralistic account of morality. At this stage 
though, another Aristotelian insight will help us to understand 
how to deal, more specifically, with the moral justification of an 
act within a system so understood. Moral judgement, taken as 
the faculty of moral interpretation, will suffice to the role of 
facing complexity with less hardship. 
The third chapter introduces the concept of supererogation 
by explaining why I adopt this category of acts to explore moral 
complexity. As I have briefly underlined above, supererogation 
is considered a complex concept; one that requires a complex 
system to be justified. In the light of this remark, I will define 
the concept by following the widespread connotation given by 
David Heyd in Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory. I will 
then try to show how the necessity of a complex system to make 
sense of supererogatory acts finds its roots in the Christian 
theological tradition that originally gave birth to the concept. 
The distinction between precepts and counsels as developed by 
Christian theologians represents the reason why a ‘secular’ 
account of supererogation requires a multileveled system of 
morality that clearly distinguishes between the Right and the 
Good. 
Chapter IV intends to show how if we fail to acknowledge the 
complexity of morality, the account of supererogation will 
become problematic. I will try to show how this argument can 
be generally raised against monist theories, as they fail to 
distinguish the many levels of the moral discourse. Similarly, 
this problem arises when we have a theory that conceives the 
maximization of the good as obligatory. Broadly, both 
Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics express this same attitude 
(even if in different forms). It is not surprising then, how both 
these theories usually tend to endorse forms of anti-
supererogationism. The lack of complexity typical of monist 
systems results in the denial of the theoretical space of 
supererogation. This point, far from being a specific criticism to 
Introduction 
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any system, aims at showing a common deficiency of monism 
in regards to supererogatory acts. 
Finally, the fifth chapter tries to answers the deficiencies 
underlined in the previous one by proposing a pluralistic 
account of supererogation. If we conceive a moral system as one 
that allows for a moral agent to have different sources of the 
good, these different sources will serve as the different levels of 
moral achievement that make possible to go ‘beyond the call of 
duty’. In particular, one source will represent the level of 
obligation, while another will show the way to exceed the 
obligatory. This is what I will call the Multiple Sources 
Dynamics. This explanation will further tell us something about 
the specific phenomenology that supererogatory acts entail. 
Generally speaking, this research work aims at dealing with 
some of the major issues in contemporary moral philosophy. 
The metaethical aspects of the main thesis deal with the 
structure of a moral system and the importance of a 
phenomenological attitude to the subject. From this outset, 
further questions typical of normative ethics arise: “how does 
moral deliberation work?”, “how is moral justification 
possible?”, “what is moral pluralism?”, “how do we give an 
account of supererogatory acts?”. To all these questions I have 
tried to answer only through complexity, with the belief that a 
life lived well would be richer if we endorse a moral system that 
allows to deny theoretical oversimplifications and to exceed the 
constrains of the category of moral obligation. As such, the 
overall goal of this work will be that of mapping and recognizing 
all the different instances of moral complexity. This 
acknowledgement comes with several beliefs. Only through 
complexity, we can make sense of what lies beyond the call of 
duty. Only through complexity, we can give an account of how 
morality works from the first-person perspective. Only through 
complexity, we can better promote the pursuing of a flourishing 
life. 
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CHAPTER I:  
PRELIMINARY CLAIMS: A MATTER OF APPROACH 
 
1. Why a Phenomenological Approach to Morality? 
Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, has given the very first 
specification of practical philosophy. He defines it as follows:  
“It is right also that philosophy should be called knowledge of the 
truth. For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of 
practical knowledge is action (for even if they consider how 
things are, practical men do not study the eternal, but what is 
relative and in the present).”1 
It appears clear that, from the very beginning the study of 
practical acts (ta e1rga2) was conceived as the study of things 
collocated in and relative to a time and space (pro&j ti kai& nu~n3). 
That is, the moral experience of the agent is the sphere within 
which moral acts take place, and thus, actions need to be 
studied accordingly. It is only through an analysis of moral 
experience that we can study those acts that are distinctively 
practical. Immanence (the collocation within a space and time) 
does not only play a major role in ethics, but also a founding 
one. 
More recently, the study of moral experience has been called 
Moral Phenomenology and this is why the phenomenological 
approach will guide us through the present work. It should 
gradually become clear why Moral Phenomenology is the 
methodology that better fits our analysis. Nevertheless, I want 
make it clearer by answering another question first: what 
exactly is Moral Phenomenology? It has been pointed out that 
                                                          
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics, a 2, 993 b 19-23. (trans. by Ross W. D.) in The Basic 
Works of Aristotle, McKeon R. (ed. by), Random House, 1941, p.712.  
2 Aristotle, ibidem, a 2, 993 b 21. 
3 Aristotle, ibidem, a 2, 993 b 22. 
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“phenomenology” is an ambiguous term4. Following this 
interpretation, with Moral Phenomenology we can refer either 
to the moral philosophy of the phenomenological tradition lead 
by Edmund Husserl or to a first-person study of the moral life 
experienced by a moral agent.  
The former understanding of the term “moral 
phenomenology” refers to the extension of Husserl’s First 
Philosophy (which aims at the comprehension of our pre-
conceptual understanding of the world) to the realm of moral 
values. Within the phenomenological tradition the author 
whose work takes on this challenge is Max Scheler. He claimed 
that the cognition of moral values primarily begins with 
emotions and affects as far as they shape our experience of the 
world5. The very first lines of his essay Ordo Amoris state as 
follows: 
“I find myself in an immeasurably vast world of sensible and 
spiritual objects which set my heart and passions in constant 
motion. I know that the objects that I can recognize through 
perception and through, as well as all that I will, choose, do, 
perform, and accomplish, depend on the play of this movement 
of my heart. […] Whether I am investigating the innermost 
essence of an individual, an historical era, a family, a people, a 
nation, or any other socio-historical group, I will know and 
understand it most profoundly when I have discerned the system 
of its concrete value-assessments and value-preference, 
whatever organization this system has. I call this system the 
ethos of any such subjects.”6 
For Scheler the understanding of the ethos needs to be done 
through the proper appreciation of the inner emotional states 
in order to find the classification according to which the system 
of values has been outlined. The answer that Scheler gives to 
this issue is that everything is ordered by the degree of love and 
                                                          
4 Kriegel U., Moral Phenomenology: Foundational issues in “Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences” 7(2008), no.1, p.1.  
5 Kriegel U., ibidem, p.3.  
6 Scheler M., Ordo Amoris, in Scheler M., Selected Philosophical Essays, 
trans. by David Lachterman, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p.98-99. 
Chapter 1 
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hate that reality presents7. Understanding the order of love will 
ultimately mean understanding the human being in itself. This 
is because, once we understand the model through which we 
characterize our understanding of the world, we also 
understand how the human being works, how it structures the 
reality within which it is possible to think, act, choose, will and 
so on. The investigation of the model leads, therefore, to the 
understanding of the origin of such a model8. Phenomenology, 
so conceived, represents the favored methodology to 
understand the human being. 
A second author that derives from the phenomenological 
tradition with a more ethics-oriented approach is Emanuel 
Levinas. Levinas refocused the aim of the phenomenological 
project toward a discipline that sees in the relationship with 
other subjects the core of the matter and the answer to the 
questions set by First Philosophy. In his Totality and Infinity he 
defines ethics as the primary way to reach the metaphysical 
truth9. This is because the other, and the relationship of the 
subject with it, is the place where such metaphysical truth is 
disclosed. The phenomenological experience of what is other 
than the subject reveals the transcendence of the subject itself. 
This is why this particular approach is relevant to the 
understanding of the metaphysical truth. Levinas is not 
interested in ethics as system of value or as a value theory. 
Instead, he is concerned with ethics as the essential way to 
answer the metaphysical questions through the methodology 
outlined by phenomenological tradition before him.  
The phenomenological approach to morality can be 
understood in various ways.  A different approach from those 
                                                          
7 Scheler M., ibidem, p.99. 
8 “Whoever has the ordo amoris of a man has the man himself. He has for 
the man as a moral subject what the crystallization formula is for a crystal. 
He sees through him as fa as one possibly can. He sees before him the 
constantly simple and basic lines of his heart. ” in Scheler M., ibidem, p.100. 
9 “Already of itself ethics is an "optics." It is not limited to preparing for the 
theoretical exercise of thought, which would monopolize transcendence. The 
traditional opposition between theory and practice will disappear before the 
metaphysical transcendence by which a relation with the absolutely other, or 
truth, is established, and of which ethics is the royal road.” in Levinas E., 
Totality and Infinity, Duquesne University Press, 1969, p.29.  
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that we have seen above is one that deals directly with the moral 
life of the agent in order to investigate how morality works. 
Roughly, this can be conceived as the first-person analysis of 
the moral experience of the subject. In other terms, this 
approach tries to analyze ‘what it is like to do x’. An author that 
clearly expresses this approach (whose work has been mainly 
overlooked) is Maurice Mandelbaum, who published in 1955 a 
book entitled The Phenomenology of Moral Experience. 
Mandelbaum offers a phenomenological approach that begins 
from the experience that an agent undergoes when she is 
confronted with a morally relevant situation10. Phenomenology, 
thus understood, is not a direct outcome of the 
phenomenological tradition influenced by Husserl11. Rather, as 
clearly expressed in the following quote, Mandelbaum’s 
phenomenological approach starts from a first person 
perspective: 
“Its essential methodological conviction [of the phenomenological 
approach]  is that a solution to any of the problems of ethics must 
be educed from, and verified by, a careful and direct examination 
of individual moral judgments. In other words, the 
phenomenological approach holds that the proper basis for any 
moral generalization, and for the confirmation which we 
rightfully demand for such a generalization, are to be found in 
an examination of the moral judgments which men make.”12 
                                                          
10 Mandelbaum’s work is influenced in some degree by the previous work of 
gestalt psychologist and philosopher Wolfgang Köhler (see Köhler W., The 
Place of Value in a World of Facts, Liveright, 1976). Mandelbaum’s book is 
dedicated to Köhler. 
11 He himself makes it clear in footnote 18 of the first chapter: “In using the 
term ‘phenomenological’ I do not refer to the specific methods of the 
phenomenological school. I use ‘phenomenology to connote any examination 
of experience or of experienced objects which aims at describing their nature 
rather than seeking to give an ‘explanation’ of them. […] What is included is 
every descriptive investigation of ‘the phenomenal world’, that is, of whatever 
is directly experienced by me or by others.” in Mandelbaum M., The 
Phenomenology of Moral Experience, The Free Press, 1955, n18, p.313.  
12 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.31. 
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I think that from this quote we can gather that the two central 
presuppositions of Mandelbaum’s project are: 1. an adequate 
moral theory must be originated from a proper analysis of moral 
experience13 2. the moral experience of the agent fully 
corresponds to all the various moral judgments she forms14. 
The first presupposition might be a misleading one. What he 
is saying is not that the phenomenological approach has an 
ultimate and exclusive role in the ethical inquiry. To claim this, 
would be a major misunderstanding of Mandelbaum’s work. 
What he is claiming instead is that such an approach should 
serve as a starting point for an adequate moral investigation. 
Once we have endorsed it and applied it to the study subject, 
then ethics would be in a position to confront or to be 
influenced by what he calls non-ethical inquiries15, that is, other 
philosophical kinds of inquiry or other sciences (such as 
anthropology, psychology and sociology).  
In order to understand the second presupposition it is 
important to consider which aspects of a judgment are relevant 
in Mandelbaum’s phenomenological approach and how he 
discriminates among different kinds of judgment. The reason 
why Mandelbaum focuses on moral judgments is not to be seen 
on the content of these judgments16. He is not specifically 
concerned with what different agents deliberate (or at least not 
primarily), but rather with how they form their judgments. 
Agents can eventually diverge a lot on the specific content of 
their judgments according to what they take to be morally 
valuable. At the same time a pure attitudinal approach, one that 
abstracts completely from the content, would end up being 
arbitrary and unconvincing17. What he is trying to propose is 
an approach that draws from both of these two approaches 
(contentual and attitudinal) some relevant points and opens up 
for a third new way: a structural approach. The object of the 
study then, is the peculiar relationship between the content of 
the judgment, the attitude of the agent and the situation with 
                                                          
13 See also Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.35. 
14 See also Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.40. 
15 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.31-32. 
16 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.35ff. 
17 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.40. 
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which the agent who makes the judgment is confronted18. This 
will allow us to determine the common features of our moral 
judgments and thus to study them accordingly. Put in these 
terms, ethics can only be considered as a discipline that begins 
from an adequate analysis of the first-person moral experience 
and that tries to interpret the relations that animate such 
experience. 
I now want to sketch out the essential framework of 
Mandelbaum’s project. The three central chapters of his work 
are dedicated to a phenomenological analysis of how the agent 
judges from the moral point of view in different ways. Briefly, 
he draws a major distinction between direct moral judgments 
and removed moral judgments. The former are judgments 
where the agent is directly involved in the situation, she is the 
one making the judgment and who lives the moral experience 
from “within”. The latter are judgments where who is evaluating 
is not living in first-person the judgmental process. This means 
that we are evaluating from “without” the relationships between 
the relevant elements (content, attitude, and situation). 
Judgments of this kind include judgments made by others, our 
own judgments made in the past and tentative judgments about 
future possible courses of action. Moreover, not all removed 
moral judgments belong to the class of judgments that are 
concerned with moral rightness and wrongness. We can talk of 
removed moral judgment also when we are dealing with 
judgments of moral worth. This other subclass of removed moral 
judgment is concerned with the evaluation of the value of a 
person as a whole or of a specific character trait. Both 
judgments belong to the group of removed moral judgments 
(because they are not made directly by the agent involved), but 
with different specifications19. 
                                                          
18 “Therefore, instead of abstracting either content or attitude from the total 
situation, we shall first inquire into the manner in which a situation appears 
to one who makes a moral judgment; we shall then attempt to interpret the 
other two elements in terms of their relationship to this situation.” Ibidem, 
p.40.  
19 “A judgment of moral rightness or wrongness concerns the application of 
moral criteria to a specific action; a judgment of moral worth predicates a 
particular type of value (moral value) of a person, or of a trait of character 
exhibited by him. While both types of judgments are ‘removed’, that is, neither 
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The interesting conclusion that Mandelbaum draws from his 
analysis is that all these judgments share a feature that 
combines them into one single genus20. This is the relation that 
is established between the agent and the situation that she is 
living. In making a moral judgment, the agent perceives the 
fittingness (or unfittingness) of a certain course of action with 
the situation that she is facing. This relation can be explained 
as a harmony between some possible courses of action and the 
end that the agent is pursuing. If a certain act ‘leads to’ or is 
‘consonant with’ a certain goal, that act fits the situation21. In 
the case of a direct moral judgment, for example, it will then 
constitute a moral obligation to act accordingly. This reveals 
what Mandelbaum calls reflexive demand. Once we apprehend 
the fittingness (or unfittingness) of a certain act, that act 
demands to be performed (or omitted). Besides, this demand is 
perceived as coming from outside of us and this is what makes 
it constitutively moral. In fact, other kinds of demand are 
generally perceived as coming from inside of us: for example 
when you are hungry, you feel a demand to pursue a course of 
action that would feed you as delightfully as possible. This 
feature is what distinguishes moral choices from non-moral 
ones: the former are urged by an objective demand, the latter 
by a subjective demand22. In addition, the claim that moral 
judgments generate a demand that is felt to come from outside 
of us, grounds the perception of that degree of objectivity that 
typically characterizes morality. 
I will spend some more pages on a deeper analysis of 
Mandelbaum’s articulation of moral experience later in this 
chapter. For now, my main concern with this view has been a 
meta-philosophical one. That is, one aimed at understanding 
the reasons why such an approach might hold advantages over 
others in dealing with ethical issues. 
Two of the authors that are trying to give new life to 
Mandelbaum’s work are Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. In 
                                                          
is made by the agent in the situation, there are differences between them.” in 
Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.95. 
20 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.181. 
21 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.64. 
22 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.54-55. 
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the recent years, they have produced several articles that deal 
directly with Mandelbaum’s work and try to underline the 
importance of his thought. This attention appears to be 
especially relevant today, when we are seeing a progressing 
opening of the philosophical research to other branches of the 
sciences that study the human being from a different 
perspective. Mandelbaum himself was an opponent of that 
philosophical trend that tried to exclude from the philosophical 
inquiry the influence of other sciences like psychology, 
sociology and anthropology23. His phenomenological approach 
could regain interest in light of the recent development that 
philosophy is undertaking in this period. As such, this might 
be a first answer to the question that the title of this section 
poses: a phenomenological approach to morality can be 
justified by the possibility to cooperate and research together 
with other subjects.  
Moreover, the phenomenological approach, as Horgan and 
Timmons underline24, gives rise to many fundamental 
questions regarding moral theorizing. I will now present the two 
questions that I consider more pressing for the present work. 
Respectively, the question about motivation and that about 
potential payoff: 
“Are there any reasons to believe that a phenomenological 
approach to philosophical questions in moral theory is superior 
to, or at any rate usefully supplemental to, other approaches? 
(motivation); 
What results might one reach about philosophical issues in moral 
theory (including both normative and metaethics) on the basis of 
a phenomenological description of moral experience? (potential 
payoff)”25 
                                                          
23 Horgan T., Timmons M., Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and 
Realism, in Verstegen I. (ed. by), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical 
Realism, Routledge, 2010, p.106. 
24 Horgan T., Timmons M., Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory, in 
“Philosophical Issues”, 15(2005), pp.56-77. 
25 Horgan T., Timmons M., ibidem, p.57. 
Chapter 1 
 Preliminary Claims on Moral Complexity 
17 
 
Both these questions are further specification of the question 
that opened this section: why a phenomenological approach to 
morality? The answers to all these questions require a much 
more specific project than this. Nevertheless, as we will realize 
more clearly in the second part of the present work, a 
phenomenological analysis of some ethical issues is able to 
bring about some progress in moral research26. At this stage, I 
would like to give a general (but limited) answer that could 
justify the espousal of this approach. Moral philosophy is 
constitutively a normative subject (even if not exclusively so), 
i.e. one that deals with the fulfillment (or unfulfillment) of 
actions in reference to a given idea of the good. Moral experience 
represents the setting where this process takes place. A study 
that takes care of understanding the relations between how 
actions are brought about and the context in which they are 
brought about seems to be (if not fundamental) of great 
importance. Moral experience, thus, does not only represent the 
setting of the moral life, but also the place where to find the 
ultimate proof of the effectiveness of our theories. These two 
features ground the motivation to pursue a phenomenological 
analysis. Moral experience is, at the same time, the setting of 
our moral life and the sphere where to inspect the legitimacy of 
the moral progress we argue for. A moral philosophy that does 
not take into consideration these two aspects, which are 
implicit in its normativity, is disoriented and meaningless. This 
is the reason why a phenomenological approach (influenced in 
a certain degree by Mandelbaum’s work) is going to characterize 
the present work. 
 
2. Moral Experience Expanded 
Now that I have briefly sketched some features of 
phenomenological approaches (and Mandelbaum’s in 
particular), I want to challenge one of its presuppositions as  
underlined above. In particular, the second presupposition of 
                                                          
26 Another hint of possible answers that supports such methodology can be 
found (other than in Mandelbaum’s work itself) in Horgan T., Timmons M., 
ibidem, p.72ff. 
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Mandelbaum’s work states that our moral experience can be 
fully described by judgmental acts. He writes as follows: 
“What characterizes this approach is the fact that it treats moral 
experience as a complete judgmental act. Not only are the 
attitudes which are present and the content which is affirmed to 
be considered, but it is crucial for such an approach to examine 
each of these in relation to the situation in which the judgment is 
made.”27 
I believe that Mandelbaum is certainly right in identifying the 
prominent role of moral judgment in our moral experience. Our 
everyday moral life is characterized by numerous and manifold 
judgmental acts. The reason why Mandelbaum claims that they 
fully express our moral experience is that judgments better 
express the normativity peculiar to ethics28. In other words, 
ethics is a normative study that deals with normative data. This 
means that each single datum studied shares the fact that it 
implies some reference to an ‘ought’ or a ‘norm’. Mandelbaum 
claims that this peculiar kind of data is to be found “within the 
realm of human judgments” and thus he focuses on the 
normative judgments that agents make. Thus, this leads him to 
claim that moral experience fully corresponds to a judgmental 
act. 
At the same time, it seems to me too approximate to claim 
that moral experience fully corresponds to a judgmental act. A 
blunt “No!” seems to be the most plausible answer to the 
question “Is moral experience equivalent to a series of 
deliberations that lead to certain courses of action according to 
conscious or unconscious states of mind?”. By deliberation, I 
mean the process of bringing about x by the evaluation of the 
reasons for x (i.e. a judgmental act as Mandelbaum puts it). In 
addition, this can happen, consciously or unconsciously. The 
former means that the agent is actively deliberating, he is aware 
of the process that it is going on. The latter means that the 
agent is passively deliberating, he is not aware of the process 
that it is going on. This happens, for example, when a certain 
                                                          
27 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.40. 
28 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.41f. 
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judgment has become a habit and so the agent does x without 
actually considering the reasons for x. Nevertheless, if asked, 
he would be able to respond why he is doing x (he would be able 
to give an account of the relevant reasons for x). Mandelbaum 
seems to be aware of something very similar to this when he 
highlights the distinction between willed and spontaneous 
actions29. Willed actions are all those actions for which the 
agent feels responsible. Or better, where the agent acts 
according to an envisioned goal she wish to accomplish. In this 
way, the sense of responsibility upon the act arises since the 
agent feels these are her actions. The fact that she is acting in 
virtue of an end will make possible for her to give reasons for 
why she acted such and such. This is what distinguishes these 
actions from spontaneous actions, which instead are performed 
for no reasons other than the fact that we did it. Besides, 
spontaneous actions are all those actions where the agent is not 
feeling to be acting in first-person. These can be of two kinds: 
reflex or habitual action. A reflex is when the action “happens” 
to agents instead of being consciously brought about by her. 
For example, when I receive an electrical shock on my hand, my 
hand jerks away without my willingness to do so. My action has 
no envisioned goal and I do not feel responsible for it. 
Mandelbaum claims that the same is true of habitual actions. 
These actions include all those situations where the agent does 
x without consciously governing the action. For example, when 
wake up I follow a particular sequence in dressing for which I 
have no particular awareness of every single step. Again, there 
is no clear sense of responsibility involved in this case, since 
the agent is not aware of the envisioned goal and neither of the 
reasons of her acting. It is important to note at this stage that 
Mandelbaum points out that direct moral judgments (contrary 
to removed moral judgements) deal exclusively with willed 
actions30. The reason why he holds this is that it is fundamental 
for a phenomenological analysis that the agent perceives the 
actions as hers. For Mandelbaum only willed actions express 
the feeling of responsibility that makes the phenomenological 
analysis possible. It is then clear why a reflex cannot count as 
                                                          
29 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, pp.46-50. 
30 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.47. 
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a moral action from this point of view. They are not originated 
by a moral choice. Recall that for Mandelbaum what 
differentiates moral choices from non-moral ones is that moral 
choices place a demand upon us to act. Accordingly, however, 
it seems less clear why all habitual actions cannot be 
considered so.  One thing is to consider habitual actions that 
constituted our everyday routine (i.e. brushing my teeth or 
preparing breakfast). Another is to claim that all habitual acts, 
lack the sense of responsibility or the moral demand that willed 
actions have. Think for example of someone who makes every 
month a small donation to the same organization for 25 years. 
The very first time she experiences both demand and a feeling 
of responsibility. But then, as time goes by, this action becomes 
her habit in the same way as brushing her teeth is. 
Responsibility and demand may hide in the agent’s 
unconsciousness, but this does not mean that one cannot recall 
or think back to the reasons why she is making the donation. 
It is hard to hold that actions such as this one cannot be 
considered as a moral habitual action. As such, the agent who 
performs it should be able to give a phenomenological account 
of it through a direct moral judgment. It is even less clear why 
some other particular spontaneous acts are left outside the 
class of actions that can be object of a phenomenological study 
(be it direct or removed). Mandelbaum states that actions such 
as catch hold of the hand of a child in danger are included in 
the group of spontaneous actions. As such, they lack the 
awareness of the subject that allows for a phenomenological 
analysis. The agent reacts directly to the situation she is 
confronted with and she is not aware of the self that originates 
the act. Rather than actions, we are in presence of ‘reactions’ 
or ‘responses’ and so they lack the sense of responsibility and 
moral demand that makes the phenomenological analysis 
possible. If so, such a moral phenomenology would cut out a 
relevant and common part of our moral experiences. From the 
moral point of view, we happen to praise many instances of 
helping behavior, even if they result from habitual behavior31. 
                                                          
31 I will talk about this issue later in the present work in dealing with acts 
of supererogation, which, while originated by a certain degree of spontaneity, 
deserve a proper moral phenomenology. See pp.173-180. 
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My contention is that we can go even further with the line of 
argumentation that says that moral experience is not only 
concerned with conscious states of mind. Moral experience is 
actually broader than situations that involve a deliberation 
process (again, judgmental acts) be it conscious or unconscious. 
It seems to me that moral experience comprehends cases where 
normative judgements, and in general a process that involves 
the bringing about of some act, play no role. The point is that 
we can live a moral experience even when we are not engaging 
any moral deliberation and consequently no act is performed. 
In order to explain this assertion I will propose three situations 
in which the formation of a judgment is not necessary to 
constitute a proper moral experience. 
The first case is meant to highlight a case of no-judgmental 
moral experience within Mandelbaum’s framework. Recall that 
for him, the moral experience of the first-person begins with the 
demand (peculiar of moral choices) that the situation casts on 
the agent. We can hold that the perception of such a demand is 
already in itself a sort of moral experience, even if no judgment 
takes then place (say because I am morally lazy or because I 
pretend to be morally indifferent). In the situation I am 
experiencing there is no active deliberation, but only a sort of 
passive perception of the fact that in front of me lies some moral 
possibility or moral worth. This does not require excluding the 
fact that most of the time I react to this with a judgmental act. 
The relevant claim is that moral experience begins before the 
actual deliberation process. Thus, we can consider proper 
moral experiences even all those cases where I try not to listen 
to the perceived moral demand. For example, every time I look 
at the books on my desk I feel a strong demand that asks me to 
work on my long-delayed paper and remembers me of the 
upcoming deadlines. Nevertheless, I try not to think about it 
and ignore the workload that would compel me to act. In this 
case, I do not respond to the demand of the situation with a 
judgmental act, rather I just try to ignore such a demand. 
Better, I refuse to bring about the proper moral judgment by 
deliberately incurring in a moral loss. I hold that this is already 
in itself an actual moral experience even if it lacks the relevant 
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elements of Mandelbaum’s account of moral phenomenology 
(the response to a moral demand). 
A second interesting case is the role of empathy in moral 
circumstances. With this term many authors have referred to 
different things. Nevertheless, a definition that seems to be 
quite widespread nowadays conceives it as the ability to feel the 
same way as others are feeling. This idea was quite relevant 
(even if with slight differences) for the work of the eighteenth 
century British sentimentalists, who referred to the popular 
notion of sympathy32. In particular, authors like Adam Smith 
(but also David Hume) used to assign to sympathy a primary 
role in their moral accounts. The very first lines of his major 
work on morality, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, define 
sympathy as follows:  
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune 
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though 
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this 
kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the 
misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive 
it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the 
sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any 
instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original 
passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the 
virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the 
most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most 
hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without 
it.”33 
Moreover and more specifically: 
                                                          
32 These pages are obviously not meant to be comprehensive and a much 
more detailed work would be required. On the issue of sympathy and 
empathy it is also worth pointing out the work of Max Scheler in Scheler M., 
The Nature of Sympathy, Heath P. (trans. by), Archon Books, 1970. 
33 Smith A., The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by Raphael D. D. and Macfie 
A. L., Clarendon Press, 1976, p. 9.  
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“Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our 
fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its 
meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, 
without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-
feeling with any passion whatever.”34 
As Smith underlines, the empathic relation represents a 
fundamental and substantial kind of moral relation. More 
recently, many other authors have underlined its relevance 
regarding to moral motivation and, more specifically, in caring-
for-others situations35. Nevertheless, in order to understand my 
point is not necessary to grant such a major role in morality to 
empathy. Once we admit cases where empathy can play a 
certain role within our moral experience, we realize how this 
broadens our conception of moral experience36. In fact, it seems 
to me that empathy represents a particular way of relating with 
the others, which does not necessarily involve a judgmental act. 
The way we perceive how the other feels is not, most of the 
times, a direct result of a deliberation, but rather an immediate 
thing. Yet, it would be hard to hold that (as Mandelbaum 
entails) this puts empathy off the radar of moral experience. 
When I understand how a friend feels after she has been 
affected by an injustice is not a matter of judgment, rather I 
just experience it immediately in virtue of our long-established 
relationship. This is already a proper moral experience before I 
form any judgment on why the deeds that afflicted her are 
wrong or consider how I could provide effectively some help. The 
point here is that moral experience begins before (and not 
functionally to) the formation of moral judgment. 
Moreover (and this leads us to the third case), empathy and in 
general all kinds of moral relation reveal another interesting 
                                                          
34 Smith A., ibidem, p.10. 
35 In both these regards, see the work of the psychologist Daniel Batson, who 
has introduced the so-called empathy-altruism hypothesis. See Batson C. D., 
Altruism in Humans, Oxford University Press, 2011. For further remarks on 
this topic in relation to acts of supererogation, see pp.179-180 of the present 
work. 
36 I am aware of the fact that this claim would require a much larger project. 
Take these lines as a hint strictly functional to our discussion of moral 
experience. 
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way to expand moral experience beyond what it is merely an 
expression of a judgmental act. In the case above, we have 
highlighted how when I empathize with my friend I am living a 
proper moral experience. I would add here that, since my friend 
is living a proper moral experience, the agent is not the only one 
who is doing so. I hold that a proper first-person moral 
experience is such not only when I am the subject who performs 
of a certain moral action (the agent). Additionally, we might 
have relevant cases of moral experience when the subject of the 
experience is the one who benefits from the moral action. If 
someone does something good (or bad) to me, I am undergoing 
a relevant moral experience even if a judgmental process does 
not necessarily originate this experience. This happens when I 
perceive to be the beneficiary of something of value (or 
disvalue). I do not think it is possible to explain this sort of 
moral experience within the theoretical framework proposed by 
Mandelbaum as he conceived moral experience as being fully 
judgmental. One might claim that it is possible to account this 
sort of experience of the beneficent with the category of removed 
moral judgments of moral worth. However, this is not a case 
where the beneficent judges from the outside of the situation 
(i.e. removed from it). It is true that she considers valuable what 
the other does for her, but she is not doing this by living from 
the outside the situation. She is directly experiencing the value 
of what it is going on between her and her benefactor. In other 
terms, being the beneficent of a moral act seems to represent a 
proper moral experience, even if the subject of the experience is 
not the one who performs the action and who makes the 
judgment about what to do. Mandelbaum seems to have missed 
to account for this possible experience.   
Moreover, this case holds if the agent benefits the subject of 
her acts both in virtue of a direct moral judgment and in virtue 
of the empathic character of their relationship (in an immediate 
way, so to say). If the latter of the two is the case, in order to 
have a proper moral experience there is no need of a judgmental 
act neither from the agent nor from whom she is benefiting. 
This is so because, the performer of the act does so immediately 
and the beneficent perceives this as immediately as the agent 
does. I believe that we cannot fail to recognize that this is an 
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actual moral experience. Think, for example, of the case of a 
terminal patient who is in a state where she is able to perceive 
the outer world, but she is not able to communicate. She is 
constantly the object of the cure of the doctors (who do this 
because they judge on moral grounds that it is good to carry 
out their job), but she also benefits from the care of her beloved 
ones (who do this likely because they are in empathic 
relationship with the patient). I believe that the doctors, the 
relatives and the patient herself are all living a proper moral 
experience37, even if for different reasons. The doctors because 
of a direct moral judgment, the relatives because of 
empathically caring and the patient because she is broadly 
benefitting of a moral good brought about by the others. 
Finally, we have seen how the phenomenological approach of 
the first-person proposed by Mandelbaum could be broadened 
in order to give a more exhaustive account of our moral 
experience38. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a major 
downfall or something that would undermine the effectiveness 
of such approach. Understanding the limits of the 
phenomenological approach would allow us to apply it 
adequately and use it consistently. Moreover, this is not to deny 
the relevance of the analysis of those aspects of our moral 
experience that constitute it predominately. The focus of the 
research should remain on all those deliberations to act in a 
certain way according to the idea of right and wrong (moral 
judgments). We need to acknowledge, at this stage, that the 
phenomenological approach needs to focus on judgmental acts, 
since they constitute the large (but not the only) part of our 
moral experience. For this reason, moral phenomenology 
remains the approach to be preferred and the one that looks 
more promising as a starting point for moral theorizing. 
 
 
                                                          
37 And probably, at least in the case of the relatives of the patient, an 
experience that is much more than a merely moral one. 
38 Another interesting and similar attempt to broaden Mandelbaum’s 
conception of moral experience can be seen in Horgan T., Timmons M., Moral 
Phenomenology and Moral Theory, in “Philosophical Issues”, 15(2005), 
pp.61ff. 
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3. Moral Phenomenology Discloses the Complexity of Moral Life 
I now want to introduce the issue of the features of our moral 
life that a phenomenological approach reveals. Let us consider 
the following example:  
Example 1: Mary has a good friend, who lives nearby, named 
John. She promised to John that she would help him to move out 
from his current apartment and to help him bring all his 
belongings to the new place. When the day of the move arrives 
she is about to go to John’s place when she receives a call from 
her long-time friend Juliet. They have not seen each other for a 
while and so Juliet asks Mary to go out for a coffee. If Mary goes 
out with Juliet, she will not have time to help John that afternoon. 
Therefore, even if she is very sorry and she would greatly enjoy 
Juliet’s company (more than helping John) she declines Juliet’s 
invitation. After all, she has made a promise to John and keeping 
that promise is the right thing to do, she believes. 
Later that day, Mary is at John’s new place, which happens to 
be much smaller than his former apartment. John’s struggles to 
make everything fit in the new place and so he decides to donate 
much of the stuff that are not necessary anymore. John has a 
friend, Mark, who has a much bigger house, which would be 
plenty of space for John’s furniture. John has previously 
promised to Mark that he would receive all that exceeds from the 
move. Mary, however, suggests that a more fair choice would be 
that of giving everything to the local prosocial organization in 
order to have all the goods redistributed to all those that have 
less. Giving to those that have less in order to maximize the 
benefits of the donation is the right thing to do, she believes.  
Situations like these are common in our everyday lives. We 
happen to make moral judgments in different contexts, 
according to different backgrounds, with different aims. As 
such, we recognize a plurality of variables in regard of how we 
deliberate morally. If we look at our moral experience through 
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a phenomenological approach, we realize how complex39 our 
moral life is. Understanding the phenomenology of our common 
moral judgments reveals the manifold essence of morality. 
Moral experience ultimately discloses that the moral life of the 
agent, if considered as a whole and not specifically to a single 
circumstance, appears to be complex. I believe that such 
complexity is the result of two different features of our moral 
life: axiological pluralism and methodological pluralism.  
The first way of recognizing pluralism is by the analysis of 
the content of our moral judgments. If we compare different 
moral judgments, we notice how we deliberate according to a 
variable set of what happens to be morally valuable or morally 
at stake in the given circumstances. This is what I mean by 
axiological pluralism, the fact that our judgments are based 
upon values40 that vary their relevance from time to time. In 
other terms, our judgments vary for their specific content. In 
the example above, Mary decided to keep her promise 
grounding her judgment according to the respect for the 
promisee41. Respect (or the autonomy of other moral agents) 
happened to be the value that, given the circumstances, 
appeared especially important to Mary. In that particular 
scenario, that value trumped all the others assigning a 
prominent importance to promise keeping. Differently, when 
she suggested how to donate fairly, her focused changed. She 
was mainly concerned with the moral value of equality (or a 
certain understanding of utility one might say). In this second 
situation, a different value gained priority over the others. This 
example shows how, in real life situations, different moral 
values (irreducible one into the other) can vary their moral 
relevance for the agent. My contention here is simple: the moral 
                                                          
39 I use “complex” as a non-technical term for now, meaning “composite”, 
“heterogeneous” and “manifold”. Starting with Chapter II I will give to this 
term a more specific and technical connotation. 
40 This term might be highly misunderstandable. What I mean here is simply 
that different fundamental ideals of morality might happen to be relevant in 
the related case. 
41 A Kantian line of argumentation could be even more specific than this, 
claiming that a promise needs to be kept because of the respect for the 
autonomy of all other rational agents. Arguably, we might deduce from this 
that Kant’s ultimate moral end is freedom. 
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phenomenology of the first person highlights a plurality of 
moral values that happen to have variable moral priority. Moral 
experience is characterized by a pluralism of values that 
suggests that we are not necessarily required to pick one of 
them as having a constant priority over the others. As we will 
see in the following section, the standard definition of moral 
pluralism suggests a framework of multiple ultimate moral 
ends that express a pro tanto priority over the others.  
A second way to understand the heterogeneity of morality42 
is to notice that we do not make all our moral judgments 
following a unique and coherent methodology. There are 
different ways in which we deliberate morally (at least two) and 
their priority varies from time to time. This is what I call 
methodological pluralism, the fact that our judgments do not 
always follow the same path to provide a moral deliberation. 
Again, in the example above Mary decided to keep her promise 
in virtue of a moral claim derived from a deontological 
approach. At the same time, once she was confronted with the 
issue of the fair donation she morally deliberated according to 
a consequentialist approach. The idea is that, according to the 
situation, one methodology for moral deliberation might trump 
another that is considered less efficient in dealing with the 
situation the agent is facing. The consequentialist approach 
might appear to be more apt to what is morally at stake in cases 
such as the fair donation of one’s belongings. Vice versa, there 
happen to be cases, such as keeping a promise, where 
grounding our deliberation on a deontological framework 
appears to fit better the circumstances43. Moreover, this is not 
to say that in a particular situation the methodology that the 
agent endorses is the only one available to reach the same 
conclusion. There are ways to ground a promise on 
consequentialist approaches and ways to respect equality 
                                                          
42 Here I do not refer necessarily to the work of Charles Larmore and to his 
usage of the motto “heterogeneity of morality”. I will analyze his position 
later in the following chapter. 
43 In certain cases, the choice of the relevant methodology might go even 
beyond the limits of rationalist theories (such us the two reported in the 
example) to conform to a sentimentalist approach. I leave this issue aside 
for now, since it is not functional to my point to complicate further the issue. 
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according to a deontological theory. Nevertheless, the choice 
among the feasible options is left to the agent, who will pick the 
most reasonable and efficient way to account for the relevant 
moral value. A claim similar to the present one has been made 
by Joshua Greene in one his influential papers44. He has tried 
to show, through experimental inquiry, that moral deliberation 
by the same agent is a combination of rational and emotional 
engagement. The moral judgement can be either impersonal or 
personal, according to which of the two elements is more 
influential. The two entail two distinct mental events. The 
experiments conducted by Greene and his collaborators 
confronted the emotional responses that different subjects 
revealed in the analysis of moral dilemmas of different kinds 
with what they revealed in cases of non-moral choices. What 
this study has shown is primarily the fact that our moral 
judgment is a combination of different factors (rational and 
emotive). This means that our moral judgment is ultimately 
complex. Moreover, his analysis has underlined how judgments, 
considered distinctively moral, can be of two kinds (at least) and 
how this is true even at cerebral level. This conclusion 
resembles what I have defined here methodological pluralism. 
However, my classification aims at giving an account of a 
philosophical distinction (deontology and consequentialism in 
Example 1) rather than a distinction of psychological and 
cerebral activities. 
My claim is that moral pluralism is developed (at least) on 
two levels: a value-related level and methodological level. 
Amartya Sen makes a similar point, when he focused on the 
idea of justice in cases of just allocation of resources45. He 
proposes a scenario where there are plural and competing 
reasons for justice, all of which are impartial in different ways. 
Suppose you have to choose which one of three children has to 
                                                          
44 Greene J. et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral 
Judgment, in “Science” 293(2001), pp.2105-2108. The main claim of this 
and the following works by Greene is that emotions play a major role in 
moral deliberation. As we will see in the following chapter this is a further 
proof that our moral judgment is much more complex than pure rationalist 
think it to be. 
45 Sen A., The Idea of Justice, Belknap Press, 2009, pp.12-15. 
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receive a flute about which they are quarreling. The first child 
is the only one that can actually play the flute. The second child 
is clearly the poorest and the one that has no toys to play with 
(the other two being clearly richer children). The third child is 
the one who has made the flute after many month of work. Who 
should receive the flute if you were to make the just decision? 
This scenario points out that there is no clear answer to this 
question. Of course, different theories of justice would 
straightforwardly point out which one of the children ought to 
receive the flute46, but the question about which of the three 
ways of deliberation we ought to follow remains an open 
question. Accordingly, we might end up making an arbitrary 
choice. This happens for two reasons: 
“I also want to draw attention here to the fairly obvious fact that 
the differences between the three children’s justiﬁcatory 
arguments do not represent divergences about what constitutes 
individual advantage (getting the ﬂute is taken to be 
advantageous by each of the children and is accommodated by 
each of the respective arguments), but about the principles that 
should govern the allocation of resources in general. They are 
about how social arrangements should be made and what social 
institutions should be chosen, and through that, about what 
social realizations would come about. It is not simply that the 
vested interests of the three children differ (though of course they 
do), but that the three arguments each point to a different type of 
impartial and non-arbitrary reason.”47 
The problem here is not just which of the moral values at stake 
gains priority over the others (be it hedonistic utility, economic 
equality or autonomy). Further, we are facing the problem of 
which of the theoretical framework (granted that all three 
provide impartial results in their own way) needs to be 
espoused to make the just choice. The phenomenology of cases 
                                                          
46 As Sen underlines, the economic egalitarian would assign the flute to the 
poorest, the libertarian would assign it to the maker of the flute and the 
utilitarian hedonist would tend to give it to the one who can actually play 
the flute. 
47 Sen A., ibidem, pp.14-15. 
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like this reveals the double layer of moral pluralism: axiological 
pluralism and methodological pluralism. 
Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether this pluralism 
revealed by a phenomenological approach is only apparent or 
substantial. Mandelbaum attempted to show that it is just 
apparent, arguing in favor of deontological monism instead. In 
fact, he straightforwardly dismissed consequentialism as a 
moral approach hardly feasible when we are directly confronted 
with a situation that requires a moral deliberation. In cases of 
direct moral judgment we do not regularly take into 
consideration consequences (even if this might be the case of 
removed moral judgments)48. Briefly, he is not convinced that 
all cases of moral obligation rely on the calculus of 
consequences, but rather they are grounded on a certain feeling 
of incompleteness that the agent would perceive in cases of 
performance (or omission) of a certain act. Mandelbaum’s claim 
is particularly clear if we keep in mind that he is concerned with 
a phenomenological analysis of the moral experience. This is 
what leads him to focus on the perception of the relation of 
fittingness of the performance (or omission) of the act, rather 
than the considerations proposed by teleological approaches.   
The point of major interest for the present work is 
Mandelbaum’s confrontation of his theory with Ross’s 
pluralism. His interest in dealing with a theory such as Rossian 
deontological pluralism revealed that Mandelbaum himself was 
aware of the possible pluralist outcome that a 
phenomenological analysis could bring about. Nevertheless he 
thought (contra pluralism) that some sort of normative unity 
among different judgments can be found and thus that Rossian 
pluralism needs to be rejected. On the contrary, Ross proposes 
a theory with a precise set of obligations that have a tendency 
to be binding on us (prima facie). However, there is no ordering 
principle or rule of thumb to discriminate which one is more 
binding than the others. The determination of which of these 
duties is the actual duty is left to the agent in the contingent 
case; the stringency of the duties varies pro tanto. Mandelbaum 
agrees with the idea of the variable stringency and he compares 
                                                          
48 Horgan T., Timmons M., ibidem, pp.72-73. 
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it to fittingness, saying that this kind of relation is what 
determines the stringency of a particular obligation: 
 “I should like to propose, in conformity with my previous 
analysis, that the ground of the stringency of a claim is the 
fittingness of answering to that claim, rather than to any opposed 
claim, in the situation which the agent confronts”49.  
What Mandealbaum found instead to be problematic is the idea 
of prima facie obligations intended as the tendency to be 
binding. For Mandelbaum (being a monist) there exist one and 
only one obligation that binds us into its performance (or 
omission), namely the one that fits the situation. All other 
options lose any kind of bindingness, once they have been 
overridden by the actual duty. There is no thing such as the 
“tendency to be binding” of the various duties, thus it makes no 
sense to talk about prima facie duties: the only duty there is, it 
is the actual one, that is, the one that fits the situation50. It has 
been pointed out that the main difference between Ross and 
Mandelbaum on this regard is that the former thinks that other 
prima facie duties are outweighed by the actual duty, while the 
latter thinks that the alternatives are silenced51 (they lose all 
their bindingness). 
The key of Mandelbaum’s argument against the existence of 
a variety of duties (such as in Ross) is the distinction between 
regret and remorse. He claims that a proper phenomenological 
analysis would reveal that once we are confronted with different 
options, those options that have been abandoned in virtue of 
the actual duty generate a form of regret. Mandelbaum 
distinguishes regret from remorse as follows: regret is what we 
                                                          
49 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.76. 
50 “In my opinion, a strictly phenomenological description reveals that what 
we take to be the more stringent of two irreconcilable moral demands is that 
demand which we still feel to be levelled against us after our initial, 
segmented view of our situation has been replaced by a new view of what 
constitutes its essential nature. Thus, what we judge to be really obligatory is 
not the ‘stronger’ of two demands, but that action which is a fitting response 
to what we take to be the dominant element in the total situation which we 
face. ” in Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.80. 
51 Horgan T., Timmons M., ibidem, p.73. 
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feel when we contemplate something of disvalue that our act 
has brought about; remorse, on the other hand, is the feeling 
we have for something that should not have been done52. Ross 
claims that, even when a prima facie obligation is overridden in 
favor of another, it keeps its tendency to be binding. 
Nevertheless, if this were true, a sentiment more apt to the 
dismissal of a prima facie duty would be remorse rather than 
regret. If omitted duties keep a certain degree of bindingness, 
their omission would generate remorse rather than regret. The 
phenomenological analysis proposed by Mandelbaum reveals 
that this is not the case. The fact that we perceive only regret 
should reveal that the actual duty is indeed only one, that the 
bindingness of the overridden options is just apparent (be it a 
misinterpretation of regret as remorse) and it therefore points 
out that there is no need to talk about prima facie duties.  
Mandelbaum’s reconstruction of the moral experience of an 
obligation might be considered sound in cases of relatively 
simple moral choices. We can recognize how his understanding 
of an obligation (being it the result of a phenomenological 
analysis) is closely related to the idea of moral motivation. A 
duty is ultimately the one that happens to have more 
motivational power, the one that ultimately provides reasons 
which motivate us to perform (or omit) a certain act. Although 
this might seem correct for an approach to moral inquiry that 
is concerned with what the agent feels, one might wonder if this 
is still the case for much more complex moral choices. Let us 
think, for example, of true moral dilemmas53. In cases where 
the agent genuinely does not know which of the opposing 
options needs to be preferred, there seems to be no clear 
prevailing relation of fittingness (given that the reason why it is 
so is not due to some sort of epistemic lack by the agent). In 
fact, both the options seems to fit the situation adequately and 
thus they both propose a viable course of action. In such cases, 
it is harder to hold that only one of the two is the actual duty 
                                                          
52 Mandelbaum M., ibidem, p.80. 
53 I refer here to cases such as the one famously proposed by Sartre. This is 
a dilemma where a youngster does not genuinely know what the right thing 
to do is: whether to join the army to commemorate his brother who has been 
killed by the Nazis or to stay at home in order to assist his ill mother. 
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and that the other options lose all their bindingness. It is not 
surprising then that the agent who finally decides somehow 
(even randomly) what to do feels a certain moral loss for not 
having done the option of the dilemma that has not been 
performed. This feeling, I believe, is much more similar to moral 
remorse than mere regret and this should reveal that, after all, 
ignored options do not completely lose their bindingness (at 
least in the case of dilemmatic choices). If this argument is 
right, Mandelbaum’s critique of the Rossian approach does not 
hold anymore. 
Furthermore, we could argue that duties are not grounded 
merely on fittingness. Some moral obligations are true of an 
agent, even if she does not adequately experience their 
fittingness to the situation. Think, for example, of the negligent 
schoolchild who does not want to do his homework. Does he 
recognize the fittingness that studying has with the situation 
(in this case caring about his future)? We might argue that he 
does perceive the fittingness, but this is not enough to make 
him willing to give up playing basketball with his friends for the 
whole afternoon instead of studying. Think then of the 
relentless tax evader, who has a moral obligation (and not only 
that) to pay taxes even if he is not able to understand how this 
could fit his situation (paying for the luxurious car he has 
bought). Cases like these give us a hint of the fact that 
fittingness is sometimes not enough to lead agents to a certain 
action.  Something similar is expressed by cases where an agent 
ignores her obligations. Ignorance greatly affects our 
obligations and consequently our moral judgments54. 
Sometimes we have obligations we do not know to have and this 
does not allow the agent to perceive the fittingness proper of the 
situation. Even if not felt, the obligation remains. It should not 
be surprising that our moral experience is affected by the 
agent’s knowledge of the situation. It is, however, more 
problematic to claim that the agent could fail to ground certain 
obligations as in the case of the ignorant agent who does not 
perceive the fittingness of the situation due to a lack of 
knowledge. Similarly to the case of the negligent moral agent, 
                                                          
54 See Zimmerman M. J., Ignorance and Moral Obligation, Oxford University 
Press, 2014. 
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this should reveal how the relation of fittingness is necessary, 
but not sufficient to bring about a moral obligation. 
All these cases reveal that obligations are not grounded 
exclusively on the relation of fittingness. This kind of relation is 
essential to a proper moral experience of direct moral 
judgments when it comes to motivate the agent to act (or refrain 
from acting). Nevertheless, claiming that the actual duty is 
exclusively identified by the perception of what fits the situation 
is not fully accurate. Some more complex situations might 
express a scenario that does not go along with the theory 
outlined by Mandelbaum. This reduction of the role of 
fittingness in the formation of a moral obligation aims at 
restoring the idea of prima facie duties proposed by Ross and 
favors the sort of moral pluralism that seems to characterize 
the heterogeneous experience of the moral agent. 
Mandelbaum argues in favor of monism because he thought 
that (as in the case of direct moral judgments) all judgmental 
acts express a normative unity in virtue of their all being based 
on the relation of fittingness. This however does not entirely 
explain why different judgments should all be part of the same 
group. They might have the same phenomenological structure 
(the feeling of fittingness), but this is not enough to explain why 
we perceive that fittingness (the content that grounds it) and 
how we get to the feeling of fittingness (the normative 
methodology that triggers our moral deliberation). As matter of 
fact both the content of different judgments (which grounds the 
fittingness relation) and the methodology of moral decision 
(which generate the fittingness) could vastly differ from one 
judgment to the other. Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons 
summarize fittingness as follows: “an action is fitting to a 
situation when aspects of that situation provide reasons that 
make the action appropriate, and it is most fitting when the 
combination of reasons there are uniquely favor the action in 
question”55. My claim is that we do not have to underestimate 
the fact that, as we have seen in the example above, reasons 
could be grounded on different values (axiological pluralism) 
and can be provided by different methodologies (methodological 
                                                          
55 Horgan T., Timmons M., ibidem, p.67.  
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pluralism). Even if all judgment originate a certain feeling of 
fittingness perceived by the agent, it seems reducing to claim 
that they do so consistently with moral monism. To the 
question “Assuming that experiences of fittingness are what 
unifies our moral experiences, how interesting is this sort of 
unity?”56 we could answer that fittingness does certainly 
express a sort of unity among different moral experience. This 
unity is nevertheless limited to the phenomenological level. 
Once we try to go deeper into the explanation of our moral 
decisions, we see that we lose that unity in virtue of the 
diversity of the contents that grounds our experiences and the 
variety of methods of deliberation that set the perception of 
fittingness. This is why I believe that a phenomenological 
analysis is consonant with the claim that the complexity of the 
moral life is expressed on two levels: a) as the pluralism 
regarding the content of our judgments (values) and b) as the 
pluralism about the method according to which we formulate 
our judgments. The very essence of morality appears to be 
manifold and heterogeneous and this is why we will refer to it 
as moral complexity57. This is ultimately, what the 
phenomenological approach discloses: moral experience is 
characterized by some sort of moral pluralism58. 
The approach of moral complexity underlines that we need to 
take into account the fact that our moral lives are much more 
manifold and various than we would like them to be. Moral 
phenomenology, as far as it is concerned with the first-person 
moral experience, discloses such complexity of our ordinary 
                                                          
56 Horgan T., Timmons M., ibidem. 
57 I am going the leave these claims unwarranted for now. The entire Chapter 
II will be dedicated to a better understanding of this issue. 
58 “It would seem that when it comes to the mere phenomenology of moral 
experience in concrete cases (involving deontic judgments), such experiences 
do not comport with monism—rather, moral experiences of being obligated, for 
instance, seem to be evoked by a variety of factors that vary from one 
circumstance to another. The factors involved in feeling an obligation of 
gratitude, for example, differ from the factors involved in coming upon 
someone who is in need of help. Indeed, a virtue of versions of ethical 
pluralism (featuring a plurality of prima facie duties which collectively attempt 
to specify a small set of underlying features in virtue of which actions have 
the deontic status they do have) is that they are faithful to much concrete 
moral experience.” in Horgan T., Timmons M., ibidem, p.66. 
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moral life. The awareness of this feature should point out why 
there is no need to oversimplify our moral theories in search for 
an ultimate and unified end. If our moral experience does not 
appear simple, there seem to be no good reason to think that 
our theories need to be such. This is especially true for the 
inquiry in moral philosophy, where the focus needs to be on the 
agent who deliberates how to act morally, rather than on the 
theory to which the agent should conform herself. It seems to 
me that this line of thought regarding the peculiarity of moral 
philosophy is well described by Arthur Schopenhauer in his 
Early Manuscripts: 
“A theoretical philosopher is one who from the representations 
of all classes can furnish a copy in concepts and hence for his 
faculty of reason (Vernunft), just as the painter copies on canvas 
what he has seen, the sculptor in marble, and the poet in pictures 
for the imagination (which, however, he gives only in the seed of 
the concepts from which they have first sprung). A so-called 
practical philosopher, on the other hand, is one who does the 
opposite and controls his actions according to concepts; thus just 
as the former transfers life into the concept, does the latter carry 
concepts over into life. […] The theoretical philosopher enriches 
his faculty of reason and gives it something; the practical 
philosopher takes something from his faculty of reason and lets 
it serve him.”59 
Borrowing this distinction from Schopenhauer, we could say 
that the approach of moral complexity reminds us the priority 
of life (the moral life we could add) over concepts. This motto 
highlights the task of those dealing with the understanding of 
moral deliberation. It should not be surprising that this task is 
of great importance for our ordinary lives and, as such, giving 
the proper account of the first-person moral experience is a 
challenge that cannot be easily dismissed. 
 
                                                          
59 Schopenhauer A., Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes: Volume I Early 
Manuscripts (1804-1818), Berg, 1988, p.122. 
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4. Why Is Moral Pluralism So Important? 
Moral Pluralism is the theoretical framework that takes into 
account more than a single and unique source of morality. In 
other terms, pluralism is the moral approach that considers 
more than a single ultimate moral end. Moreover, a pluralist 
holds that these ultimate ends might eventually come into 
conflict generating what we call a moral dilemma60. This view is 
to be distinguished from the approach called Moral Prioritism61, 
which allows many sources of morality without considering the 
possibility of moral dilemmas. In fact, Prioritists hold that 
dilemmas can be explained away by a precise ordering of the 
principles that rule the moral structure62. Finally, in order to 
complete this rough sketch of moral frameworks, we can 
distinguish (at the two opposite ends of the moral gamut) Moral 
Particularism and Moral Monism. Particularists claim that there 
are no moral principles apt to help us in moral deliberations. 
Furthermore, moral principles might mislead the moral agent 
in recognizing the relevant moral reasons that the situation 
exhibits. The recognition of moral reasons is the only source of 
morality and reasons may vary greatly according to the 
situation63. Contrary, Monists hold that morality can be ruled 
by principles64 and this happens thanks to a unique principle, 
                                                          
60 Many relevant authors of the 20th century have leaned toward a pluralist 
account of morality. In different degrees, authors such as W. D. Ross, I. 
Berlin, B. Williams and T. Nagel all belong to this group. In Applied Ethics, 
the bioethical framework outlined by Beauchamp and Childress is another 
good example of moral pluralism. 
61 In the breakdown of the taxonomy of different moral frameworks I am 
referring to Gaut B., Moral Pluralism in “Philosophical Papers”, 22(1993), 
pp.17-40. 
62 John Rawls, for example, proposed a conception of justice based on two 
principles (the first one based on basic liberties and the second one on equal 
opportunities and the fair distribution of the goods), with the first one always 
having a priority over the second (the so-called lexical order). See Rawls J., 
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition, Belknap Press, 1971, §11. 
63 J. P. Sartre, J. McDowell and, more actively, J. Dancy have argued in favor 
of this view.  
64 Pluralists and prioritists share this claim too. Together with monists they 
all belong to the group of moral generalism believing in the possibility to 
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source or an ultimate end that coherently manages the outline 
of morality. Monist theories can vary a lot on what they take to 
be morally relevant as the founding principle and, as such, they 
can express divergent responses to the same issue65. In fact, 
these distinctions are based on the number of principles that a 
moral theory allows and on how such a theory manages its 
principles. This is to say that these differences are exclusively 
drawn upon the theoretical structure of moral theories. Nothing 
has been said about the differences in terms of the content of 
the principles or in terms of the methodology that animates the 
principles. For example, two pluralist theories, while 
structurally identical, might vary on what they take to be part 
of the set of relevant moral principles. Or again, two monist 
theories, while structurally identical, might vary on how the 
single principle should work66. This is how we can summarize 
different moral approaches based on their identification of the 
relevant moral sources67: 
 
Particularism No moral principles at all 
Pluralism 
A set of moral principles that can come into 
conflict generating moral dilemmas 
Prioritism 
A set of moral principles that never come into 
conflict due to a precise ordering system 
Monism A single and unique moral principle 
Table 1.1 
                                                          
generalize from the particular situation a set of moral principles (or a single 
one). Clearly, generalists stand jointly in opposition to particularists.       
65 The influential and dominant moral theories developed in the 18th century 
can all be ascribable to moral monism. Kantian Ethics and Utilitarianism, 
as part of this group, have probably generated the broadest and most 
articulated debate in Normative Ethics of the last centuries.  
66 Think of the well-known distinction between deontology (adherences to 
one’s duties) and teleology or consequentialism (consideration of the act’s 
consequences). In this regard, another interesting methodological 
distinction is that between agent-relative theory and agent-neutral theory 
introduced by D. Parfit and T. Nagel. See p.71-72 of the present work. 
67 It would be inappropriate to distinguish them by their acknowledgement 
of moral principles. While most of these theories endorse at least one 
principle of morality, this term might be misleading in the case of 
particularism, which, while having no precise principles or duties, does 
certainly have sources of morality (reasons). 
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I will now focus on a confrontation of moral pluralism with 
the alternative moral frameworks. In fact, the previous section 
has revealed how pluralism seems to be the moral framework 
that better faces the outcome of a phenomenological analysis of 
our moral experience. Pluralism, as defined by John Rawls, is 
consonant with a moral life that presents a variety of moral 
principles that occasionally generate moral conflicts: 
 
“Once we reach a certain level of generality, the intuitionist 
maintains that there exist no higher-order constructive criteria for 
determining the proper emphasis for the competing principles of 
justice. While the complexity of the moral facts requires a number 
of distinct principles, there is no single standard that accounts 
for them or assigns them their weights. Intuitionist theories, then, 
have two features: first, they consist of a plurality of first 
principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in 
particular types of cases; and second, they include no explicit 
method, no priority rules, for weighing these principles against 
one another: we are simply to strike a balance by intuition, by 
what seems to us most nearly right.”68 
 
Remember that Rawls refers here to pluralism with the name of 
intuitionism, using the term with a broader understanding than 
usual69. The reason why he does this is an issue related to the 
Priority Problem. Rawls, in fact, defends a prioritist view and 
considers pluralist theories as dealing with the choice between 
the many principles only by mere intuition. He holds that they 
do not have other way that this to pick one of the conflicting 
principles rather than another. Thus, he has tried to undermine 
the plausibility of moral pluralism by claiming that a way of 
giving principles a priority is necessary and actually exists. It is 
necessary because people would otherwise fall outside the 
perspective of justice as fairness defending principles on 
particular interests. At the same time, a method to prioritize 
principles, given the existence of a variety of them, exists. Rawls 
believes that we can order them according to the notion of the 
so-called lexical order. This notion entails that the agent always 
                                                          
68 Rawls J., ibidem, p.34.  
69 Rawls J. ibidem.  
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fulfills the first principle before considering the next one. 
Subordinate principles cannot be brought about if the superior 
principles are either satisfied or do not apply70. However, it 
could be pointed out that a strict serial order of the principles 
of this kind, even if it would go along well with the majority of 
cases, it could eventually bring about counterintuitive results. 
If this were the case, a prioritist view of this kind would lose the 
original advantages it holds over pluralism. Berys Gaut, who 
claims that prioritism might allow suspicious and unreasonable 
outcomes, has made a similar point. Think, for example, of a 
case where, in order to comply with the respect of someone’s 
liberty (as the right to participate in a specific governmental 
decision), a society gives up a major economic benefit for a large 
number of people71. The fact that principles are so strictly 
prioritized makes it harder to deal with peculiar cases where it 
would be reasonable to allow a different order of principles. 
Nevertheless, this should not degenerate to the claim that a 
lack of priority rule would allow principles to be confronted in 
virtue of particular interests (as Rawls seems to believe). 
Pluralists can easily hold that adequate discrimination between 
principles does not have to reflect particular interests and 
inequalities of power and this needs not to be done by mere 
intuition. They can apply the same principle that prioritist do 
without thinking that it is always the case that this happens. 
What differs from one approach and the other is the belief that 
a certain priority rule is exhaustively true of all moral 
deliberations72. Pluralism thus, still holds some advantages 
when following a priority rule would give rise to particularly 
counterintuitive results. In that situation a pluralism might 
simply that a given priority rule does not apply in the relevant 
circumstances. 
                                                          
70 “This is an order which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the 
ordering before we can move on to the second, the second before we consider 
the third, and so on. A principle does not come into play until those previous 
to it are either fully met or do not apply. A serial ordering avoids, then, having 
to balance principles at all; those earlier in the ordering have an absolute 
weight, so to speak, with respect to later ones, and hold without exception.” 
Rawls J., ibidem, p.43. 
71 Gaut B., ibidem, p.22. 
72 Gaut B., ibidem, p.28. 
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It has been pointed out that pluralism brings about some 
advantages which are consonant with a widespread version of 
common sense morality. Gaut expressly highlights these 
advantages and lists them as follows73: 1) while recognizing the 
existence of a variety of principles, pluralism does not require 
us to pick one of them to have priority over the others. This 
might happen to be a difficult rather arbitrary move; 2) 
pluralism explains the phenomenology of moral dilemmas in 
which we are confronted with two conflicting moral demands. 
Other moral frameworks struggle in explaining away the fact 
that such a phenomenon happens; 3) pluralism gives an 
account of the fact that we, as moral agents, do not perceive 
our role as unitary. We can get morally relevant reasons in 
virtue of our role in society, our role in our family or group of 
relatives or, generally, many different facts about ourselves. 
This heterogeneity of moral life is better explained by moral 
pluralism while being quite consistently in accord with common 
sense morality. This is important because any inquiry in the 
field of morality does not start from a blank page. We are, 
without exceptions, already part of a variety of moral values 
originated from different traditions and inherited convictions. 
The best way to systematize all of them is to allow a plurality of 
sources from which morality springs. 
Since a phenomenological analysis reveals the need of a 
variety of principles to make sense of moral experience, prioritist 
theories represent the most tempting alternatives to moral 
pluralism. As we have seen though, pluralism still holds some 
advantages over them (such as the possibility to drop a 
counterintuitive priority rule). It is now worth turning to a brief 
analysis of the advantages of moral pluralism over the other two 
moral frameworks we have highlighted above: particularism and 
monism. 
Although particularism would be consonant with the 
heterogeneity of moral experience, it will nonetheless leave 
some theoretical gaps, which will make us prefer pluralism 
instead. Particularists, in fact, hold that the morally relevant 
properties are many (like pluralists do). However, they also 
                                                          
73 Gaut B., ibidem, p.35ff. 
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claim that moral principles are not useful tools of morality, 
rather they can misguide our judgments since they are 
generalizations that do not take care of the particular case. As 
such, moral principles are to be though as crutches, which can 
help us walking, but also can they can lead us into error. My 
claim is that, in the case of pluralism, principles are more like 
running shoes rather than crutches. They make us go faster in 
moral matters, even if you do not recognize their benefits or 
simply you do not realize you are using them. Particularism, on 
the other hand, is all about recognizing the moral reasons that 
the particular situation offers, regardless the contribution of 
principles. Nevertheless, pluralism allows the appreciation of 
the situation too, since none of the principles has an exhaustive 
and absolute priority over the others. Provisional priority of a 
principle over the others has to be gained according to the 
particular case. And while this allows pluralism to avoid the 
counterintuitive results of a generalist theory, it still allows for 
moral principles to provide some help in the appreciation of the 
relevant moral reasons. The main disadvantage of 
particularism is that it leaves the agent with no tools other that 
her moral sensibility for reasons. This might end up being too 
vague in complex situations or when the agent is not 
particularly experienced or used to the present situation. The 
mere ability to recognize certain reasons for action might not be 
enough. If this is the case, particularism might be vulnerable of 
the charge of being relativistic. If no principle can aid the 
decision, the moral agent will arbitrarily choose what to do. The 
fact that pluralism does not discharge the importance of 
principles, while holding that they have to be tested in the 
particular situation, supports the suitability and the 
advantages of this theoretical framework. Therefore, the real 
advantage of pluralism over particularism is that, while holding 
that morality is characterized by a variety of factors (including 
contingent ones), it can still accommodate the grounds to 
provide adequate moral reasons. 
On the other hand, choosing pluralism over monism seems 
to have many advantages too. In fact, if we take moral 
experience as it appears, moral pluralism has more overall 
justifying potential than monism. This is true on different 
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regards: a) pluralism is the theoretical approach that better 
responds to the complexity of moral life and the heterogeneity 
of its sources as disclosed by a phenomenological analysis; b) 
it goes along well with what commonsense morality holds about 
the different moral roles and moral sources that the same agent 
has74; c) pluralism (unlike monism) can explain the existence 
and the phenomenology of moral dilemmas75; d) monism 
struggles to make sense of complex moral concepts in a way 
that pluralism does not76. All these elements particularly favor 
pluralism over monism (and generally over all other theoretical 
options). These claims share a lot with the thought of Isiah 
Berlin who states that the belief of realizing an ultimate 
harmony in the field of morality is a fallacy. Although ethics is 
ultimately complex, we cannot but try to soften collision 
between its elements, look for compromises and establish 
contingent and temporary priorities77.  
In conclusion, Moral Pluralism is important because it 
represents the theoretical framework that better faces the 
explanatory needs required by the complexity of our moral lives. 
This is ultimately and most of all the reason to favor pluralism 
as the most attractive moral theory: its ability to give an 
account of the phenomenology of the first person experience as 
a complex system. Rawls rightly acknowledged how proponents 
of Moral Pluralism take their theory as the theoretical answer to 
the complexity of moral life78. This answer is necessary to make 
                                                          
74 This refers, to a certain degree, to the preexistence of rules, values, 
traditions and teachings that already characterize our moral lives before any 
theoretical framework applies; 
75 In fact, the alleged existence of a unique moral source should not entail 
any insolvable moral conflict.  
76 As we will see extensively on the second part of this work, the peculiar 
case of the concept of supererogation represents a good example of this 
evidence. 
77 Berlin I., The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Princeton University Press, 
2013, pp.17-18. 
78 “The intuitionist believes to the contrary that the complexity of the moral 
facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments and necessitates 
a plurality of competing principles. He contends that attempts to go beyond 
these principles either reduce to triviality, as when it is said that social justice 
is to give every man his due, or else lead to falsehood and oversimplification, 
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sense of our moral experiences and to aid the decisional 
processes that challenge all moral agents. A complex (plural) 
moral approach is the answer we are looking for when we reflect 
on what to do from the first-person moral point of view. 
Furthermore, this moral framework is relatively similar to a 
widespread version of common-sense morality. Similarly, 
pluralism entails the idea that from a moral perspective we are 
not a single, coherent and unitary agent. The different roles we 
fulfill and the various sources of morality bring about a moral 
life that is ultimately complex and as such is to be explained. 
This is what I call the need of moral complexity. Our moral lives 
require such a theoretical depth in order to be interpreted: 
 
“[…] our moral values are rooted in our view of what are the 
salient facts about ourselves, in our self-understanding, which is 
socially conditioned. We view ourselves as standing in several 
salient relationships: as friends, lovers, sons or daughters, 
parents, colleagues, fellow-men, and co-inhabitants of the earth 
with many different sorts of beings. Each of these parts of our 
self-conception is expressed by a set of duties we have. We also 
think that it is important that we can feel pain and suffer, but 
also that we can exercise our autonomy in choosing our life-plan 
(in which suffering may be acceptable if it is necessary for great 
achievements) – and also that we have to live together with 
people in communities, constituted by inherited, shared values. 
Each of these facts is salient in our view of ourselves, but only 
the pluralist is in a position to allow that such a complex self-
understanding can find appropriate expression in the realm of 
values as a plurality of principles.”79 
                                                          
as when one settles everything by the principle of utility. ” in Rawls J., ibidem, 
p.39. 
79 Gaut B., ibidem, p.36. 
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CHAPTER II: 
WHAT IS MORAL COMPLEXITY? 
 
1. Moral Complexity: a matter of structure 
Moral Complexity is not, in the first place, a new theoretical 
framework of morality and neither a new moral theory. Rather, 
by Moral Complexity is intended a moral approach originated 
from the analysis of the heterogeneous sources of morality as 
revealed by moral phenomenology. As such, morality is a 
complex subject composed by complex elements. Only through 
the analysis of this complexity, we will get a grasp of what 
stands behind the moral experience of the moral agent. Now, 
from this point of view, Moral Complexity is primarily the study 
of the already-existent moral framework that assists us in 
identifying ultimate moral ends and consequently supports our 
moral deliberations. This task will be considered completed 
only inasmuch as committed to the recognition of how our 
moral reasoning works in ordinary life. This matter, as far as it 
is relevant for practical philosophy, needs to be concerned with 
of how things are from the perspective of the moral agent. The 
theoretical practice that tries to affect our moral experience 
through the oversimplification of how things look will be 
contrary to this approach. Such an approach that ensures the 
complexity of morality is widely shared by pluralists. This is the 
case of David Ross, who writes: 
 
“[…] it is more important that our theory fit the facts than it be 
simple, and the account we have given above [pluralism] 
corresponds (it seems to me) better than either of the simpler 
theories with what we really think […]”1. 
 
Moral philosophy, as far as it is intended as the study of what 
ought to be done, needs to maintain the priority of life over 
concepts. The focus of the present chapter then, is to outline 
                                                          
1 Ross W.D., The Right and The Good, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.19. 
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the structural features that make our moral life so authentically 
complex. It will not be surprising however, if this study will be 
of some help to highlight the content, rather than just the mere 
structure, of what it is of ultimate moral relevance. 
A first step toward the understanding of Moral Complexity is 
to take the difficulties that characterize our moral life (roughly 
hard choices), not as something we need to explain away 
through a moral theory, whose task is to make difficulties fall 
silent. Hard choices are not necessarily unsolvable; they simply 
remember us that morality could be characterized by 
challenging moments.  Such choices might become even more 
challenging when hard choices become moral dilemmas and 
thus unsolvable. The reason why this happens is the ultimately 
complex nature of morality. Here is where morality reveals its 
complex essence and the manifoldness of the moral experience 
- this (as I have underlined in the previous chapter) will lead to 
the acceptance of pluralism.  
On this regard, moral monism holds the opposite belief: 
moral conflict can be avoided if we pledge allegiance to a single 
ultimate moral end. Proponents of monist theories expect to 
explain away all the conflicts appealing to the principle they 
endorse or the value they take to be of supreme importance. In 
this way, the problem of dealing with moral dilemmas would be 
apparently solved. Additionally, the major monistic traditions 
inspired by the work of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill 
highlight a distinctive problem that pluralism faces. They 
maintain that pluralist theories struggle to carry out the proper 
moral justification of a moral act. The fact that the many 
sources of morality can enter into conflict while holding their 
incommensurability, is seen as an obstacle that cannot be 
overcome. If there is no apparent way to discriminate between 
conflicting options, how would the agent ground moral 
justification? Michael Gill underlines this shared belief of 
monists: 
 
“What I think Mill and Kant took to be the insurmountable 
problem for pluralism is that it is not able to account properly for 
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moral justification in cases in which ultimate moral ends come 
into conflict with each other […]. If pluralists hold that both of two 
ultimate ends are on the bottom floor of moral justification, they 
will also have to hold that there is no more fundamental moral 
end that tells us why we ought to act on one of those ends rather 
than the other when they conflict”2. 
 
I think that these claims give us the possibility to summarize 
the dispute between monism and pluralism according to two 
main issues: the existence of moral dilemmas and how moral 
justification needs to be managed. Both these issues acquire a 
certain relevance in the sphere of commonsense morality too. 
Although it is interesting to note that commonsense morality 
favors monism on the issue of moral justification3 and, at the 
same time, it endorses pluralism on the issue of moral 
dilemmas. The following table illustrates the relation between 
structural frameworks and two of the central issues of moral 
philosophy: 
 
 Moral Dilemmas 
Moral 
Justification 
Monism 
Dilemmas do not exist. 
They can be explained 
away by the single 
ultimate source of 
morality. 
We need a reliable tool 
in order to justify a 
certain course of 
action in cases of 
moral conflict. 
Pluralism 
Dilemmas exists. They 
are an expression of 
the multiple sources of 
morality. 
There is no single 
principle that can 
consistently 
discriminate between 
conflicting options. 
Shared by commonsense morality 
Table 2.1 
 
 
                                                          
2 Gill M. B., Humean Moral Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2014, p.130. 
3 Gill agrees with this claim. See Gill M., ibidem, p.131 and p.138. 
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The game between monism and pluralism, I believe, has to 
be played primarily on these two issues. While according to 
commonsense morality it appears as 1-1 draw, a research in 
moral philosophy needs to find a tiebreaker on this matter. As 
long as monism will be able to give a satisfactory account of the 
phenomenology of moral dilemmas, it would affirm its 
superiority4. If pluralism, on the other hand, will be able to 
provide a satisfactory procedure for moral justification, it would 
fully take care of the moral complexity of our moral experience. 
Monism is right in claiming that generally moral justification 
requires the appeal to a single source of morality5. This is the 
reason why this claim is so appealing to commonsense 
morality. It would be wrong, however, to think that moral 
pluralism could not arrange moral justification in the same 
way. After all, the real task of moral pluralism is outlining which 
of the many available moral sources gains priority over the 
others. A priority that is only provisional to the present 
situation, but still this is a priority that counts in favor of a 
single moral source. As such, moral justification can be 
grounded on the single source that is provisionally relevant to 
the agent. This process, while it might happen to be a 
complicated one, represents the real advantage of pluralism 
over monism in the area of moral justification. Pluralism (contra 
monism) claims that we are not required to use always the 
same moral source and this is important for two reasons: a) it 
                                                          
4 I have briefly underlined in the first chapter why this is not the case. 
5 Although this is not always the case. Think of those cases where we do x 
in virtue of two independent non-conflicting reasons. For example, I make a 
donation because I want to reduce injustice and because it makes me feel 
better. I would call this a case of conjunctive justification. Moreover, there 
are some other cases where the performance of x, while justified by a certain 
principle a, it would also be justified by another principle b. For example, I 
could keep a promise out respect for the other agent or because it is better 
to keep promises for the convenience of society. In this case too (that we 
could call disjunctive justification) moral justification does not necessarily 
require a single principle, but either of the two. This distinction would 
certainly require a dedicated and more detailed work. 
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avoids counterintuitive results6; b) it gives the agent the 
possibility to adjust to the situation. These two claims represent 
the first step towards the appreciation of pluralism over 
monism. 
As outlined above, the argument in favor of the singularity of 
the moral source proposed by monist theories is based on the 
issue of moral justification7. This appears clear when we take 
into consideration John Stuart Mill’s preliminary assertions on 
his A System of Logic: 
 
“There is, then, a philosophia prima peculiar to Art, as there is 
one which belongs to Science. There are not only first principles 
of Knowledge, but first principles of Conduct. There must be some 
standard by which to determine the goodness or badness, 
absolute and comparative, of ends, or objects of desire. And 
whatever that standard is, there can be but one; for if there were 
several ultimate principles of conduct, the same conduct might be 
approved by one of those principles and condemned by another; 
and there would be needed some more general principle, as 
umpire between them. Accordingly, writers on Moral Philosophy 
have mostly felt the necessity not only of referring all rules of 
conduct, and all judgments of praise and blame, to principles, 
but of referring them to some one principle; some rule, or 
standard, with which all other rules of conduct were required to 
be consistent, and from which by ultimate consequence they 
could all be deduced.” 8 
                                                          
6 Monist theories have traditionally been charged of bringing about counter-
intuitive results when faced with particular circumstances. Kantian Ethics 
struggles with cases such as the “murderer at door” (see Kant I., On a 
Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy in Kant I., Practical Philosophy, 
Gregor M. (ed. by), Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.605-615), while 
consequentialism generally struggles with cases such as the one of the 
“drowning partner” (see Williams B., Persons, Character and Morality in 
Williams B., Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
7 In order to examine in more depth this issue see Chapter 7 “Formal 
Monism” in Gill M., ibidem, pp. 128-139. 
8Mill J. S., A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1904, pp.657-658. 
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The argument here sketched by Mill is based on the need of a 
single principle to make moral justification feasible. Formally9 
a moral theory has to be grounded on a unique principle, in 
order to make possible the outlining of the right course of 
action. Otherwise, Mill claims, it would be impossible to 
understand which act is the right one. As I have already 
underlined above, however, the fact that a theory allows for 
many principles it is not the same as claiming that all of them 
play a relevant role in the given situation. The point is to 
understand which of the many principles actually is the 
relevant one. But this is a question of priority, rather than 
justification. The worry of monists is that pluralists would bring 
about this task with a certain degree of arbitrariness10. This is 
the main reason why Mill introduced the principle of utility and 
here is where the need of formal monism seeks a substantial 
answer. As moral agents, we all need a standard that helps us 
to discriminate between the many options: 
 
“If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may 
be invoked to decide between them when their demands are 
incompatible. Though the application of the standard may be 
difficult, it is better than none at all; while in other systems, the 
moral laws all claiming independent authority, there is no 
common umpire entitled to interfere between them; their claims 
to precedence one over the another rest on little better than 
sophistry, and, unless determined, as they generally are, by the 
unacknowledged influence of consideration of utility, afford a 
free scope for the action of personal desires and partialities.”11  
 
                                                          
9 Gill distinguishes between formal monism (the claim that morality needs a 
single principle) and substantive monism (the claim that morality needs a 
specific principle). See Gill M., ibidem, p.128. 
10 Later I will further discuss how pluralism can handle this task. See section 
3 of the present chapter. 
11 Mill J. S., Utilitarianism, Hackett Publishing, 2001, p.26. 
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In order to have a single principle, as Mill states here, such a 
principle would necessarily be very general. This is the case of 
the principle of utility or the greatest happiness principle: the 
right thing to do is the one that tends to promote happiness, 
i.e. pleasure and absence of pain. Now, in order to discriminate 
the right course of action once we are confronted with a 
situation of conflicting obligations, the agent would be required 
to calculate the utility of the options. Due to the generality of 
the principle, it seems far from obvious how to accomplish this 
task. How do we measure happiness? How do we compare 
different kind of pleasures? This procedure, it seems to me, 
would require the same amount of moral sensibility (or 
arbitrariness if you want) that pluralism requires. The fact that 
moral justification is much more reliable and less arbitrary 
under a single general principle than under a variety of sources 
or set of principles is simply a false belief. As long as the single 
principle of morality has such a high degree of generality, it 
would require an equal degree of sensibility to be applied to the 
particular case. This is when a monist theory such as 
utilitarianism is subjected to the same criticism of arbitrariness 
it tries to avoid. This fact, I believe, undermines the argument 
which favors that moral justification would require the greatest 
happiness principle. Moreover, it would cast some doubts over 
the idea that morality would formally require only a single 
principle. 
Immanuel Kant, although he proposed a substantially 
different monism, certainly agreed with Mill’s formal monism. 
Indeed, while he is not explicit on why a moral theory has to be 
formally monist, he repeatedly claims that morality is 
substantially monist in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals: 
 
“The present groundwork, however, is nothing more than the 
identification and corroboration of the supreme principle of 
morality, which by itself constitutes a business that is complete 
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in its purpose and to be separated from every other moral 
investigation”12 
 
Again: 
 
“When I think of a hypothetical imperative as such I do not know 
in advance what it will contain, until I am given the condition. 
But when I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what 
it contains. For since besides the law the imperative contains 
only the necessity of the maxim to conform with this law, 
whereas the law contains no condition to which it was limited, 
nothing is left but the universality of a law as such, with which 
the maxim of the action ought to conform, and it is this conformity 
alone that the imperative actually represents as necessary. 
There is therefore only a single categorical imperative, and it is 
this: act according to that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it become a universal law.”13 
 
The argument implicitly says that, since the only thing that the 
categorical imperative requires is to universalize the maxim of 
the action, there cannot but be a single objective principle. In 
order to be moral then, a subjective principle (the maxim of the 
action) should conform to the only objective principle (the 
Categorical Imperative). It has been argued, however, how such 
a feature of Kantian Ethics might leave open to the possibility 
of a pluralistic interpretation of the theory14. Thomas Hill 
claims that, in order to recognize such Kantian pluralism, we 
need to recognize first some common features that all 
                                                          
12 Kant I., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, p.7. 
13 Kant I., ibidem, pp.33-34. 
14 This interpretation does not apply to those ethical theories that are 
traditionally classified as pluralism with a strong Kantian influence. The 
work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick fall within these categories, although 
it might be underlined how it would be more accurate to further specify the 
degree of pluralism they hold (Rawls, for example, can be considered a 
prioritist rather than a pluralist).  
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pluralisms share: a) the presence of many principles15; b) the 
incommensurability of values16; c) the right independent of the 
good17; d) the undogmatic and permissive character18. Does 
Kant’s theory possess any of these features? Briefly, Hill thinks 
that: a) Kant’s ethics does not admit dilemmas, holding that the 
categorical imperative is the higher order principle that would 
help solving them; b) Kant thinks rational moral agents to have 
an independent dignity (they are all ends in themselves), as 
such his theory seems fundamentally committed to the 
incommensurability of values; c) Kant puts the right prior to the 
good, principles of right are derived by rational reflection rather 
than any reflection upon goodness; d) While on a personal level 
Kant seemed to be a dogmatic person, his theory reveals the 
opposite attitude: since it starts from the abstraction from the 
particular by the rational agent, the theory leaves aside the 
matter of what particular values are to be preferable. According 
to Hill, point b) and d) especially represent the features that give 
to Kant’s theory a possible pluralist character. The fact that all 
agents have an intrinsic dignity (b) gives rise to the fact that 
they are incommensurable19. The incommensurability of 
values, as we have seen, is a typically pluralist feature. 
Moreover, Kant’s formality of the moral law prevents him (at 
least on a theoretical level) from any moralistic constraint of the 
content of maxims (d). The categorical imperative, after all, 
requires only the universality of the maxim. According to this 
understanding then, Kant’s theory would be in a certain way 
permissive, undogmatic and nonjudgmental. As Hill puts it: 
 
“[…] because Kantian ethics starts from the idea of rational 
agents abstracting as far as possible from particular cultural 
commitments and preferences, arguments from it should tend to 
                                                          
15 Hill T. E., Kantian Pluralism, in “Ethics” 102(1992), no.4, p.743. 
16 Hill T. E., ibidem, p.747. 
17 Hill T. E., ibidem, p.748. 
18 Hill T. E., ibidem, p.749. 
19 Hill T. E., ibidem, p.756. 
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support a relatively open society with liberties protected and 
diversity permitted. Cultural diversity would not be glorified as 
valuable for its own sake, but it would not be suppressed for the 
purpose of promoting the general happiness.”20 
 
Although these features represent an interesting pluralistic 
insight and go along well with the well-known liberal tendency 
of moral pluralism, it is not enough to fully consider Kant’s 
theory pluralistic. A conception of pluralism that entails only 
one of the four features that Hill has underlined is too weak and 
non-comprehensive. These four features cannot simply be 
considered four different “understandings” of moral pluralism. 
They need to be taken together to form the set of features that 
a theory has necessarily to entail if it has to be considered 
pluralistic. As such, Kantian Ethics falls short in many basic 
elements of pluralism and thus it cannot properly be conceived 
a pluralistic theory. Consequently Kant’s theory shares with 
other monistic theories all the shortcomings I have underlined 
above in regard of the recognition of the phenomenology of 
moral dilemmas, the acknowledgement of the multiplicity of the 
sources of morality and the explanation of the nature of moral 
complexities. 
Such reflections on the nature of the different moral 
frameworks represent the main purpose of what I call the 
approach of Moral Complexity. While favoring a pluralistic 
account of morality, Moral Complexity wants to unveil and 
focus on the structure of moral thought. It is helpful here to 
resort to some images in order to understand this point. 
Generally, moral monism thinks of morality as being composed 
by a pyramidal structure21. All moral decision are made 
according to a moral framework that attributes moral value 
entirely to a single ultimate source of morality. Pluralism, 
instead, entails a much more complex picture. The many 
sources of morality require us to think of it as a network of 
                                                          
20 Hill T. E., ibidem, p.760. 
21 In a certain degree, the same can be said of prioritism too. 
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interrelated points. Principles, norms, values, special 
obligations, etc., they all play a role in our moral lives when it 
comes to moral decisions. Their roles cannot be reduced to a 
single source of morality, otherwise we would not make sense 
of the complexity that characterizes the experience of the moral 
agent. All the elements that constitute the structure of morality 
are ideally placed on the junctions that compose the moral 
network. Each element stands in a variable relationship with 
the other elements, creating an evolving web that constitutes a 
complex system. This would also mean that every element 
would be affected in some degree by the mutating of another. 
For example, if I decide to foster beneficence as the primary 
moral value in the present situation this will result in a 
completely new set of moral recommendations. This is 
ultimately the understanding of morality that I call Moral 
Complexity: the idea that morality is composed by a variety of 
sources that come into different relation according to the 
present situation. As such, according to the relational status of 
the relevant elements hard choices (or even moral dilemmas) 
might easily arise in the field of morality. The contingent 
situation, then, is what redefines the balance of the whole 
structure. However, this is not the only factor that plays such 
a role. Social context, tradition, education, exemplary figures 
they all affect the balance and the relation of the elements of 
our moral system. Provided a system of this kind, a moral 
choice is given by the ability to understand the different 
priorities that the elements gain in the contingent case. 
Accordingly, the agent understands what has the proper moral 
relevance and then applies it to the right course of action.  It 
would be wrong, however, to think of this process as the varying 
precedence of a single element over the others. This would recall 
a pro tanto pyramidal structure that takes place each time, 
where one of the elements plays the provisional role of the 
overriding one. Unfortunately, this is not always the case; 
moral experience is often more complex than this. Sometimes 
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more sources claim for their relevance22 and a balance is hard 
to find. Most of the times, indeed, a moral choice springs from 
what appears to be the right compromise between all the 
sources involved. 
As anticipated above, the evidence of such a structure of 
morality can be appraised in a particular case of moral choice: 
the moral dilemma. Bernard Williams holds a famous position 
on this regard, which it seems to me extremely relevant for the 
present work. The existence of moral dilemmas is explicated by 
the phenomenological analysis of the moral experience of the 
agent who faces a choice between conflicting obligations. The 
fact that she experiences regret (as a form of moral residue) for 
the moral loss generated by option of the dilemma she has not 
performed, is a confirmation of the existence of true moral 
dilemmas23. Given this claim, the role of an ethical theory is not 
necessarily that of trying to smooth conflicts and uncertainties. 
Moral conflicts are not necessarily pathological24. To claim this, 
is the first step towards the acceptance of Moral Complexity. 
Along with Williams’ position, I would additionally claim that 
moral dilemmas not only are real and undeniable, but also they 
reveal the ultimately complex structure of morality. Without the 
multiplicity of the sources of morality such a phenomenology of 
dilemmas would not be explicable. A pyramidal structure of 
morality would require us to generalize up to the point where 
the dilemma simply fades away. The argument from 
phenomenology shows how this is not always the case. The 
dilemmatic influence (in the form of regret) remains even if the 
choice between the alternatives has been made and this should 
be taken as a hint of the actual structure of morality. I believe 
that if we understand morality as a network of many 
                                                          
22 This feature will become extremely helpful in the second part of the 
present work when it comes to explain complex moral concept such as the 
concept of supererogation. 
23 See Williams B., Ethical Consistency, in Williams B., Problems of the Self, 
Cambridge University Press, 1973. 
24 Williams B., Conflict of Values, in Williams B., Moral Luck, Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, p.80-81. 
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interrelated sources of reasons for action, the phenomenology 
of moral dilemmas becomes understandable and coherent with 
the background theory. Dilemmas arise when the agent 
considers more than a moral source and does not know how to 
balance them adequately (given that such a balance truly 
exists). Ultimately, then, moral dilemmas reveal that morality 
is structurally much more complex than most of our moral 
theories would want us to concede. Moral Complexity aims at 
understanding and taking care of such a distinctive structural 
feature of morality. 
 
2. Towards an Understanding of Complexity: Charles Larmore 
The origins of what can be considered the approach of Moral 
Complexity are hard to trace. Certainly, the debate of English-
speaking philosophical tradition of the twentieth century is 
characterized by a multitude of authors that have tried to 
address this issue. Among them, the name of David Ross, Isiah 
Berlin, Stuart Hampshire, Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel 
and Charles Larmore stand out. What all these authors have in 
common is the inclination to underline that the moral 
experience of the agent is ultimately complex and, as such, it 
cannot be oversimplified in favor of whatsoever moral 
framework. The approach of Moral Complexity, then, is the 
belief that we, as moral agents, are not required to conform to 
the moral theories that have greatly characterized (and partly 
still do so) moral philosophy in the last three centuries25. As we 
have seen in the first chapter, some phenomenological features 
of what it is like to be a moral agent lead to the espousal of a 
pluralistic (complex) system of morality. The endorsement of a 
pluralistic structure of morality is, in a certain degree, another 
feature that combines the thought of these authors. This is 
what I have called the need of a theoretical framework that 
acknowledges moral complexity, which can only be satisfied by 
                                                          
25 I implicitly refer to the rise of the great monistic traditions from the 
eighteenth century to the present days. 
Part I:  
Moral Complexity as the Required Background Of Morality 
60 
 
the appeal to a degree of theoretical depth that pluralism can 
extensively grant. Different moral sources can eventually clash 
with each other, but this, rather than being a problem to solve, 
is the very essence of our moral lives. We need to keep this 
essential complexity intact if we want to give a truthful account 
of morality. Isiah Berlin’s words remind us forcefully this 
important prerequisite of any moral inquiry: 
“These collisions of values are of the essence of what they are 
and what we are. If we are told that these contradictions will be 
solved in some perfect world in which all good things can be 
harmonized in principle, then we must answer, to those who say 
this, that the meanings they attach to the names which for us 
denote the conflicting values are not ours. We must say that the 
world in which what we see as incompatible values not in conflict 
is a world altogether beyond our ken; that principles which are 
harmonized in this other world are not the principles with which, 
in our daily lives, we are acquainted; if they are transformed, it 
is into conceptions not known to us on earth. But it is on earth 
that we live, and it is here that we must believe and act. […] I 
can only say that those who rest on such comfortable beds of 
dogma are victims of forms of self-induced myopia, blinkers that 
may make for contentment, but not for understanding of what it 
is to be human.”26 
If a study of morality wants to give an account of how human 
beings ultimately are, it needs to keep complexity intact, 
otherwise it will happen that humans will try to conform to a 
morality that it is simply cast upon them. Moral Complexity 
wants to avoid this distortion and to do so the espousal of a 
pluralist system seems the best option overall. 
The focal point upon which Moral Complexity is grounded is 
the heterogeneity of the sources of morality. As such, morality 
is complex because it is composed by sources of different kinds, 
which play different roles and are effective on different levels. 
                                                          
26 Berlin I., The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Princeton University Press, 
2013, p.14. 
Chapter II 
 What Is Moral Complexity? 
 
61 
 
As I have said earlier, morality is a network, rather than an 
ordered pyramid, of sources. This means that the fact that the 
sources are different in kind explains why they can eventually 
enter into conflict. Thomas Nagel in his Mortal Questions has 
argued in favor of this thesis27. He claims that we have five 
fundamental kinds of value and, as such, value appears 
fragmented28. By value Nagel means source of morality, that is, 
values are sources of moral reasons to act. These sources 
cannot be placed into an absolute order in which a certain value 
x is always more stringent than value y; to claim this would be 
absurd. Nagel’s point is that moral reasons are constitutively 
different in kind and this highlights the fundamental difference 
of their sources. Additionally, this explains the nature of 
unsolvable moral conflicts: as long as a moral agent feels the 
pull of different kinds of reasons, moral conflict is inevitable. 
The fragmentation of value is explained by a famous distinction 
between kinds of reasons that Nagel reexplores in this paper. 
On the one hand, reasons can be agent-centered (or personal) 
when they deal with who the agent is. Reasons of this kind 
include, for example, special obligations and private 
commitments. On the other hand, we have outcome-centered (or 
impersonal) reasons when they deal with what happens in 
general29. Reasons of this kind include, for instance, utility and 
perfectionist ends. Roughly, we can understand these two 
                                                          
27 Nagel T., The Fragmentation of Value, in Nagel T., Mortal Questions, 
Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp.128-141. 
28 “Obligations, rights, utility, perfectionist ends, and private commitments -
these values enter into our decisions constantly, and conflicts among them, 
and within them, arise medical research, in politics, in personal life, or 
wherever the grounds of action are not artificially restricted. What would it 
mean to give a system of priorities among them?” in Nagel T., ibidem, p.131. 
29 While on this article Nagel refers to these kinds of reason as agent-centered 
and outcome-centered, the distinction has been drawn on a different 
terminology elsewhere. Nagel himself in a previous book talks of 
subjective/objective reasons (see Nagel T., The Possibility of Altruism, 
Princeton University Press, 1970). Derek Parfit is the one who introduced 
the now-popular and widespread distinction between agent-relative/agent-
neutral reasons (see Parfit D., Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, 
1984). 
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classes of reasons to spring from different points of view30 and 
this is what makes them ultimately different. Thus, value 
appears fragmented and gives rise to possible moral conflicts. 
Think for example of the famous case of the “drowning partner”: 
imagine yourself in a situation where you can save from 
drowning either your beloved partner or two strangers. You are 
not able to save both your partner and the two strangers. So, 
who would you save? If we look at this case through the two 
classes of reasons that Nagel distinguishes we are facing a 
possible moral conflict: a) we certainly have an agent-centered 
and personal reason to save whoever stands in a special 
relationship with us; likewise, b) we have an outcome-centered 
and impersonal reason to save the highest number of possible 
victims31. Cases of this kind show how it is certainly possible to 
have different kinds of reasons that come from different points 
of view and which eventually enter into conflict. As Nagel 
entailed, value, from the perspective of Moral Complexity, is 
fragmented. 
It is worth asking, then, the following: is it possible to 
systematize the many heterogeneous sources of the good? If so, 
how do we actually deal with them? Charles Larmore has 
offered in his works some insightful answers to these questions 
and, at the same time, an interesting bigger picture of the 
structure of morality and its nature. In this latter regard, 
Larmore’s view is based on a conception of Reason as a faculty 
that we express by being more or less responsive to the reasons 
there are. “Rationality” he claims “is the capacity to reason, and 
                                                          
30 This reference to the different points of view will be extremely relevant 
later for the explanation of the concept of supererogation. Something similar 
can be found in Dreier J., Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational 
Satisficing Doesn’t, in Byron M. (ed. by), Satisficing Maximizing: Moral 
Theories on Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.131-
154.  
31 Notice that outcome-centered reasons become increasingly pressing if you 
add a large number of possible victims to be overlooked in favor of the 
partner.  
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reasoning consists in responding to reasons”32. Reason, thus, 
involves receptivity to reasons33, which are what ultimately 
motivates the agent to act accordingly. Larmore takes 
advantage of a typically Kantian terminology to distinguish 
between Vernuft (Reason intended as a faculty) and Gründe 
(reasons intended as what grounds a belief or action)34. These 
two elements make possible a conception of the moral 
experience based on a moral agent who reflects on the given 
situation in order to acknowledge moral reasons to act. 
Reflection is a cognitive process (the exercise of Reason) that 
aims at the acquisition of knowledge of how things are and what 
reasons for belief and action there are. Motivation, then, (contra 
the Humean tradition that assigns a fundamental role to 
desires) comes from knowledge alone. The truth that a belief 
carries within itself, involves a commitment to think and act 
accordingly. If I believe that outside is raining, I have a good 
reason to take an umbrella, whether or not I have a desire to do 
so. As such, beliefs are not motivationally inert and thus moral 
judgments are ultimately beliefs of the reasons for action there 
are35. It is interesting to note at this point how, according to 
Larmore, the Kantian distinction between theoretical and 
practical Reason is fundamentally unnecessary: “there is a 
single faculty of reason whose exercise may be styled as 
‘theoretical’ or ‘practical’ depending on whether its subject 
matter is belief or action”36. The kind of activity that Reason 
reveals is the same in its two connotations and, in truth, given 
the motivational power of beliefs, a much intertwined one. 
                                                          
32 Larmore C., The Autonomy of Morality, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p.135. 
33 Larmore C., ibidem, p.109. 
34 This lexical explanation of the terms can be found in Larmore C. Dare 
Ragioni. Il soggetto, l’etica, la politica, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2008, p.69. 
35 Larmore C., The Autonomy of Morality, pp.78-79. This is not to say that 
belief are the only motivationally capable aspects of human agency. Desires 
too can play a motivational role.  
36 Larmore C., ibidem.  
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Morality, then, consists in attending to moral reasons that 
the agent acknowledges in the situation. This practice, in order 
to make sense, needs to be grounded on a moral realist 
framework that considers moral reasons as relational, 
normative and real facts. Indeed, moral reasons consist in a 
certain relation (counting in favor of x) between some features 
of the world and a certain possible course of action (or belief)37. 
Reasons are not physical (like a chair and a table are); rather 
they might be based on some features of the physical world. 
Rain gives rise to a reason that counts in favor of bringing an 
umbrella with me. But rain, while it grounds it, it is not a 
reason in itself. The relation between rain and bringing the 
umbrella is the actual reason. At the same time, reasons are 
not psychological either. They do not correspond to a certain 
psychological state of mind. I might really want to use my new 
umbrella, but if outside is not raining, there is no reason for me 
to use it. Nonetheless, reasons are real. Precisely they are the 
link existing between some features of the physical or 
psychological world and the possible actions of an agent. This 
is why Larmore defines this peculiar relation to be normative in 
kind, or better, reasons are not considered physical or 
psychological, but rather normative facts38. A sort of fact, as we 
have seen, that entails a certain course of action. If I have a 
reason to pay you back, then I ought to do so. The existence of 
a reason comes with its normativity. It would be correct to 
consider Larmore an externalist, one that agrees with Bernard 
Williams’ understanding of “there is a reason for A to φ” as 
external39. It is not surprising, then, how this view of reasons 
as not having physical or psychological features in themselves 
(while relationally dependent on them) expresses a sort of “soft” 
Platonism. While Larmore does not refer to a platonic dimension 
                                                          
37 Larmore C., Dare Ragioni, p.71 and Larmore C., The Autonomy of Morality, 
p.128.  
38 Larmore C., ibidem. 
39 Rather than the opposing internal view of “A has a reason to φ”. See 
Larmore C., ibidem, p.126. 
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of the forms, he claims, in fact, that “[reasons] constitute an 
intrinsically normative order of reality, irreducible to the physical 
or psychological facts”40. Reasons form a peculiar part of reality 
(one that is often neglected): the normative realm. 
Given this understanding of the faculty of Reason as 
responsiveness to reasons and the conception of moral reasons 
as normative facts, it appears clear how Larmore’s moral 
rationalism entails two further negative claims. Briefly: a) a 
critique to the Kantian understanding of an Ethics of 
Autonomy; b) a critique of naturalism, the metaphysical 
position that limits reality to what natural sciences study.  
What Larmore criticizes of a typically Kantian approach to 
ethics is the conception of human freedom intended as the self-
legislation of Reason41. Reason is not a faculty that constitutes 
its own reasons for action and that entails a moral agent who 
ought to conform to the Moral Law in virtue of this self-
legislation (as Kant believed). Rather, Reason is the faculty that 
has the role of recognizing those reasons we consider good, 
reasons that exist apart from the agent. In this sense, morality 
is something autonomous and its authority is not granted by 
the self-legislation of the agent. This does not mean that 
Larmore is criticizing the understanding of autonomy intended 
as the necessity for a moral agent of recognizing moral reasons 
apart from any influence from the other agents or from an 
institution42. What he is claiming is that the foundation of 
ethics is not necessarily the self-legislating Reason, but rather 
morality is something that is impossible to conceive from 
outside or in a sort of pre-moral stage. Morality is something 
we live in, something that makes sense in its own terms and 
speaks for itself once we are confronted with it. Morality 
                                                          
40 Larmore C., ibidem, p.129. 
41 Larmore’s critique of autonomy (intended as the Kantian Autonomie) is the 
core argument of The Autonomy of Morality. Moreover it is an issue 
extensively covered in Larmore C., Reanut A., Débat sur l’Éthique. Idéalisme 
ou réalisme, Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, 2004. See also Larmore C., Dare 
Ragioni, pp.69-71. 
42 Larmore C., The Autonomy of Morality, p.111. 
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consists in the appreciation of a certain dimension of reality, 
rather than founding our own reasons for action apart from the 
empirical dimension (as Kantian Ethics typically entail).  This 
is why Larmore wants to shift our attention from the Kantian 
Ethics of Autonomy (the morality of self-legislation) to the 
Autonomy of Morality (a morality that cannot be recognized 
merely within the moral agent). Briefly: 
 
“The ethics of autonomy needs to be jettisoned, and in its stead 
belongs what I have called the autonomy of morality – by which 
I mean, obviously enough, not that morality is self-legislating 
(that would be nonsensical), but that morality forms an 
autonomous, irreducible domain of value, into which we cannot 
reason ourselves from without, but which we must simply 
acknowledge)”43. 
 
As it appears clear, the whole idea of morality that Larmore 
offers is deeply grounded on a more general issue: the criticism 
of naturalism. Indeed, the conception of Reason as responsive 
to reasons, the idea of reasons as normative facts and the 
critique of Kantian Autonomy all rely on a clear metaphysical 
point: reality is wider than the totality of physical and 
psychological facts, it is not normatively mute and, as such, it 
cannot be understood as naturalism does. Only the 
understanding of reality as having a normative dimension 
(different from the physical and psychological one) makes 
possible a conception of Reason as responsiveness to reasons. 
This faculty intends moral reasons as something that needs to 
be acknowledged in the normative dimension of reality, rather 
than being grounded on the self-legislation of an agent. 
Naturalism, the metaphysical position that has dominated 
the modern thought, is the major responsible for a morality that 
does not allow any conception of moral reasons as part of the 
real world. A broader conception of reality, a reality that takes 
into consideration its normative dimension is ultimately 
                                                          
43 Larmore C., ibidem, p.122. 
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capable of affirming the autonomy of morality. Nevertheless, the 
normative dimension (the dimension of reasons), being 
concerned with the relation (“counting in favor of”) between 
some facts of the world and the possible acts of the agent, 
greatly depends on the other dimensions. Without the physical 
and the psychological dimension, there would not be a 
normative dimension either. If outside it is not raining, there 
would be no reason for me to bring an umbrella. There would 
be, instead, a reason not to bring an umbrella. The normative 
dimension is then strictly dependent on how the facts are in the 
other two dimensions. Nevertheless, the fact that reasons are 
present, whether the agent recognizes them or not, leaves no 
doubt that they are part of a non-naturalistic conception of 
reality. The fact that I do not realize that outside is raining it 
does not mean that I do not have a reason to take an umbrella. 
Reality is broader than what we are naturalistically aware of 
and this comprehensive understanding of reality includes the 
normative dimension of reasons, reasons that are there 
independently from the agent. 
Finally, this meta-ethical background is functional to the 
definition of what the moral point of view is in general. Larmore 
identifies the moral point of view as the ability of seeing in 
another’s good in itself a reason for action44. Morality means 
acting for the good of another without any interest other than 
the fact that it is his/her good. The interest for another’s good 
becomes so basic (as in the case of my own personal good) that 
it does not require any further justification. Thus, the moral 
point of view brings about the following understanding of 
morality: 
 
“Morality consists in seeing in another’s good a demand on our 
attention that is as direct, as unmediated by ulterior 
considerations, as the concern we naturally feel for our own. The 
                                                          
44 Larmore C., The Autonomy of Morality, pp.73-74 and pp.88-89; Larmore 
C., Dare Ragioni, p.28 and pp.65-66; Larmore C., Reflection and Morality, in 
“Social Philosophy and Policy” 27(2010), no.2, p.8ff. 
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ability to look beyond our own interests, whatever they may be, 
and to take an interest in another’s good simply because it is his 
or hers – that is the essence of moral thinking”45.  
 
Larmore points out that the biblical maxim “Love thy neighbor 
as thyself”46 expresses well this moral attitude towards the 
others. The reason why this maxim becomes important for a 
moral point of view of this kind is its unmediated character and 
its spontaneity in pursuing the good of another. This fact is a 
sufficient reason to act morally and, most importantly, this is 
not something we can understand from an outer standpoint. 
Indeed, we do not come to appreciate others’ good thanks to a 
sound argumentation in favor of it (from the outside of a moral 
perspective, so to say). Morality directly places its demands on 
an agent that acknowledges the importance of others’ good, 
apart from her personal interests and desires. In this sense, 
“morality speaks for itself” and the moral point of view appears 
clear and unmediated47. Once we recognize a moral reason for 
action, we are already reflecting from the moral point of view.  
Now that we have delineated the bigger meta-ethical picture, 
we can analyze Larmore’s position about the nature of a 
normative system. Specifically, how does this metaethical 
background manage at a normative level the Moral Complexity 
we have seen to be typical of our moral experience? In his 
Patterns of Moral Complexity48 he has offered an interesting 
                                                          
45 Larmore C., The Autonomy of Morality, p.73-74.  
46 Leviticus 19:18, Matthew 19:19, 22:39, Mark 12:31, James 2:8. Larmore, 
rightly underlines that this maxim is quite different from the well know 
Golden Rule (“treat the others as you would like the others to treat yourself”). 
This, in fact, entails a sort of reciprocity between the agent and the subject 
of her actions. Larmore’s critique of the Hobbesian approach attacks this 
aspect as an untenable moral perspective. Larmore C., ibidem, pp.76-79. 
47 “When we acknowledge the authority of moral claims, despite the allure of 
contrary desires and independently of appeals to our own interests, we are 
commonly said to be listening to our conscience. The call of conscience is in 
this sense none other than morality speaking for itself, and that is why it 
stands in need of no higher validation” Larmore C., ibidem, p.105. 
48 Larmore C., Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University Press, 
1987. 
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interpretation of a moral system and, ultimately, of how moral 
reasoning works. As I have tried to highlight in Chapter 1, moral 
experience is characterized by a multitude of sources and 
dynamics further complicated by the circumstances in which 
the action takes place. Larmore, while acknowledging this fact, 
does not give up the very possibility of moral theorizing as other 
authors have done in the past49. In this book, he highlights 
three understandings of Moral Complexity, that is, three aspects 
in which morality (and consequently political philosophy) needs 
to exceed the traditional and inappropriate theoretical 
oversimplifications50: a) the essential role of moral judgment for 
the exercise of virtue b) the liberal ideal of political neutrality c) 
the heterogeneity of the sources of morality. I now want to focus 
on the third dimension51. 
Morality, it has been said, speaks for itself in showing its 
intrinsic authority and importance. Additionally (and more 
importantly) “If morality speaks for itself, it does not always 
speak with a single voice”52. This is an important truth to be 
recognized: morality is a realm of irreducible values coming 
from different sources. This is the reason why they eventually 
come into conflict generating the so-called moral dilemmas. 
Larmore has highlighted three different principles that 
characterize our moral experience and make morality 
essentially complex. A moral principle is a tool for deciding what 
the morally good thing to do is, a tool that guides our action 
accordingly. Moreover, a moral principle gains its authority as 
long as: a) it is rational, that is, we have good reasons 
(recognized by the faculty of Reason) to endorse and accept it53; 
b) it reflects a specific and irreducible way of moral reasoning54. 
                                                          
49 For example, see Williams B., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
Routledge, 2011. 
50 Larmore C., ibidem, p.151.  
51 I will deal with the other constitutively moral issue (the fundamental role 
of moral judgment) in the next section of this chapter. 
52 Larmore C., The Autonomy of Morality, p.88. 
53 Larmore C., ibidem, p.109. 
54 Larmore C., Dare Ragioni, p.37. 
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The three principles of morality, in virtue of these two aspects, 
are identified from the moral point of view, that is, they 
constitute what we, as moral agents, take to be morally 
relevant. If we look at our moral experience, we realize how 
these principles are equally important and irreducible one into 
another. Specifically, we distinguish55: 
 
a) The principle of partiality, points out those obligations that 
arise from the respect for an agent’s particular desires or 
special relations with others;  
b) The principle of consequentialism, requires that we do 
whatever will produce the most good or the least evil 
overall;  
c) The principle of deontology, demands that we never do 
things of a certain sort to others. 
 
These three principles are primarily different in kind. The first 
principle is clearly concerned with the empirically relevant 
aspects of an agent’s moral life. If a friend of mine were in need 
of my help, I would feel that I ought to act in a certain way, 
specifically so in virtue of our relationship. This sort of partiality 
constitutes this kind of obligations. On the other hand, the 
principles of consequentialism and that of deontology are 
universalistic (or impartial we might say), that is, they support 
categorical obligations. A categorical obligation is one that 
applies independently from empirically conditioned desires.     
Furthermore, in order to highlight their differences, it would 
be helpful to refer to a terminological distinction I have 
introduced in the first chapter: methodological pluralism and 
axiological pluralism. It appears clear how different the three 
principles are in terms of how they determine what the morally 
right thing to do is. They are methodologically different. The 
principle of partiality takes care of our specific affections, the 
principle of consequentialism looks at the outcome of our acts 
                                                          
55 Larmore C., Patterns of Moral Complexity, p.132-134; Larmore C. Dare 
Ragioni, p.37. 
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and the principle of deontology is concerned with the nature of 
the acts. When it comes to explain why we have specifically 
three principles, Larmore points out that they express three 
different and irreducible kinds of moral reasoning. An 
interesting explanation of this picture of how morality works is 
that they reflect three different kinds of relations in which we 
possibly stand with the others56. Partiality is based on the 
special relationships that we have with those who share 
interests, commitments, affections with us. This sort of relation 
generates a series of sui generis moral requirements. Think, for 
example, of the moral dimension of parenthood and friendship. 
These obligations are such in virtue of the fact that my friend 
Bob is exactly Bob. These relations are not special because they 
are necessarily better, from a moral point of view, than other 
kinds of relation. They are special because they are not 
established with anybody else. Differently, some other moral 
relations are not based on the fact that we relate with her\him, 
but because we relate with a fellow human being as such. This 
way of treating others impartially can be expressed in two ways: 
consequentialist and deontological. Once we acknowledge that 
the others have their own good that deserves to be pursued, we 
ought to treat them in a consequentialist way, says Larmore, 
trying to bring about the most good (or least evil) possible. 
Nevertheless, this is not the only way of treating others in virtue 
of the respect for their own good. We would act, at the same 
time, as they would never be treated or not treated in a certain 
way. This typically deontological way of behaving means caring 
for the others’ rights to be regarded in certain way by us. In 
virtue of the respect for others’ good as such, a moral agent has 
some obligations (generated by the correspondence with certain 
rights) that ought to be respected. Another famous distinction 
between consequentialism and deontology explained in terms 
of relations is that introduced by Thomas Nagel and Derek 
                                                          
56 Larmore C., Dare Ragioni, p.38. 
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Parfit57. While deontology is understood as providing agent 
relative reasons (where the reference to the agent is 
fundamental), consequentialism provides agent neutral reasons 
(which are true besides any reference to the agent). However, 
according to Larmore, the distinction put in these terms fails to 
recognize that consequentialism too entails a certain reference 
to the agent of the act. Namely, “Just as I have a (deontological) 
duty to give you the book if I promised to do so, so I have a 
(consequentialist) duty to relieve your pain if I am the one best 
able to do so”58. Relativity of the agent, rather than being what 
distinguishes the two approaches, is what assimilates them. 
Both of them point out the importance of seeing the others’ good 
as valuable in itself and as related to the agent. This is an 
essential feature of the moral point of view. 
This is what Larmore intends by heterogeneity of morality, 
the fact that moral reasoning is not uniform, but fundamentally 
various. Moreover, he claims that this heterogeneity is not 
governed by a precise order or strick priority of a principle over 
the other (as a sort of Rawlsian lexical order). This is what 
makes Larmore a moral pluralist to the full extent: moral 
sources, while heterogeneous, cannot be ordered a priori, they 
gain their priority according to the situation. Obviously, this 
does not exclude the possibility that different sources lead to 
different directions. Indeed, as pluralist systems usually entail, 
moral conflict is possible in virtue of the multiplicity of the 
sources and their non-prioritization. We might add that a moral 
dilemma, within the Larmorian understanding of a moral 
system, is the conflict between two ways of moral reasoning. It 
is easy to find examples of the clashing between the principle 
of consequentialism and the principle of deontology in our 
everyday life. A first way of facing such conflicts is the 
suspension of judgment, waiting for further information that 
                                                          
57See footnote 29. For an analysis of the difference between the two impartial 
ways of morally treating others see Larmore C., The Patterns of Moral 
Complexity, p.144-150. 
58Larmore C., ibidem, p.146.  
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might explain away the conflict. If this is not possible or it is 
simply not the case, it will underline the potential non-
eliminability of moral dilemmas. This fact reveals an interesting 
truth of morality: 
 
“So when we find that heeding both sorts of ultimate moral 
commitments is at odds with the way the world is, when we 
cannot do what they tell us we ought to do, we cannot entertain 
revising their authority or suspending judgment. We have to live 
with the fact that we have obligations we cannot honor. Our 
possibilities in the world are then too narrow for what we know 
we ought to do”59. 
 
What I have called methodological pluralism is Larmore’s 
main concern when it comes to explain the heterogeneity of 
morality. Morality is characterized by three different sorts of 
moral reasoning, all of them equally valid, important and 
irreducible one into the other. Nonetheless, I think we can 
underline some further aspects of Moral Complexity in terms of 
what I have defined axiological pluralism. That is, the sources 
of morality, not only differ for how they arrive to determine what 
is the right thing to do, but also they differ on why, they do so. 
A typically consequentialist approach, for example, is 
concerned with the general outcome of our acting in virtue of 
the caring for human flourishing. Humanity as whole deserves 
to live well (live happy according to certain traditions) and 
acting morally means improving this status. Deontology, on the 
other hand, claims that certain acts can never be performed (or 
omitted) out of the respect for others’ freedom60. This means 
                                                          
59 Larmore C., Patterns of Moral Complexity, p.150. 
60 In a certain sense, this means to respect others’ autonomy. I am not 
referring to the Kantian notion of the self-legislation of Moral Reason 
(Autonomie) as criticized by Larmore. The contemporary wide spread 
understanding of the autonomy of the moral agent refers to the fact that she 
has the chance to deliberate free from any influence from others (be it an 
institution, an ideology or another person). Autonomy, in this sense, means 
that a moral agent is free to deliberate and to form her moral choices. 
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that acting morally means caring for the status of a fellow 
human being as such. Differently, the principle of partiality 
underlines the moral relevance of our special affections with 
others and the particularistic desires. As such, it works in 
virtue of the importance that individual flourishing has. In sum, 
the three principles are concerned with different morally 
relevant aspects of our moral life. Claiming that all three are 
valid and indispensable part of our life means, at the same time, 
claiming that the good is represented by a variety of values that 
we cannot but acknowledge. In virtue of all this, two Larmorian 
mottos appear clear and incisive: “morality is heterogeneous” 
and “morality does not speak in a single voice”. Nevertheless 
heterogeneity might be a misleading term61 if it is to be 
understood as to undermine the unity of morality. Indeed, 
morality is expressed in different ways, while it remains one and 
unified. Although there is no doubt that a Larmorian system of 
morality is a clear example of moral pluralism, a further 
characterization needs to be highlighted. In fact, this pluralistic 
system and the three principles of morality all reflect a common 
and unique attitude: the morally good thing springs from the 
unique moral point of view. That is, they are all different and 
equally plausible ways of seeing in another’s good a reason for 
action. While the morally right thing to do can be achieved 
through different paths, the morally good thing is unique. 
Normatively this system is characterized by the pluralism of the 
right and a sort of monism of the good. The different moral 
sources share the starting point, the consideration of the 
others’ good from the moral point of view. In this sense, 
Larmore’s pluralism is more precisely the heterogeneity of the 
sources of a single good rather than a specific pluralism of 
values. While it is true that morality does not speak in a single 
voice, the speaker is always the same one. While the sources of 
the good are manifold and different in kind, they all ground the 
                                                          
Larmore’s criticism does not involve this second understanding of autonomy. 
See Larmore C., Dare Ragioni, pp.69-70. 
61 Larmore C., Reflection and Morality, p.25, footnote no.21. 
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same good. It is in virtue of all this that Lamore affirms  that 
the biggest mistake of monistic theories has been that of 
believing in their exclusivity on the level of the right (a claim 
that I fully share). Contrary, instead of believing in the exclusive 
validity of a single principle, we need to acknowledge the 
existence of different kinds of moral reasoning. This dimension 
of Moral Complexity at a normative level is well summarized by 
this passage: 
 
“Finally, instead of supposing that the structure of morality must 
be in the end either deontological or consequentialist, and 
instead of assuming that either all or none of our moral 
obligations are categorical, we should recognize that the ultimate 
sources of moral value are not one, but many”62.  
 
Morality, it has been said, does not speak in a single voice. 
 
3. Facing Complexity with Less Hardship: The Role of Moral 
Judgment in Moral Justification 
 
First of all, some terminological distinctions are required. As 
we have seen, Practical Reason is the faculty that acknowledges 
the reasons there are to act in a certain way. However, morality 
is not straightforwardly the mere acknowledgment of what rules 
and principles point out (as some of the monistic traditions tend 
to claim). While it might happen that a principle or a rule tells 
us exactly what to do according to what we have reasons to do, 
most of the times this is simply not the case. Morality is much 
more than a hard science whose results are precise and 
reproducible. It is a subject that requires a certain degree of 
interpretation and reflection for a proper application and this 
sort of operations is where the faculty of moral judgment comes 
in. One thing is to know and acknowledge that we have reasons 
to do x (the role of practical Reason), another is to know how to 
bring about x (the role of moral judgment). Sometimes the given 
                                                          
62 Larmore C., ibidem, p.151. 
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circumstances require almost no need of judgment, as when, 
for example, you have promised to buy your child an ice cream 
and you are in front of an ice cream parlor. However, some other 
cases are much more complex than this. Think for example of 
a case where your friends have been so kind to organize a 
surprise birthday party for you. You certainly acknowledge that 
you have good reasons to show gratitude, but the question is to 
understand how to do so adequately. Should you simply say 
“thank you” or should you buy everybody a round? Cases where 
we ought to express gratitude, courage, generosity and similar 
moral virtues require a certain degree of moral judgment. Moral 
judgment, then, does not have the same role of practical 
Reason. Aristotle has been the ancestor of this understanding 
of moral judgment (fro&nhsij)63. Whoever expresses mastery in 
the use of moral judgment is considered wise. In book VI of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, we read:  
 
“On the subject of wisdom, we may get what we need once we 
have considered who it is that we call ‘wise’. Well, it is thought 
characteristic of a wise person to be able to deliberate well about 
the things that are good and advantageous to himself, not in 
specific contexts, e.g. what sorts of things conduce to health, or 
to physical strength, but what sorts of things conduce to the good 
life in general. An indication of this is that we also call those in a 
specific field wise if they succeed in calculating well towards 
some specific worthy end on matters where no exact technique 
applies. So in fact the description ‘wise’ belongs in general to the 
person who is good at deliberation.”64 
 
                                                          
63 I here consider the translation of fro&nhsij as ‘moral judgment’, although 
it has been also translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudence’. I prefer 
‘judgment’ because it better entails the deliberation process typical of 
fro&nhsij. 
64 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a24-a33. I here refer to the translation 
given by Christopher Rowe in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translation, 
introduction and commentary by Broadie S. and Rowe C., Oxford University 
Press, 2002.  
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Moreover, moral judgment is different from systematic 
knowledge (such as the hard sciences) or technical expertise 
(such as craftsmanship): 
 
“it remains therefore for it [fro&nhsij] to be a true disposition 
accompanied by rational prescription, relating to action in the 
sphere of what is good and bad for human beings”65. 
 
In virtue of this understanding of the role of moral judgment, 
we can conclude that it plays a major role in moral justification, 
i.e. the actualization and the application of a moral reason to 
action. Judgment is not necessarily the source of the 
justification in itself, since practical Reason is the faculty that 
highlights the moral reasons there are. Nevertheless, as we 
have underlined in the previous section, morality does not 
speak in a single voice and listening to it might be puzzling and 
disheartening at times. Moral judgment plays here a 
fundamental role in the definition of which of the available 
sources of morality is responsible for the identification of moral 
reasons. Moreover, moral judgment is responsible of the 
application of reasons to action. In general, moral judgment 
(fro&nhsij) is the faculty of moral interpretation, be it the 
comprehension of how to apply a reason to action or be it the 
discernment between conflicting moral sources. As I will point 
out later, in a complex moral system the latter feature is 
especially important. 
At the present point, I have already sketched three 
fundamental features of moral judgment: a) moral judgment is 
always placed into a particular moral experience66; b) moral 
judgment deals with the interpretation of moral principles or, 
generally, of moral reasons; c) moral judgment is essential to 
                                                          
65 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140b5-b7. 
66 It does not need to be the actual or present situation. When we reflect on 
what to do morally, we picture ourselves into some potential scenario so to 
understand what we would do. In this regard, in the first chapter, we have 
talked about Mandelbaum’s removed moral judgments.   
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the identification of the relevant moral source and to its 
application (Moral Justification). Let us analyze these three 
features in some further detail. 
Moral Judgment is a faculty that necessarily needs to be 
exercised within experience. This claim is fully in line with the 
Aristotelian understanding of fro&nhsij. Moral agency is given in 
the experience of our moral lives, as such moral judgment is 
the faculty entitled to reconsider each particular case in order 
to deliberate what is the right thing to do. Moral agency cannot 
be determined a priori once and for all67. This feature of 
morality has often been neglected by many philosophical 
traditions and, for this reason, it represents one of the aspects 
in which Larmore highlights the need of a more complex vision. 
Since morality is inevitably characterized by experience, we 
need to reassign the leading role of practical Reason and moral 
judgment. Larmore’s ‘soft Platonism’ about the nature of moral 
reasons underlines the non-eliminability of experience from any 
talk about the nature of morality. Reason is the faculty that 
acknowledges reasons from how things are in a non-
naturalistic conception of reality. As such, Reason reads 
experience. Similarly, moral judgment is a faculty that is 
exercised in the experience and developed through the practice 
within experience68. This is the ‘Aristotelian insight’ of the first 
dimension of moral complexity: we need to reestablish the 
centrality of moral judgment as it responds to the peculiarities 
of the given situation69. 
                                                          
67 “[…] things in the sphere of action and things that bring advantage have 
nothing stable about them, any more than things that bring health. But if what 
one says universally is like this, what one says about particulars is even more 
lacking in precision; for it does not fall either under any expertise or under any 
set of rules – the agents themselves have to consider the circumstances 
relating the occasion, just as happens in the case of medicine, too, and of 
navigation.” in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104a5-a10.  
68 Remember that for Aristotle moral judgment is a faculty that it is not 
given, but rather developed through education and examples from the 
community of the polis. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1179b30f.  
69 “Reacting against what he perceived to be Plato’s belief that virtue consists 
solely in the knowledge of general principles, Aristotle protested that moral 
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What is the role of moral judgment? I have briefly underlined 
that another relevant feature of this faculty is that it deals with 
moral principles and, more generally, with moral reasons. 
Nevertheless, it would be reducing to talk of judgment as the 
faculty that merely sees what rules and principles point out70. 
Although sometimes rules and principles suffice to themselves 
to pinpoint what it is the right thing to do, most of the cases 
present a much more complex scenario. We have already 
analyzed how cases such as being grateful might confront the 
agent with a scenario that requires much more than the 
acknowledgement of the moral reasons there are to show 
gratitude. Even if the agent recognizes to have reasons to be 
grateful, how is this gratitude to be realized successfully? 
Judgment is thus the faculty that deals with rules, principles 
and, generally, moral reasons and it is concerned with their 
satisfactory application71. As Larmore underlined, this is the 
centrality of moral judgment that we need to reestablish if we 
want to take into account the complexity of our moral 
experience. In a clear Aristotelic spirit, taking care of the 
application of a rule means being aware that the expression of 
virtue consists in avoiding any excess and deficiency of 
behavior72. This sort of operation requires an understanding of 
moral judgment (fro&nhsij), as the faculty that manages the 
application of moral reasons. It is interesting to note how this 
understanding of judgment resembles the concept of fittingness 
                                                          
action depends on the exercise of judgment in applying these principles to 
particular circumstances. Judgment itself, he stressed, is not an activity 
governed by general rules; instead it must always respond to the peculiarities 
of the given situation” in Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, p.15. 
70 The main philosophical traditions in moral philosophy have had the 
tendency to reduce the role of judgment to a mere auxiliary of rules and 
principles. See Larmore C., ibidem, p.5. 
71 Larmore C., ibidem, p.7. 
72 An operation that requires some adjustments “This much, then, shows 
that the intermediate disposition is to be praised in all circumstances, but that 
one should sometimes incline towards excess, sometimes towards deficiency; 
for in this way we shall most easily hit upon what is intermediate, and good 
in practice” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b24-27.  
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so central to the phenomenological view of Maurice 
Mandelbaum. As analyzed in the first chapter, fittingness is the 
relation between an appropriate course of action and the end 
that the agent is pursuing73. The ability to bring about this sort 
of relation is precisely, I believe, the role of the faculty of 
judgment. If I recognize that I have a reason to do x and this 
reason does not come with enough evidence of what I have to 
do in order to fulfil it, moral judgment comes in and tries to 
establish a relation of fittingness between what I have to do and 
the course of action that would satisfy this need. I here want to 
underline again how moral judgment is the faculty of moral 
interpretation, i.e. it is responsible of interpreting the situation 
and understanding which course of action fits it according to 
the moral reasons the agent has. In this sense, the activity of 
judgment goes beyond what rules and principles strictly tell us, 
trying to understand how to adjust them and make them 
effective in the given circumstances74. 
Finally, a further feature of the moral judgment that needs 
be underlined is an aspect particularly relevant when we 
consider the moral justification of an act (and especially so 
within a complex moral system). It appears clear how the role 
of moral judgment in a complex system is at least twofold. I 
have previously underlined the first one: once practical Reason 
has done its job by acknowledging the moral reason there are, 
moral judgment is in charge of applying them to the situation. 
This application might require a greater or lesser role of 
judgment according to how much the reasons are explicit about 
what to do. However, in a pluralist system, the agent might 
happen to have more than a single reason to act and, on top of 
that, these reasons might eventually enter into conflict. I think 
that we can here identify a second role of moral judgment in the 
situation of a conflict between reasons: adjudicating which of 
the different sources of morality has to be finally considered. 
Larmore himself acknowledges this further role of judgment: 
                                                          
73 Mandelbaum M., The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, p.64. 
74 Larmore C., ibidem, pp.8-9. 
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“Of course, we do possess higher-order moral principles such as 
utility, or Kantian universalizability, one of whose tasks is to 
adjudicate moral conflicts. But many times the verdicts rendered 
by these higher-order principles for a particular case diverge, and 
then – because there are no higher rules to be invoked and 
because no absolute ranking of these principles is plausible – 
judgment may have to direct us how to choose”75. 
 
This understanding of moral judgment guarantees that, even if 
the situation becomes increasingly complex and conflicting, we 
do not need to give up the chance to grasp a reasonable 
decision. Once we abandon the idea of a monistic structure of 
morality in favor of a pluralistic framework, moral conflict is a 
recurring phenomenon in our moral experience. Although not 
all conflicts are solvable, moral judgment can guide us through 
the heterogeneous world of morality76. 
The question of moral justification is a focal one for a 
pluralist system. The issue becomes even more pressing when 
it comes to the resolution of moral conflicts (something that 
pluralist systems frequently face). As I have underlined in the 
first chapter, the difficulty of a clear-cut procedure for moral 
justification represents the major criticism that supporters of 
moral monism raise against pluralists. The claim is the 
following: if we have to abandon the unique moral standard that 
makes moral commensurability possible, how do we adjudicate 
conflicts? The best answer to this problem is, I believe, that of 
broadening our idea of reasonable solution of a conflict. When 
no further consideration can be drawn from our moral reasons 
in order to solve the conflict, it does not necessarily mean that 
what we decide to do77 is irrational or arbitrary. Moral 
judgment, once we arrive to the point of a moral conflict, can 
still provide a reasonable choice about what to do. However, the 
                                                          
75 Larmore C., ibidem, p.9. 
76 Larmore C., ibidem, pp.10-11. 
77 Granted that we ultimately need to act and that we cannot benefit from 
the suspension of judgment. 
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only way to accommodate this point is to broaden our idea of 
what makes a moral act the outcome of a reasonable 
deliberation. In this terms, moral deliberation cannot be the 
mere outcome of moral reasons (as they can conflict), but, 
further, moral judgment plays here a fundamental role. Thomas 
Nagel shares this idea of the reasonable solution of moral 
conflicts:  
 
“The fact that one cannot say why a certain decision is the correct 
one, given a particular balance of conflicting reasons, does not 
mean that the claim to correctness is meaningless. […] What 
makes this possible is judgment – essentially the faculty 
Aristotle described as practical wisdom, which reveals itself over 
time in individual decisions rather than in the enunciation of 
general principles. It will not always yield a solution: there are 
true practical dilemmas that have no solution, and there are also 
conflicts so complex that judgment cannot operate confidently. 
But in many cases it can be relied on to take up the slack that 
remains beyond the limits of explicit rational argument”78.  
 
We need to push rational deliberation as far as possible, but 
once we get to a moral conflict we do not need to give up the 
possibility of identifying a reasonable thing to do. In these 
cases, judgment is the only viable option left to get a reasonable 
decision when the situation makes trade-offs between different 
moral sources complicated.  
The peculiar thing about judgment is that it is a faculty that 
needs to be developed through time and experience. That is why 
Aristotle underlined the importance of education and 
habituation of the youngsters, who needs to live in a society 
that nurtures their moral character79. With experience, we use 
to say, we become wiser and it becomes easier for us to find a 
moral justification of our acts. The complexity of morality might 
                                                          
78 Nagel T., The Fragmentation of Value, in Mortal Questions, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, pp.134-135. 
79 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1179b30f. 
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be discouraging at times, but judgment makes it easier (but not 
necessarily easy) to face it. This is what allow us to manage 
complexity with less hardship, the work of a qualified and 
experienced moral judgment can guide the agent through the 
adversities of moral experience. 
In sum, moral justification in a complex moral system is 
granted by the combined work of two faculties (practical Reason 
and moral judgment) in a three steps process: 1. Practical 
Reason acknowledges the moral reasons there are from the 
moral point of view; 2. Moral judgment picks the most relevant 
source of morality by interpreting the situation; 3. Moral 
judgement defines the most efficient application of the reasons 
to the given circumstances. While the work of acknowledgement 
of moral reasons delivered by practical Reason is obligatory 
(otherwise we would not be able to reflect from the moral point 
of view), the dual role of judgment is not. Moral reasons can 
sometimes be straightforwardly clear about what to do and why 
to do so, thus, there is no further need of the moral 
interpretation provided by judgment. In the same way, if moral 
reasons happen to be clear about the course of action that 
needs be undertaken, there would be no conflict between the 
sources of morality and the interpretive role of judgment would 
not be necessary. To the contrary, sometimes the situation 
might be so complex that the agent faces a true moral dilemma, 
making moral judgment useless.    
The approach of Moral complexity entails the 
acknowledgment of how a suitable moral framework requires 
the centrality of moral judgment in the justificatory process. 
This approach does not make morality a subject that merely 
governs human agency with a set of rules deliberated a priori. 
Morality springs from the combined work of different faculties 
and the interpretation of the various and heterogeneous 
sources of morality. This process is something that cannot but 
take place in our everyday moral experience. 
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CHAPTER III: 
SUPEREROGATION: WHY, WHAT, AND HOW 
 
1. Why Supererogation? 
In this second part, I will focus primarily on the analysis of 
some of the major problems related to the concept of 
supererogation. As it will hopefully become clear at the end, the 
reason of this shift in the argument is that supererogation 
exemplifies well the complexity typical of morality. In this way, 
I will define supererogation as a complex concept that can be 
successfully supported by a complex system. As such, in the 
present work, supererogation and moral complex systems 
stand on an interdependent and mutual relation. I take 
supererogation as a good expression of the ultimately complex 
nature of moral thought and, at the same time, a moral complex 
system as the moral framework that better satisfies the 
necessities of the justification of the concept of supererogation. 
Most importantly however, both the concept and the system 
rely on a preliminary assumption: moral complexity is 
something given in the phenomenological analysis of our moral 
experience. From the phenomenological perspective, the moral 
life of the regular agent appears heterogeneous and fragmented. 
Consequently, pluralism appears to be the normative structure 
that better acknowledges this complexity. Likewise, 
supererogation represents a complex concept that further 
expresses such complexity. 
I have already dedicated the first part of the work to the 
analysis of the need of a complex moral system. It is now 
worthwhile spending a few words on the necessity of having a 
moral category such as supererogation. For now, it will be 
enough to broadly conceive a supererogatory act as one that is 
morally good, but not required. Supererogation, then, is that 
category of the good that stands above (or beyond) the category 
of the morally obligatory. So, why would we need such a 
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category? Susan Wolf argued in her well-known article1 that 
moral perfection is not the proper ultimate moral goal. 
Perfection in the moral sphere (or moral sainthood as Wolf calls 
it) prevents the agent from benefitting of several other valuable 
things in life. This is, briefly, the main argument: if one 
dedicates her entire life to morality, it will be impossible for her 
to appreciate many other valuable non-moral things in life. 
Morality, if taken to the extreme, prevents the agent from living 
a valuable life because it annihilates the possibilities of 
benefitting of other goods. For example, someone who devotes 
his time entirely to the feeding of the hungry, surely it will not 
spend much time learning how to play the piano or reading an 
enjoyable novel2. This limitation of the other non-moral aspects 
of life can affect negatively the overall consideration of what it 
is to live a good life. The life of a moral saint will lack many non-
moral valuable aspects that, according to common sense, 
constitute a life lived well. It is not simply the fact that a moral 
saint would miss some important aspects of a well-rounded life; 
the point is that those lacks would concern something valuable 
(although not from a moral point of view), the moral saint would 
lack in some valuable aspect of life3. Moreover, according to 
Wolf, there is something particularly problematic with this 
constitutively moral extremism. She claims that, while every 
sort of idealistic extremism might comport some sacrifice in 
other aspects of life, the moral saint represents a case where 
this lacks are brought about in a questionable way. One might 
think that someone who devotes an entire life to become the 
greatest pianist on earth or to break the record on the 100 
meters would incur in the same sort of lacks in several valuable 
aspects of her life. Accordingly, any sort of extremism of a single 
value would appear to be as problematic as the case of the 
moral saint4. However, Wolf underlines how the most 
problematic features of value extremism are typical of the moral 
                                                          
1 Wolf S., Moral Saints, in “The Journal of Philosophy” 79(1982), no.8, 
pp.418-439. 
2 Wolf S., ibidem, p.421. 
3 Wolf S., ibidem, p.426. 
4 Wolf S., ibidem, p.423. 
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saint5: a) differently from other sorts of extremisms, the moral 
saint seem to be giving up many valuable things not in virtue 
of a personal choice (such as in the case of the musician or the 
Olympic athlete), but rather in virtue of a moral imperative; b) 
the aspects of life that the moral saint gives up are not neglected 
as a result of a trade-off, but rather because it seems that the 
saint lacks some sort of ability to perceive and recognize their 
value. Let me further explain these two points. Wolf thinks that 
if our ultimate concern is always moral, it will result in the loss 
of value (or incapability of recognizing it) of any non-moral good. 
As such, picking always the moral good over the other non-
moral goods is not the consequence of a trade-off between fully 
recognized values. All non-moral values (in virtue of the 
espousal of moral perfection as the ultimate standard) are 
ultimately not values. Then, the moral saint is not someone who 
chooses what to do, but someone who listens to an imperative 
(the only kind of value allowed) about what one needs to do. As 
such, the moral saint is an undesirable perspective. In this 
specific problem of the moral saint, I disagree with Wolf. I 
believe that the relevant objection to moral perfection is that 
any extreme of a single value (be it moral or non-moral) will 
generate a loss in the achievement of other values and it will, 
thus, jeopardize the well-roundedness of the single person. It 
might be true that the exclusive evaluation from the moral point 
will fail to consider many valuable things in life. But, for 
example, the same applies to the professional athlete who 
considers all the aspects of her life from the “athletic” point of 
view, which considers valuable only the things that are 
functional to a better athletic performance. As a matter of fact, 
this is what leads to cases where athletes use performance-
enhancing drugs. These athletes simply fail to consider the 
value of things other than those that appear relevant from the 
“athletic” point of view. Accordingly, the use performance-
enhancing substances appears permissible as long as it 
improves their abilities or speeds up the achievement of certain 
goals. The real problem of this course of action is that this 
athlete fails to consider other kinds of point of view (such as the 
                                                          
5 Wolf S., ibidem, pp.423-424.  
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moral one). It seems to me that the exclusive consideration of 
any point of view might lead to the same problematic failure of 
appreciating other values important for the flourishing of our 
well-roundedness. This does not seem to be a constitutive moral 
problem. Any extreme might turn out to have bad side effects, 
although it is not the exalted value to be bad in itself. The real 
problematic fact that derives from these attitudes is the loss of 
the well-roundedness so important to the common sense 
understanding of a life lived well. It is interesting to note here 
that this idea of well-roundedness of a life lived well resembles 
the Aristotelian conception of a virtuous life. Virtue is for 
Aristotle the mean between scarcity and excess of the 
expression of a value:  
“[Moral virtue] is a mean between two vices, the one involving 
excess and the other deficiency, and that it is so because it is 
such as to aim at what is midway in emotions and in actions, 
has been sufficiently stated. That is why it is no easy task to be 
virtuous. For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle”6. 
A life characterized by some kind of excess (or deficiency) is a 
life that seems to be missing something valuable. In this 
respect, I share the central point of Wolf’s argument: the 
extreme of a value (or its maximization at all costs) cannot be 
taken as the ultimate standard for a moral theory.  
It is important to underline, however, that Wolf does not 
think that moral sainthood is a bad thing in itself; moral saints 
are extremely praiseworthy for the way they conduct their lives. 
Claiming that moral perfection cannot be considered the 
standard to which we need to conform, it is not to limit the 
possibilities of bringing about the good7. Saying that moral 
perfection is not the most efficient ideal for a life lived well does 
not mean that, from the moral point of view, moral sainthood 
cannot be eventually considered praiseworthy. This possibility 
of evaluation can be explained by the adoption of multiple 
points of view. The moral point of view is not the only point of 
                                                          
6 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a21-26. I have here used the 
translation contained in Barnes J., Kenny A. (ed. by), Aristotle’s Ethics. 
Writings From the Complete Works, Princeton University Press, 2014. 
7 Wolf S., ibidem, p.432. 
Part II: 
Supererogation in Normative Ethics:  
Definition, Justification and New Perspectives 
 
91 
 
view from which the agent evaluates. According to Wolf, there 
is the point of view of individual perfection from which we decide 
what it means to live a good life. From this point of view, 
morality constitutes a valuable, but limited feature of our lives. 
In this terms, morality has no priority over other kinds of 
evaluation, the idea of living a life well is shaped by the 
perfectionist point of view and, as such, from outside the moral 
perspective8. The moral point of view is not the ultimate 
evaluative standard and this is what makes it possible for a 
person to be “perfectly wonderful without being perfectly 
moral”9. 
Although, as I have said, I completely agree with Wolf on the 
inadequateness of moral perfection as the ultimate moral 
standard, I believe that she did not give a satisfactory account 
of how supererogation needs to be conceived. The adoption of 
two different points of view fails to acknowledge how 
supererogation has to be understood as the “moral beyond” 
essentially from within the moral perspective and not merely 
from without. Let me explain this point. Wolf thinks that, if one 
follows all the way through the moral point of view, one cannot 
but aim at moral sainthood. If we do not want to incur in this 
problematic situation, we need to let the moral point of view go 
and evaluate from some other alternative all-things-considered 
point of view. Thus, accordingly, always following the moral 
point of view becomes the supererogatory thing. However, it is 
seems to me that this misses the point or rather it leaves 
halfway done the task of playing down the reach of morality on 
our lives (a task, I believe, for which supererogation has been 
introduced). I think that we need to understand supererogation 
from within morality, in order to redefine the limits of the 
morally obligatory10. Deciding how to live a life well is the 
ultimate task of the moral perspective, there is no need to 
assign this task to some other point of view11. What Wolf says 
                                                          
8 Wolf S., ibidem, p.437-438. 
9 Wolf S., ibidem, p.436. 
10 A task that I will directly try to accomplish only in Chapter V. 
11 This is not to say that points of view different from the moral do not exist. 
The point at issue here is that the moral perspective in sufficient to a 
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is that the supererogatory trait is evaluating always from the 
moral point of view. This is her argument for limiting the reach 
of morality. However, the category of supererogatory acts, tries 
to highlight how this task can be achieved within the moral 
point of view. What we really need to do is to find a way to limit 
the demands of bringing about the good within the limits of the 
right. Indeed, the attitude of the “as much good as possible” is 
not the most efficient theory of the right (while it might be an 
effective approach to a theory of the good). 
A similar attack to Wolf’s conception of supererogation as 
based on two distinct points of view (a moral one and a non-
moral one) is that presented by Jonathan Dancy. Wolf’s 
supererogation is a misunderstanding of what this peculiar 
moral concept should represent: 
“It is not that there can be actions which have the highest moral 
value but which are morally permitted not to perform. Wolf is not 
a strong supererogationist. […] For her, the supererogatory action 
is one we are morally required to perform, but this requirement 
is not visible from the point of view of individual perfection”12.  
In these terms, a non-saint turns out to be a defective moral 
agent from the moral point of view. However, this is exactly 
what misunderstands the role of the concept of supererogation, 
which, conversely, wants to acknowledge the fact that someone 
who is not a saint is not morally defective either. Supererogation 
is the moral category of the morally good, but morally optional. 
Wolf thinks that the optionality relies in the espousal of the 
moral point of view. The supererogatory act, instead, is 
something whose optionality needs to be understood within the 
moral sphere. There is no need to draw upon the existence of 
two different points of view, one inside and one outside 
morality. As Dancy puts it, there is no need to accept a 
perspective other than that of morality to recognize that our 
moral theories do not necessarily aim at the moral ideal life13. 
                                                          
satisfactory interpretation of supererogation and, most of all, of what it 
means to live a life lived well. 
12 Dancy J., Moral Reasons, Blackwell, 1992, p.135. 
13 Dancy J., ibidem, p.137. 
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In conclusion, I believe that the concept of supererogation is 
important because it gives to our moral theories the theoretical 
depth that would be problematic to deny. David Heyd 
beautifully claimed that “the good is open-ended in a way that 
the bad is not”14 and I think that to take into account this 
feature of morality means, first and foremost, setting the proper 
space to supererogation. If the morally good has no limits (open-
ended) and morality places no boundaries to which extend we 
are obligated to bring about moral goodness, our moral systems 
would always be condemned to set never-reaching goals. The 
concept of supererogation works as to prevent this to happen. 
Moreover, note that I am talking about the undesirableness of 
moral goodness (to its full extent) as a possible moral 
requirement, a remark that is quite different from saying that 
morality sets some ideals to which one should aspire as much 
as possible (which seems to be a plausible inclination instead). 
In my opinion, the point at issue is the rather popular idea that 
the good needs to be maximized. As a matter of fact, if we take 
moral requirements to be dealing with the maximization of the 
good, the life of the moral agent would be frustrating at best. If 
the morally good is open-ended and we are required to 
maximize the good, morality will be transformed into an endless 
run. To avoid this unpleasant scenario it would mean to leave 
some moral room for the category of supererogation, mitigating, 
in this way, the reach of our moral obligations. This operation 
will ultimately mean to clearly distinguish the morally good 
(open-ended) from the morally right (morally obligatory). Thus, 
supererogation lies in the conceptual space granted by the 
distinction between the morally good and the morally right. A 
theory that identifies the good with the right would be too 
narrow and, after all, a truly moralistic one. This is the 
downside of all those theories that conform to the motto “good-
ought tie up”. In fact, in order to avoid the problematic scenario 
where all the good things are at the same time obligatory (rather 
than simply desirable), we need to limit the reach of moral 
                                                          
14 “…The extremely good cannot be required, but the extremely bad (vicious) 
is the prime target of prohibition” Heyd D., “Supererogation”, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 edition), Zalta E. N. (ed. by), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/supererogation/>. 
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obligations. We need a category of morally good acts that lies 
beyond duty, otherwise moral perfection will become the 
standard to which our theories would need to conform. This 
operation will not, as someone might think, reduce the 
contribution of morality to the minimalistic standard of the 
right. In fact, in this way morality will still deal with the broader 
category of the morally good, but in a different fashion. In these 
regards, the morally good springs from the agent’s gratuitous 
caring for the others, beyond the mere boundaries of the 
obligatory. This is the true spirit of the moral act from the moral 
point of view. Reducing the reach of the morally obligatory will 
not decrease the purport of morality in our lives. Contrary, a 
less demanding category of the right will open up the possibility 
for the authentic morally good. This is, ultimately, the moral 
less is more. The less demanding the category of the right 
becomes the more possibilities of gratuitously caring for the 
others are open to the moral agent. 
 
2. What is Supererogation? A first definition of the concept 
James Urmson was the first contemporary author that 
recognized a philosophical urgency of giving the proper 
theoretical space to supererogation. In 1958 he published his 
seminal article entitled Saints and Heroes15, where he deals 
with the category that lies “beyond the call of duty” 
(interestingly enough without even mentioning the word 
supererogation). In these terms, sainthood and heroism are 
categories (far from having any intrinsic religious implication) 
that clearly represent a moral behavior that cannot be strictly 
required of the moral agent. In particular, Urmson tried to 
underline how a schematic and rigorous classification of the 
categories of moral worth of actions16 in virtue of moral 
permissibility was unable to fit the actions of saints and heroes 
in.  As long as we differentiate between the obligatory (what we 
                                                          
15 Urmson J., Saints and Heroes, in Essays in Moral Philosophy, A. Melden 
(ed. by), University of Washington Press, pp.198-216. 
16 As particularly characterized by the understanding of the deontic logic of 
his time. Remember the influential article by Von Wright G. H., Deontic Logic, 
in “Mind”, 60(1951), issue 237, pp.1-15. 
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ought to do), the permissible (or the morally indifferent) and the 
forbidden (what we ought not to do), there is no space for those 
morally worthy acts well exemplified by saintly and heroic 
behavior. Supererogation is not morally indifferent, yet not 
morally obligatory. A three-fold partition of morality, which 
acknowledges the obligatory as the only category of positive 
moral worth, cannot but fail to acknowledge the moral 
relevance of supererogatory acts. Urmson, then, concluded 
that, given the undeniable existence in our everyday life of acts 
of this kind, moral theories have to take into account the 
importance of this category of action and leave it some 
conceptual space. Along these lines, the issue regarding the 
theoretical relevance of supererogatory acts evolved and gave 
rise to the contemporary debate still vivid nowadays. 
In the years following Urmson’s paper, a worth noting 
attempt to solve the “problem of supererogation”17 was that 
offered by Roderick Chisholm in a series of articles published 
in the sixties18. In order to move on from the original three-
folded classification and to support both supererogation’s 
optionality and its moral worth, he suggested expanding the 
degree of complexity of the conceptual scheme of ethics. 
Following the example of some authors before him19, Chisholm 
offers a scheme that considers both performance and non-
performance of the act (commission and omission). This first 
feature underlines how supererogation is a moral category that 
evaluates a specific kind of acts, rather than a certain 
disposition or behavior of the agent. It is always the specific act 
                                                          
17 These terms usually refer to the impossibility to understand 
supererogation through the categories of the early deontic logic.  
18 Chisholm R., Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics, 
in “Ratio” 5(1963), pp.1-14; Chisholm R., The Ethics of Requirement, in 
“American Philosophical Quarterly” 1(1964), no.2, pp.147-153; Chisholm R., 
Sosa E., Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of Supererogation, in 
“Synthese”, 16(1966), pp.321-331. 
19 In particular, he focused on the similarly aimed work of Alois Höfler, 
Alexius Meinong and Ernst Schwarz. See Höfler A., in 
Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen zwischen Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen, 
Sitzungsberichte der kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, bd. 
CLXXXI (1917), pp.1-56; Meinong A., Psychologisch-ethische 
Untersuchungen zur Wert-theorie, Graz, 1894; Schwarz E., Über den Wert, 
das Soll, und das richtige Werthalten, Graz, 1934. 
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that is considered more than duty requires, rather than a 
certain way the agent is or behaves. Moreover, his classification 
of moral acts is based on the moral worth of the performance 
(or non-performance) of the given act. Accordingly, an act can 
be good, bad or morally indifferent (that is neutral20). Finally, 
combining this three-fold classification of the value with the 
performance and non-performance of the act, gives rise to nine 
possible descriptions of moral acts. In this way, Chisholm tries 
to underline what the previous approach of deontic logic failed 
to acknowledge: the optionality of supererogation and, at the 
same time, its moral worth. Plainly Chisholm holds the 
following:  
“I have said that to determine the moral status of any particular 
act we must decide (a) whether its performance would be good, 
bad or neither good nor bad, and (b) whether its non-performance 
would be good, bad or neither good nor bad”21.  
In order to clarify this point it is helpful using a schematic 
illustration of the various possibilities22: 
 P NP  
1 b b Totally offensive 
2 b n Offence of commission 
3 b g Forbidden 
4 n b Offense of omission 
5 n n Totally indifferent 
6 n g Supererogatory omission 
                                                          
20 The choice of using the terms good and bad is not free from possible 
criticisms as pointed out by Michael Stocker: “he must not try to define ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ in terms of each other – or, what is the same thing, in terms of some 
third concept such as ought to be. Doing so simply collapses the definition of 
‘obligatory’ into that of ‘good’ and it further allows (requires) the fatal 
interpretation of ‘permitted’ ”. In Stocker M., Professor Chisholm on 
Supererogation and Offence, in “Philosophical Studies”, 18(1967), p.93. 
21 Chisholm, Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics, 
p.12. 
22 The moral worth of the act is represented by the letters g (good), b (bad) 
and n (neutral). On the top of the diagram the P stands for performance and 
NP for non-performance. A very similar scheme can be found in Chisholm 
R., ibidem, p.12. 
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7 g b Obligatory 
8 g n Supererogatory 
commission 9 g g Totally supererogatory 
 
This scheme points out the full spectrum of moral acts from 
the point of view of deontic logic. The richest moral theory would 
be one that is able to accommodate all of them. A defective 
moral theory would fail to acknowledge the majority of these 
categories. Specifically acts number six, eight and nine are 
those dedicated to identify the different ways in which it is 
possible to go beyond the call of duty. The totally supererogatory 
is an act whose both omission and performance is good. As 
Chisholm himself referred to them, it is a state of blessedness. 
Correspondingly, supererogatory commission and 
supererogatory omission define those acts whose performance 
(or non-performance) is good and whose non-performance (or 
performance) is neutral (morally indifferent). They both share 
the status of being optional (whether it is optional omission or 
optional commission) and they both are morally good in the case 
they are carried out (whether it is good omission or good 
commission). This classification saves supererogation from 
being considered morally indifferent, assigning its performance 
(or non-performance) to the more adequate category of the 
morally neutral (i.e. optional).  
Interestingly enough, this schematization highlights the 
existence of an antithetical category to supererogation: 
offence23.  As such, this concerns those acts whose commission 
(or omission) is bad and whose omission (or commission) is 
morally optional. Alleged examples of these kinds of act are, for 
instance, taking too long to leave the table at the restaurant 
knowing that someone is waiting or refusing to tell your friend 
where she can buy that jacket she has been strongly looking 
for. 
                                                          
23 Later referred to as “suberogatory”. See Driver J. The Suberogatory, in 
“Australasian Journal of Philosophy”, 70(1992), pp.286-295; McNamara P., 
Supererogation, Inside and Out: Toward an Adequate Scheme for Common-
Sense Morality, in Timmons M. (ed. by), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 
(Vol. 1), Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.202-235.  
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While this scheme of ethics is appealing for its logical 
symmetry and its explicative power, it is worth asking whether 
it goes too far in the delineating some apparently unusual moral 
categories. Particularly, this applies to the categories that 
describe the so-called offences. Is it ever the case that we can 
bring about some venial bad thing without being, at the same 
time, morally reprehensible (i.e. morally blameworthy but not 
morally forbidden)? It seems that, morally speaking, the 
categories of the good and the bad do not work in a symmetrical 
way. While, as we have seen in the previous section, it makes 
sense to conceive a category of the good that does not limitlessly 
require the agent to promote the good, the same cannot be said 
of the category of the bad. The avoidance of actively bringing 
about some instance of the bad is obligatory, that is, the bad is 
forbidden to any degree. The way morality appears to work is 
that of negatively forbidding the bad and positively promoting 
the good. In these terms, the promotion of the good is not 
something that necessarily enters the sphere of requirement (as 
the concept of supererogation testifies). Contrary the negative 
prohibition of the bad (‘do not do x’, ‘it is never the case to bring 
about y’, etc.) always belongs to the sphere of moral 
requirements. This feature of morality explains why we struggle 
so much in finding convincing examples of offences intended as 
the morally blameworthy, but not morally forbidden. If we keep 
in mind that these categories explicitly deal with the evaluation 
of acts, there seems to be nothing of intrinsic moral disvalue 
that should not be morally reprehensible at the same time. It is 
difficult to conceive an example of a morally bad act that is per 
se excusable. Commonly the achievement of morally bad acts 
might become excusable in virtue of the performance of some 
other proportionally bigger morally good act. In this case, then, 
the offence is just side effect of some other morally good act24 
and never a moral act excusable per se. Taking too long at 
leaving the table at the restaurant is always morally forbidden 
                                                          
24 In this regard I refer to the interesting doctrine (or principle) of Double 
Effect. See McIntyre A., Doctrine of Double Effect, in “The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy” (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/double-
effect/. 
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if deliberately done for no good reason. The same can be 
excused only in virtue of some other moral act that it is judged 
proportionally bigger. Think for example of a case where I am 
chatting at the table with my best friend who I have not seen in 
ten years. A proportionate delay in leaving the table, while 
negative for those waiting in line, might be excused.  It seems 
to me that, the fact that offence can be conceived at best as a 
side effect of some other good act undermines whatever 
conception of offence as an independent category of act, which 
is considered per se morally optional despite its morally bad 
connotation25. 
The conceptual symmetry between supererogation and 
offence might be broken when we realize that there is no 
‘offensive’ counterpart of the heroic or saintly kind of 
supererogation. While supererogation’s optionality and value is 
well exemplified by acts that greatly exceed the demands of 
moral laws, the same cannot be said of the antithetical category 
of those acts that while greatly bad are morally excusable26. 
This point underlines the typical asymmetry of morality. To this 
regard let me recall once again the illuminating passage from 
Heyd:  
“By its nature, a moral system does not leave patently bad action 
as morally permissible. In that respect, good and bad, the 
virtuous and the vicious, are not symmetrical from the deontic 
point of view: the good is open-ended in a way that the bad is 
not. The extremely good cannot be required, but the extremely 
bad (vicious) is the prime target of prohibition”27. 
                                                          
25 Another interesting explanation of the fact of offence has been offered by 
the introduction of the idea of inconsiderateness. See Ullmann-Margalit E., 
Considerateness, in “Iyyun” 60(2011), pp.205-244. 
26 Heyd D., Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, p.128. 
27 Heyd D., “Supererogation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2015 edition), Zalta E. N. (ed. by), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/supererogation/>. I 
acknowledge that the issue of suberogation would require a much deeper 
analysis than these few lines. I leave this task to a future and more specific 
work. 
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Upon a deeper reflection on the categories proposed by the 
broader approach of deontic logic proposed by Chisholm, the 
same category of the totally supererogatory (as its offensive 
counterpart) appears to be less plausible. Similarly to offences, 
it seems problematic to find a satisfying example of a 
supererogatory act whose both performance and non-
performance would be good28. In these terms, the two categories 
would be logically possible, but factually empty. Moreover, it 
has been claimed that the totally supererogatory is problematic 
because it would coincide with the morally indifferent, since it 
is indifferent (to the achievement of a supererogatory outcome) 
if the agent does x or y. I do not think (as Heyd does29) that this 
is the real point at issue. In fact, the so-called totally 
supererogatory acts are not morally indifferent, since they will 
bring about some moral good indeed (either x or y). Rather, the 
aspect of these acts that is characterized by (non-moral) 
indifference is which, among the options, the agents decides to 
perform. Again, it is indifferent if she does x or y, since this will 
have equally good consequences no matter what she decides. I 
think that the real problem with this category of supererogatory 
acts (other than their factual emptiness) is that they fail to be 
actual instances of supererogation. Specifically, an act of 
supererogation is characterized by the fact that the agent might 
freely decide not to bring about any instance of the good. Cases 
of totally supererogatory acts seems to have lost this freedom of 
performance (and omission), given that the agent will somehow 
bring about some good (she is “condemned to the good” so to 
say). These acts (which we might call blessed acts in lack of a 
better denomination) fully lose their optionality and so, as we 
will later see with a fuller definition of the concept, they lose the 
special moral connotation that assigns their moral value. 
At a more general level, the problem of supererogation and 
deontic logic reveals an interesting truth. Deontic logic was 
                                                          
28 The fact that Chisholm himself can do without the two extreme categories 
of the totally supererogatory and the totally offensive in a later article written 
with Ernest Sosa is an indication of their theoretical uselessness. See 
Chisholm R., Sosa E., Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of 
Supererogation, in “Synthese”, 16(1966), pp.329-330. 
29 Heyd D., ibidem, p.123n. 
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conceived, from the outset, as a system based on permission 
and, as such, it was concerned with rights and duties. I this 
regard, Millard Schumaker published a compelling remark 
about the problem of supererogation30. It has been assign to 
deontic logic too wide a scope, since it cannot give an account 
of the whole range of acts relevant to morality. The fact that it 
cannot differentiate between supererogation and the morally 
indifferent is a clear example of this. The reason for this limit is 
that from the standpoint of permission, these two categories 
cannot be distinguished. The morally relevant cannot be 
reduced or subsumed to what is relevant to the deontic 
schematization of acts. We can avoid this by acknowledging 
that morality is much more than a subject based on permission. 
Therefore:  
“[…] deontic logic is not the logic of morality; it is instead the logic 
of rights and duties, the logic of right conduct; and that is neither 
required nor forbidden is therefore shown to be indifferent only 
with respect to rights and duties; it is not necessarily indifferent 
to morality itself. The fact of supererogation, then, reveals that 
there is more to morality than right conduct […]”31. 
This explains why every definition of supererogation that tries 
to define it along with the categories of deontic logic, fails to 
acknowledge its moral status together with its moral 
optionality. 
The most important and, at the same time, fascinating aspect 
of the concept of supererogation is that it is a phenomenon that 
reminds us how the good exceeds the right in many ways and 
degrees. This fact is particularly important since it focuses on 
a fundamental theoretical distinction for the vast majority of 
the moral theories: the axiological level and the deontic level. 
These are ‘the two faces of morality’: the one that refers to 
goodness, ideals and virtues and the one that refers to rights, 
duties and obligations. As I have underlined above, the former 
is open-ended in a way that the latter is not and this explains 
                                                          
30 Schumaker M., Deontic Morality and the Problem of Supererogation, in 
“Philosophical Studies”, 23(1972), pp.427-428. 
31 Schumaker M., ibidem, p.428. 
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the possibility to go beyond the sphere of requirements in 
pursuing moral goodness. The relevance of these two levels of 
morality give sometimes rise to a terminology that distinguish 
between the minimal standard of ethics (minimal ethics) and 
some other ideal or broader category (maximal ethics). It would 
be wrong, however, to consider these two categories as separate 
subjects; one more rigorous and notably identifiable with a 
legalistic conception of morality and the other dedicated to the 
promotion of goodness and the aspiration to achieve moral 
ideals. They simply represents the two faces of the same moral 
subject or, in other terms, they represent the different degrees 
of achievement of the normative dimension of our lives. The 
former is the level of the moral requirement, which is expected 
by all moral agents. The latter is the level of moral goodness, 
which is simply desirable of all moral agents. Ultimately, 
morality cannot be merely reduced to its deontic aspects; the 
good is vastly broader than the right and the fact of 
supererogation reminds us of this.   
In what follows, I will present the definition of supererogation 
given by David Heyd in his Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical 
Theory32. While it would certainly be possible to improve the 
definition in different ways, I take this to be most exhaustive 
interpretation of the relevant aspects of the concept. 
Specifically, according to Heyd, four features define 
supererogation as follows: 
“an act is supererogatory if and only if (1) It is neither obligatory 
nor forbidden; (2) Its omission is not wrong, and does not deserve 
sanction or criticism – either formal or informal; (3) It is morally 
good, both by virtue of its (intended) consequences and by virtue 
of its intrinsic value (being beyond the call of duty); (4) It is done 
voluntarily for the sake of  someone else’s good, and is thus 
meritorious”33 
These four conditions all highlight relevant aspects of 
supererogation. In sum, they are: optionality, the moral non-
                                                          
32 Heyd D., Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. 
33 Heyd D., ibidem, p.115. 
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imputability in case of omission, the value of the consequences 
and its intrinsically good status and the altruistic character of 
the act. The present definition presents the first two conditions 
in negative terms (defining what supererogation is not), while 
the latter two are formulated in positive terms (stating what 
supererogation is).  
At this point, it is important to underline that from this 
definition we can derive how supererogation is a moral concept 
primarily concerned with acts, rather than with agents, traits 
of character or other morally relevant aspects of moral 
experience34. Moreover, the composite nature of this definition 
expands the reach and overcomes the limits of those definition 
that define the concept limitedly by the asymmetrical 
opposition of two terms. That is, ‘a supererogatory act is…to do, 
but…not to do’35. Expanding the definition in this way allows 
coming out of the dimension of deontic logic and taking care of 
the non-deontic aspects of supererogation (for example, the 
altruistic character of these acts).  
Let us analyze more specifically the four conditions of 
supererogation. The first condition tries to underline the 
optionality of such acts according to the category of permission. 
As such, we remain within the conceptual framework of deontic 
logic, where when we consider the obligatory as opposed to the 
forbidden, supererogation finds its collocation right in between 
them, into what is permissible. This, however, it is not enough 
if we want to avoid the reduction of the supererogatory to the 
permissible, a category that includes, primarily, the morally 
indifferent. Clearly enough, supererogation, while maintaining 
the condition of being permissible, is not morally neutral. 
Deciding to walk back home on street a rather than on street b, 
is morally permissible and, at the same time, per se morally 
indifferent. Contrary, letting someone jump the line at the 
supermarket because he has very few items to pay is morally 
permissible and, at the same time, being an act of kindness, 
intrinsically morally valuable. Supererogation entails that not 
conceding one’s own position in line is morally permissible as 
well. Supererogatory acts are peculiar permissible acts since, 
                                                          
34 Heyd D., ibidem. 
35 Heyd D., ibidem, p.117. 
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contrary to some other kind of acts in their class, they maintain 
a certain degree of moral value (possibly a very significant one). 
In order avoid the reduction of supererogation to the morally 
indifferent, it is important to further define supererogation’s 
permissibility. Hence, the second condition underlines how 
supererogation is ultimately morally optional36 and thus, its 
omission does not deserve any sort of moral criticism or 
reproach. The terminological shift from permissible to optional 
makes a huge conceptual difference since it allows that the 
moral value of these act does not lose its importance. Moreover, 
a further sort of the asymmetry of morality is revealed in this 
aspect of supererogation. The great praiseworthiness that is 
attributed to the performance of these acts is not paired by a 
similar degree of blameworthiness in the case the agent refrains 
from doing it37.  Being supererogation what lies ‘beyond the call 
duty’ means that it can consequently be considered ‘beyond the 
reproachable’. 
The third condition deals with the moral status of 
supererogatory acts, assigning to them a special moral value. 
As the definition states, this value originates from two different 
sources: the intended consequences and the fact of being 
beyond what is required. The intended consequences must 
bring about some good, but, since it would be inaccurate to 
reduce supererogation to a merely consequential concept, this 
is not enough. Additionally, supererogation has an intrinsic 
                                                          
36 The term optional (contrary to permissible) entails that the act x is not 
necessarily deprived of its moral value. Thus, “[…] while according to (1) 
supererogatory acts are permissible, (2) makes them optional […]an act is 
permissible if despite its negative value (bad, wrong, undesirable) or because 
of its neutral value, it is not forbidden. On the other hand, an act is more 
naturally described as optional if despite its positive value (good, right, 
desirable) or because of its neutral value, it is not compulsory” in Heyd D., 
ibidem, p.116. 
37 This feature of supererogation, it has been noted, reminds the 
characterization of Christian evangelical counsels in the fact that their 
omission is not blameworthy as long as one respects the precepts. Briefly: 
“[…] one ought to follow the counsels only if one seeks certain goals or ideals. 
But these ideals, thought highly praised, are not obligatory, and failure to 
adopt them is by no means wrong” in Heyd D., ibidem, p.130. For an example 
of this aspect see the parable of the young rich man in Matthew 19:16-22 
and Luke 10:17-22.   
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value due to its optionality, i.e. going beyond the call of duty. 
Since the willingness to do the supererogatory means aiming at 
some extra good, it follows that the given supererogatory act x 
is per se worth some degree of moral value. Thus, this particular 
aspect grants the peculiar meritorious nature of supererogatory 
acts: the willingness to achieve some extra (optional) good in 
virtue of its consequences. This reveals that the value of 
supererogation relies on the combination of two moral features. 
In other terms, the combined nature of supererogation’s value 
blends deontological and axiological elements38. As Heyd 
himself acknowledges, the dual nature of the moral value of 
supererogation is heterogeneous and thus: 
“this dual source of moral value explains why supererogation 
requires a theory which blends both axiological and deontological 
elements. Neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism alone is 
sufficient to account for supererogation […]”39. 
Moreover, we need to specify some further important features 
of these two sources of moral value. Specifically, the 
consequences that assign a moral value to the act need to be 
intended. This rules out from the assignment of moral praise all 
those optional well-doings unforeseen by the agent. If I decline 
a job offer in virtue of accepting a more interesting one, I am 
not to be praised if the job offer I refused will benefit another. 
The same scenario greatly changes if I decline the job offer 
because I want someone else to benefit from it (whether I am 
considering another job offer or not). Intention in the 
performance of the act plays a crucial role for its 
praiseworthiness. Furthermore, this also means that the failure 
of satisfactorily performing an act of supererogation does not 
necessarily affect its moral status. For example, if someone 
jumps into the water in order to save a drowning stranger and 
in the attempt of doing so she drowns herself, the failure of 
bringing about the actual supererogatory act (saving the 
                                                          
38 As it starts to appear clear, this fundamental element will be particularly 
relevant for the following part of the present work where I will try to give an 
account of supererogation in virtue of moral pluralist system. See Chapter 
V. 
39 Heyd D., ibidem, p.131. 
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stranger) does not undermine the value of what she has done. 
As long as the agent intended the good desired consequences40, 
the act maintains its moral value. 
Furthermore, if a supererogatory act gains part of its moral 
value from being optional, i.e. more that duty requires, this 
means that there is logical dependence between supererogation 
and duty. In order to explain this fact Heyd introduced two 
conditions that specify the relation between these two moral 
categories: correlativity and continuity41. The former emphasizes 
the fact that we cannot have the concept supererogation 
without the correlation to some kind of duty that is opportunely 
surpassed by the performance of optional well doings. If there 
is no level of requirement, it is logically impossible to conceive 
a category that is beyond requirement42. The latter concept, 
that of continuity, remarks that, although supererogatory acts 
are differentiated from duties in their being beyond, they still 
share with obligations the same kind of moral value. That is, 
the morally good that gives value to supererogation is the same 
morally good that we attach to the performance of a moral duty. 
In other terms, supererogatory acts and moral obligations are 
both evaluated from the same moral point of view, the only 
difference being the degree of moral requirement. That is to say 
that “there is a common and continuous scale of values shared 
by supererogation and duty”43. The relations of correlativity and 
continuity logically entangle supererogation and duty. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that this relation is asymmetrical 
in kind. Duties can be conceptually conceived even without a 
proper classification of supererogatory acts. Although if we 
endorse such an anti-supererogationist theory we could incur 
in extremely demanding duties, it would be hard to argue that 
duties cannot exist in such a theoretical framework. Contrary, 
any theory of supererogation cannot but be grounded on a 
proper concept of duty. Supererogation without a qualified 
                                                          
40 Heyd D., ibidem, p.133. 
41 Heyd D., ibidem, p.5. 
42 “Correlativity means that acts of supererogation derive their special value 
from being ‘more than duty requires’; i.e. they have meaning only relatively to 
obligatory action” in Heyd D., ibidem. 
43 Heyd D., ibidem. 
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relation to duty cannot conceptually exist, while duty is 
conceptually self-sufficient. 
In conclusion, the fourth condition brings in two more 
features fundamental to the definition of a supererogatory act: 
voluntariness and altruistic character. These features give an 
additional connotation to the kind of moral worth which 
supererogation typically involves. If supererogatory acts are 
performed accordingly, moral merit ought to be assigned to 
their agent. This reveals how, differently from the third 
condition where the moral status of the act was the main focus, 
this condition underlines the aspects that make the agent 
morally meritorious44. 
First of all, a supererogatory act, in order to originate moral 
merit, needs to be performed voluntarily by the agent. This 
means that she is free from any kind of pressure to act 
accordingly and free from any concern to refrain from doing so. 
Contrary, if this would not be the case it would undermine the 
moral goodness of the act’s optionality (its being beyond as we 
have seen in the third condition) and, ultimately, the merit of 
the agent. The freedom to perform or not the supererogatory act 
x is functional both to the moral status of the act and to the 
agent herself. Furthermore, the agent has to act altruistically; 
i.e the outcome of her act must primarily benefit someone other 
than herself45. This feature further specifies the character of the 
consequences mentioned in the third condition. The benefitting 
                                                          
44 Heyd D., ibidem, p.136 and p.139. 
45 At this point, it is important to underline how the required altruistic 
character of supererogation is far from being given for granted in the 
contemporary debate. In particular see Mellema G., Beyond the Call of Duty: 
Supererogation, Obligation and Offence, State University of New York Press, 
1991, pp.19-20; Kawall J., Self-Regarding Supererogatory Actions, in 
“Journal of Social Philosophy” 34(2003), no.3, pp.487-498; Archer A., 
Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent, in “Philosophia” 41(2013), 
pp.447-462. A deeper analysis of this point will unfortunately take us off-
topic in the present work. I here just assume that the altruistic character of 
supererogation (following Heyd’s position) is the most accurate description 
of these acts. I have dedicate some space to the issue elsewhere. See 
Grigoletto S., Why Proximity Matters for the Concept of Supererogation?, 
manuscript. 
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consequences must be other-regarding46. As such, as long as 
these two elements (voluntariness and altruistic character) are 
respected, the fourth condition claims that the agent deserves 
to be considered morally meritorious47.   
At this point, it is worth specifying an important distinction 
that Heyd introduces in order to clarify the status of the agent, 
that between motive and intention. Supererogation, as we have 
underlined, requires altruistic intentions, which is different 
from requiring altruistic motives. In fact, the agent might find 
a self-interested motive to act to benefit others. This, however, 
does not prevent the act from having all the features  that make 
supererogation morally good. A self-interested motive to behave 
in a particular way is not, in this context, problematic for the 
status of the act. As Heyd highlights: 
“One may act heroically in order to gain fame, to soothe one’s 
conscience (haunted by guilt feelings), or out of moral self-
indulgence. High-minded motives are not a necessary condition 
for supererogatory action as so many theorists tend to believe. 
Although the motives of supererogatory acts may be self-
regarding, the intention must be other-regarding”48.  
As long as selfish motives do not affect the moral-goodness-
conferring elements (optionality, good intended consequences, 
voluntariness and altruistic character), there is no reason to 
require high-minded motives for supererogatory acts. 
Finally, the altruistic qualification of supererogation rules out 
any possible utilitarian evaluation of the outcome of the act.  
Indeed, the good altruistic consequences are not necessarily the 
best consequences. The foreseen sacrifice of the agent (typical 
of this kind of act) might involve a loss in terms of the general 
amount of happiness. Nevertheless this is, as we have seen, 
                                                          
46 Supererogatory acts typically (even if not necessarily) involve some sort of 
sacrifice by the agent. The act, then, might have some non-benefitting 
consequences that primarily affect the agent herself.  
47 “An act is said to be meritorious only if it earns merit for its agent. Unlike 
the attributes of permissibility and moral goodness, which apply to acts 
independently of their agents, ‘meritorious’ is conceptually linked to persons 
(like ‘intentional’ or ‘benevolent’)” in Heyd D., ibidem, p.139. 
48 Heyd D., ibidem, p.137. 
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what makes supererogation of special moral value49. This 
necessity of altruistic intentions, introduced with the fourth 
condition, makes supererogation’s value not utilitarian in kind. 
Much more could be said to further specify and refine the 
aspects of this definition of the concept. Nevertheless, I 
explicitly want to the limit this analysis to a plain exposition of 
Heyd’s definition. I think that at this point it is already possible 
to show those aspects of supererogation that will become 
functional, in the following chapters, to the positive 
argumentation in favor of a foundation of the concept. In 
particular, let me recall the fact that supererogatory acts deeply 
rely on the theoretical acknowledgment of the different levels 
that constitute the structure of ethics. It has been underlined 
in the present section how morality has two fundamental levels 
of understanding. We can refer to the two ‘faces’ of morality in 
different ways, the deontic and the axiological, minimal ethics 
and maximal ethics, the right and the good. The concept of 
supererogation is a conceptual consequence of this important 
distinction and, as such, it can serve as a proof of that. 
Similarly, the entire first part of this work aimed at pointing out 
how the very nature of moral experience (when it comes to 
moral decision-making) is far from being a unitary matter. 
These expressions of the complexity typical of morality should 
serve as a reminder of the necessity of acknowledging the actual 
nature of the moral domain. 
 
3. How is Supererogation Possible? The Acknowledgment Of 
Moral Complexity 
In the present work the embracement of a complex approach 
to morality aims at recreating, on a philosophical level, the 
theoretical depth that gave rise to the concept of 
supererogation. The etymological origins of supererogation are 
to be found within the Christian tradition and go as far back as 
the parable of the Good Samaritan in the Gospel according to 
St. Luke50. More precisely, though, the theoretical background 
                                                          
49 Heyd D., ibidem, p.132. 
50 Luke 10:25-37. The Vulgate version of the Bible translates as follows the 
lines of the dialogue between the Samaritan and the innkeeper (line 35): “[…] 
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that makes sense of supererogation as a concept derives from 
the later distinction between precepts and evangelical counsels 
as outlined by Catholic theology. I will now dedicate some pages 
to a brief sketch of the theological background that originated 
this concept. 
 Traditionally, the distinction between precepts and counsels 
refers to a well-known passage of the Gospel: the parable of the 
young rich man51. Here Jesus, when asked how to live aiming 
at the eternal life, distinguishes between two paths to salvation. 
A first path is that concerned with the precepts of the 
Decalogue, whose Jesus recalled five of them (Mt 19:18-19), 
plus the so-called rule of love (You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself). These are expected from anyone that has Christian 
charity as the fundamental value of a life lived well. The young 
rich man acknowledged to have lived according to all of these 
precepts and nevertheless he further asks “What do I still lack?”. 
The young man, then, was looking for an additional way of 
achieving a virtuous existence according to the Christian 
doctrine. Jesus, thus, answers by introducing the way of 
perfection to salvation, a route that is not require of everyone52, 
the path of the evangelical counsels. 
The distinction introduced in these pages of the Gospel will 
later fit the classical and fundamental Christian distinction 
between the Old Law and the New Law as later outlined in the 
theological tradition. As it appears especially clear from the 
work of Saint Thomas Aquinas, such a distinction is 
particularly relevant for the Catholic doctrine of a life lived well. 
Briefly, according to Aquinas the law is divided into five 
                                                          
et quodcumque supererogaveris ego cum rediero reddam tibi […]”. Strangely 
enough though, the etymological origin of the word has nothing to do with 
the passages that describe the Samaritan’s decision to stop and rescue the 
stranger (the actual supererogatory act). Actions like this represent the 
typical act of supererogation, acts that are sometimes referred to as Good 
Samaritanism. 
51 Matthew 19:16-22. The distinction is also explicit in a passage of the 
Pauline epistles (I Corinthians 7:25). 
52 The way of living of the counsels has to be understood within the sphere 
of optionality. Jesus introduced it with an if clause: “If you would be perfect 
[…]” in Mt 19:21.  
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different kinds53. One of them is the Divine Law, which, 
combined with the Divine Grace, aims at leading us towards the 
virtues and the goodness. Oppositely, Temptations influence us 
to perform sins in accordance with the vices. Within this general 
schema, precepts and counsels are what constitutes the Divine 
Law, as outlined in the Scriptures. In particular, the Old 
Testament transmits the Old Law by means of the Decalogue of 
Moses, which prescribes us what to do in the form of precepts. 
On the other hand, the New Testament is the bearer of the New 
Law, by means of the teachings and the life of Jesus Christ, 
whose message brought us the counsels. St. Thomas highlights 
this distinction very clearly, underlining the difference between 
the two notions: 
“the difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a 
commandment implies necessity, while a counsel is left to the 
choice of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New 
Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to the 
commandments, and not in the Old Law, which is the law of 
bondage. We must therefore understand the commandments of 
the New Law to have been given about matters that are 
necessary to gain the hand of eternal Happiness, to which end 
the New Law brings us immediately, but that the counsels are 
about matters that render the gaining of this end more assured 
and expeditious”54 
So, the commandments are binding and prescribe us clearly 
what to do (i.e. honor your father and mother) and what not to 
do (i.e. thou shalt not kill). On the other hand, counsels do not 
prescribe anything in particular other that the achievement of 
some extra good and thus, their performance is to be 
considered optional and left to the will of the performer. 
Generally, counsels rely on the avoidance of three things: 
external wealth, carnal pleasures, and honors.  
                                                          
53 See the Summa Theologica, I-II, q.91. 
54 St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, I-II, q.108, a.4. In particular, 
this English translation can be found in The Summa Theologica of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
revised by Daniel J. Sullivan, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1952, 
vol.II, p.336. 
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Notably, St. Thomas points out that the most important thing 
for a Christian is having God as the main end in life. 
Accordingly, this will lead the virtuous believer on the road of 
charity towards Christian perfection. This is the main point of 
a Christian life, aiming at God by expressing a charitable 
behavior55. This is what justifies the obligatoriness of the 
precepts (or commandments), the fact that their observance 
leads to the true Christian existence by expressing that charity 
typical of however is directed towards the love of God. Failing 
to follow the commandments means failing to appreciate the 
true Christian existence and, ultimately, it means not to be 
headed towards God. Differently, the purpose of the counsels is 
not to set an obligation to refuse all the material goods in order 
to gain eternal life. This would certainly be a valuable way of 
living a Christian life, but it remains optional and left to a free 
choice of the single individual. The most important thing is 
keeping God as the primary end of a life lived well. Since the 
abandonment of material goods could facilitate this task, it is a 
desirable, but discretional achievement56. The counsels do not 
prevent us from committing sins (being this the direct purpose 
of commandments), but facilitate the path to Christian 
perfection by avoiding those circumstances where walking on 
the road of charity becomes more difficult (while not 
impossible). This explains how the fact that counsels leads us 
to perfection ‘more speedily’ does not mean that they better do 
what precepts do ‘more slowly’. Instead, this means that if we 
follow the counsels we can walk more easily on the road of 
                                                          
55 “[…] in itself  and essentially the perfection of the Christian life consists in 
charity, principally as to the love of God, secondarily as to the love of our 
neighbor, both of which are the matter of the chief commandments of the 
Divine law” in St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, II-II, q.184, a.3, 
ibidem, p.631. 
56 “Nevertheless, for man to gain the above mentioned end, he does not need 
to renounce the things of the world attain to eternal happiness, provided he 
does not place his end in them; but he will attain more speedily to that end by 
giving up the goods of this world entirely. And so the evangelical counsels are 
given for this purpose” in St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, I-II, 
q.108, a.4, ibidem, p.336. See also Vecchio S., Precetti e consigli nella teologia 
medievale in Bacin S., Etiche Antiche, Etiche moderne, il Mulino, Bologna, 
2010, pp.223-242. 
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charity towards the love of God and our neighbors. The 
difference between precepts and counsels relies on the fact that 
the former help us avoiding all those behavior that are contrary 
to charity, while the latter simply facilitates this task57. This 
explains also why counsels are not strictly required: having an 
easier path to God is a desirable, but free choice. As we have 
seen above, this is the same free choice that Jesus gives to the 
rich young rich man: 
“if you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have and give to the 
poor and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come, follow 
me”58 
Here, contrary to what I have just outlined, it seems that 
perfection is gained only by the repudiation of material goods 
and so by the following of a counsel. Aquinas clarified this 
argument accurately; the focal point that constitutes the 
perfection of the life of the young man is following the Lord (i.e. 
having God as the primary end) and this is something that the 
precepts make possible. The counsel of selling all the material 
goods is the path that more easily leads men to the loving of 
God and so on the road of charity59. In this circumstance, 
selling the material goods is a way of redirecting one’s own life 
toward God more easily, away from those goods that might 
prevent to do this by misdirecting one’s life to material 
                                                          
57 “In other words, the precepts are intended to remove things which are 
contrary to charity, while the counsels are meant to remove things that hinder 
acts of charity” in Heyd D., Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p.21. 
58 Matthew, 19:21. This passage in the words of “Then come, follow me” has 
been widely considered the origin of the doctrines of a Consecrated life. 
While before the council Vatican II the understanding of this particular 
religious experience was considered as being a better Christian existence 
and a faster way of salvation, things have greatly changed since the 
publication of the council’s decree on the adaptation and renewal of religious 
life (Perfectae Caritatis). As St. Thomas Aquinas had already underlined, 
both the way of living a Christian life (consecrated and not) are perfectly 
capable of leading to the Eternal Salvation.   
59 “In this saying of our Lord something is indicated as being the way to 
perfection by the words, Go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor; and 
something else is added in which consists perfection, when He said, And 
follow Me.” St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, II-II, q.184, a.3, 
ibidem, p.631-632. 
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attainments. Almost a millennium before, the words of Clement 
of Alexandria underline, once again, this aspect of the ultimate 
end of the Christian life: 
“‘Sell what belongs to thee.’ And what is this? It is not what some 
hastily take it to be, a command to fling away the substance that 
belongs to him and to part with his riches, but to banish from the 
soul its opinions about riches, its attachment to them, its 
excessive desire, its morbid excitement over them, its anxious 
cares, the thorns of our earthly existence which choke the seed 
of the true life”60 
The material goods represent a problem if someone 
misunderstands the place and the importance they ought to 
have in a Christian Life. External wealth is not something bad 
per se, but since it might distance oneself from a life lived 
according to charity it is preferable to follow the counsel of 
poverty. 
As the work of S. Thomas Aquinas reveals, the 13th century 
was vivaciously animated by a theological debate on these 
particular issues. In particular, the questions about a life lived 
according to humility, poverty, chastity and obedience was one 
of the major points at issue due to the emerging clerical class 
of Mendicant Orders. The nature of these expressions of 
Consecrated life is deeply based on the distinction between 
precepts and counsels. It is in this precise time that the concept 
of supererogation finds its most substantial theorizations in the 
theological sphere. The members of the newborn orders of friars 
were called upon to give an account of the way of perfection 
according to which they dedicated their religious existence 
against the charges of the rest of the clergy. Within this 
scenario, the words of Saint Bonaventure, member of the 
Franciscan order, explain the degrees of charity that can 
constitute the life of a Christian. In particular, in his Apologia 
pauperum contra calumniatorem he makes ample use of the 
concept of supererogation, pointing out how strictly following 
the counsels (as it is typical of the Mendicant Orders) is a 
                                                          
60 Clement of Alexandria, The Rich Man’s Salvation, 11-2 in Clement of 
Alexandria with an English translation by G.W. Butterworth, W. Heinemann-
Harvard University Press, London, 1953, pp.291-293. 
Part II: 
Supererogation in Normative Ethics:  
Definition, Justification and New Perspectives 
 
115 
 
supererogatory (optional we would say) choice61. Precepts and 
counsels represent two distinct degrees of achieving a life in the 
light of charity. While both lead to eternal salvation, the latter 
is known as the way of perfection, a perfection expected only 
from those who decide to live a life beyond the merely required. 
It is not surprising that, within this moral framework of a 
Christian conception of a life lived well, we can find a multitude 
of fascinating examples of supererogation. Think for example of 
the life lived by the Blessed Teresa of Calcutta and the saintly 
act of Saint Maximilian Maria Kolbe. Cases like these clearly 
represent the implementation of a life lived according to the 
evangelical counsels, exemplifying the acts of an agent who 
goes ‘beyond the call of precepts’ so to say. In particular, it is 
this aspect of the Christian conception of a life lived well that 
inspires and theoretically supports the practice of the 
indulgences much criticized by Protestant movements in the 
Reformation era. According to this doctrine, the extraordinary 
well-doings of the saints can be redirected to the forgiveness of 
the sins of other believers. As Pope Paul VI has underlined in 
the Apostolic Constitution Indulgentiarum Doctrina: 
“There reigns among men, by the hidden and benign mystery of 
the divine will, a supernatural solidarity whereby the sin of one 
harms the others just as the holiness of one also benefits the 
others. Thus the Christian faithful give each other mutual aid to 
attain their supernatural aim”62 
Holy behavior (that which lies beyond ordinary required 
practices) can be shared for the beneficence of the people of 
God. It appears clear how such a practice relies on a theoretical 
specification of the many levels of achievement of morality 
within the Christian tradition. Someone who has 
                                                          
61 “Scientium est igitur, quod radix, forma, finis complementum et vinculum 
perfectionis caritas est […] Ipsa vero caritas triplicem habet statum: unum 
quidem infimum, in observantia mandatorum legalium; secundum vero 
medium, qui constat in adimpletione spiritualium consiliorum; tertium autem 
supremum, in perfruitione sempiternalium iucunditatum. […] Secunda est 
perfectio supererogationis […]” in St. Bonaventure, Apologia pauperum contra 
calumniatorem, cap.III, no.2. 
62 Paul VI, Indulgentiarum Doctrina, 1967, no.4.  
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underperformed or underachieved in certain regards can 
benefit from the overachievement of the others. 
A first important conclusion to be drawn from this analysis 
of the theological origins of the concept of supererogation has 
to do with the necessity of a morally complex approach. Moral 
complexity intended as an approach that grants the 
multileveled nature of morality, is fundamental in order to give 
an account of these theological conceptual distinctions that 
represented the fertile background that introduced the concept 
of supererogation in its original theoretical framework. As such, 
we can refer to the distinction between precepts and counsels 
(and not just this one) as a sort of Catholic Complexity63, where 
the grounding idea is that of a system based on multiple levels 
of understanding, normativity and possible achievements. If we 
do not give an account of this aspect in “secular” morality as 
well, there is no way we can properly justify the concept of 
supererogation. Moral complexity, then, is the 
acknowledgement of the two necessary levels of normativity 
that constitute the essence of morality, the axiological and the 
deontic. The adoption of a complex moral system is a promising 
answer to the question of how we can give an account of 
supererogation in a moral system. The absence of such a 
complex approach to morality can lead to the undesirable 
identification of the axiological level with the deontic one. The 
flattening of the levels of morality results in a moral theory that 
aims at the maximization of the good, where every good act is, 
at the same time, required of the agent. Consequently, such a 
system (as I will further highlight in the following chapter) will 
                                                          
63 It might be inappropriate to call it ‘Christian’ Complexity given different 
understanding of the moral sphere that the Protestant tradition has offered. 
The strong opposition in time of Reformation to the theory of supererogation 
(and to the doctrine of indulgences that is grounded on it) was the occasion 
to draw a clear distinction between the ethics of the two different traditions. 
David Heyd, referring to the thought of Martin Luther summarized the 
Protestant opposition to supererogation as follows: “No human being, not 
even a saint, can do all that is strictly required by duty, let alone hope to go 
beyond that. The way to salvation is not through ‘works’ but through divine 
grace alone. Even the most dramatic acts of martyrdom and self-sacrifice, 
which served the Catholics as paradigm examples of supererogation, are 
strictly speaking obligatory” in Heyd D., ibidem.  
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not leave any theoretical space for the concept of 
supererogation. 
However, while the distinction of the many levels of morality 
is a necessary condition of supererogation, is not in itself a 
sufficient one. Complexity is the metaethical background 
condition of a process that takes place at the normative level. I 
have previously defined the structure of morality as being better 
represented by the imagine of a web of interrelated levels, rather 
than that of an ordinated pyramid that culminates in a precise 
value or ideal. As I will further analyze in Chapter V, 
supererogation springs from the normative pulls originated by 
the interaction between two levels of the moral web. Most of the 
times this phenomenon is brought about by the cooperation 
between the axiological level and the deontic level. In virtue of 
this necessity of a complex system, supererogation can rightly 
be considered a complex moral concept, that is, one that 
requires more than a single moral dimension in order to be 
justified. If we oppose to complex concept simple ones, we 
realize how the simple\complex distinction somehow resembles 
the difference between thin and thick concepts. A thick concept 
is a concept (such as ‘courageous’) that has both evaluative and 
descriptive elements64. Its nature is grounded upon two 
relevant aspects of morality. Differently, a thin concept is one 
that concerns a single aspect of morality. Similarly to this 
distinction, I generally define complex concepts as those that are 
concerned with more than one aspect of morality. 
Supererogation, far from being the only one, is a clear example 
of a complex moral concept. As we have seen above, this 
category of acts springs from the interaction of the axiological 
and the deontic level. As such, supererogation requires this 
theoretical complexity and, consequently, cannot but be 
conceived as a complex concept. 
 In conclusion, given the characteristics of the theological 
framework that originated the concept in the Christian 
tradition, I believe that a complex moral system is the answer 
to the questions on how we can give an account of 
supererogation. The challenge, widely expressed by the tone of 
                                                          
64 Kirchin S. (ed. by), Thick Concepts, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
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the contemporary debate on the concept, is that of 
understanding if the existing moral theories can grant the 
degree of complexity that supererogatory acts require. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
WHY MONIST THEORIES STRUGGLE WITH THE 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT? 
 
If we consider the normative ethics debate on the justification 
of supererogatory acts, we can infer that monist theories of 
different sorts generally struggle in this specific regard. As it 
has been already suggested in the previous chapters this 
difficulty has to do with a loss of complexity that makes 
supererogation conceptually impossible. Heyd’s definition of 
the concept underlines the dual moral source of supererogatory 
acts (the intended consequences and its optionality) and, as 
such, they show the inadequateness of single-guided theories:  
“This dual source of value explains why supererogation requires 
a theory which blends both axiological and deontological 
elements. Neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism alone is 
sufficient to account for supererogation […]”1.  
Along these lines, this chapter aims at showing this general 
inadequateness of monist moral theories. So to say, this 
chapter represents the pars destruens of the work, being 
concerned with a negative argumentation on what interferes 
with the justification of supererogation. In particular, I will give 
an account of the main problematic aspects of the justification 
of supererogation as follows: a) The General Argument about the 
impossibility for a monist approach to morality; b) The relation 
between maximizing duties and supererogation, c) Once these 
elements will be clarified, it will be possible to analyze in some 
finer detail the problems of specific normative systems. 
Specifically I will try to explain why both Utilitarianism and 
Kantian Ethics fail to give an account of the concept. 
 
                                                          
1 Heyd D., Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982, p.131. 
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1. The General Argument 
An argument for the inadequateness of a monist theory needs 
to start from a clear definition of what is intended for monism 
in normative ethics. Generally, a monist theory is a theory that 
considers a unique, consistent and ultimate source of morality. 
This role is usually played by a value, an ideal or principle. The 
good is then identified according to a single and unique way of 
reasoning. Well-known examples of this approach are Kantian 
Ethics which aims at freedom (intended as autonomy) and 
Utilitarianism (here intended without further specification) 
which aims at the greatest happiness. Monist theories like 
these, then, suppose that we act according to a single guiding 
principle that will tell us what is the morally good thing we 
ought to do (moral obligations). Respectively, Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative and Mill’s Principle of Utility represent a way of 
moral reasoning that grants that our actions are directed at the 
promotion of the ultimate value. Traditionally this approach is 
opposed to moral pluralism, the idea that morality deals with a 
heterogeneous (yet limited) set of value and principles2. 
Furthermore, it is helpful to outline a synthetic definition of 
the concept of supererogation. Supererogatory acts, broadly 
considered, are morally good but not morally required3. As we 
have seen, this concept entails a distinction between the 
axiological level of morality (moral goodness) and the deontic 
one (moral rightness). Supererogatory acts are those acts that 
exceed the requirements of the deontic in order to bring about 
some extra-ordinary goodness. The failure of acknowledging 
                                                          
2 In the second chapter I have discussed the issue of moral pluralism at 
length. For a general overlook, see Mason E., Value Pluralism, in “The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy” (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed. by), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/value-pluralism/, 
Gaut B., Moral Pluralism, in “Philosophical Papers”, 22(1993), no.1, pp.17-
40. 
3 There is no doubt that Heyd’s definition as outlined in the previous chapter 
is far more adequate than this classification. Nevertheless, I believe that, for 
the present argument, a simpler and less detailed definition will be enough 
for understanding the point at issue.  
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this distinction between different levels of the moral discourse 
consequently brings the failure of appreciating the special and 
peculiar value of supererogation. 
The General Argument aims at underlining how the problems 
of monists with supererogation derive from the difficulty of 
keeping the axiological and the deontic level well distinguished. 
In this regard, the embracement of a single principle of morality 
that outlines the moral ought might prevent from appreciating 
the constitutive heterogeneous nature of morality by smoothing 
over every aspect of it into the deontic sphere. It is not 
surprising that strong monists are usually anti-
supererogationists, as they include this category of acts within 
the realm of moral obligation. 
Specifically, the General Argument reads as follows: 
 
P.1 
Moral Monism is the theoretical approach that 
considers a single ultimate moral source and a single 
way of moral reasoning. 
P.2 
Supererogatory acts are morally good while not 
morally required. 
P.3 
The nature of supererogation entails the existence 
and the distinction between the axiological (the Good) 
and the deontic level (the Right). This explains why 
not all good acts are also required (contra ‘the good-
ought tie up’ thesis). 
C.1 
It is problematic to hold that the same moral source 
can give an account of the different levels of morality. 
We simply cannot conceive a moral principle (a way of 
reasoning from the moral point of view) that sets both 
the agent’s duty and tells the agent how to go beyond 
this same duty. 
C.2 
The multileveled structure of morality entailed by 
supererogation requires a double (at least) source of 
morality. The axiological and the deontic. 
C.3 
Moral monism is the inadequate moral structure to 
give an account of supererogation. 
 
The first conclusion (C.1) requires a further careful comment. 
The main point it raises is that we cannot use the same 
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principle both for setting moral obligations and for 
understanding how to go beyond them. If we allow theories 
driven by a single principle to justify both acts that are “going 
beyond duty” and the duties that those acts surpass we might 
be saying two things. First, that the principle already points out 
the different levels of moral goodness. Or, second, that the 
principle can work in two different ways revealing different 
degrees of good acts, some morally obligatory and some other 
beyond this class of requirements. Both options seem to be 
hard to hold. A moral principle is a way of reasoning that 
provides reasons for action. At the same time, we have good 
reasons to adopt such a principle if we aim at promoting the 
given ultimate value x. Indeed, a principle (here understood as 
the tool of morality), when adopted, fulfills the achievement of a 
specific value. For example, the categorical imperative helps the 
agent to fulfil the ultimate moral value of freedom (in the case 
of Kantian Ethics4). When freedom is taken to be the only 
ultimate moral value, the adoption of the categorical imperative 
is what makes an act morally worthy. The problem for such a 
monistic system is leaving some space to those acts that, while 
not obligatory, are morally good according to that same ultimate 
moral value that animates the adopted principle. Hence the 
problems raised by C.1 start here to arise more clearly. How is 
it possible to say that a principle has fulfilled enough a given 
end, in order to leave that extra space needed by 
supererogation? It seems that in this regard a single principle 
is not able to grant the different levels of morality. Moreover, 
how is it possible to understand how to go beyond 
requirements, when our theory envisions only one way of 
reasoning (principle) and that way of reasoning is fully 
concerned with moral obligation? A single way of reasoning 
animated by a single ultimate value seems incapable of leading 
the agent into two different “moral realms” so to say. 
The second conclusion is a risky one as, according to the idea 
on the structure of morality one has, C.2 can be misunderstood. 
My point can be understood if we identify the two faces of 
                                                          
4 Since this argument intends to be critical of monist theories in general, it 
is implicit that I take it to be working against other form of monism such as 
Utilitarianism. 
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morality in a way that the deontic coincides with the morally 
right and the axiological coincides with the morally good. 
Generally, monistic theories seems to be excessively concerned 
with the deontic aspect of morality by pointing out what is the 
right thing to do. Although this is an essential dimension of 
morality, it is not the only one. Supererogatory acts belong to 
that category of acts that are morally good in a way that exceeds 
the dimension of primary concern for monism5. Supererogation 
(and morality in general) reminds us that human flourishing 
has to do with many moral aspects and ways of behaving. These 
instances of the good can exceed the binding dimension of the 
morally obligatory in many surprising ways.   
The third conclusion states that the loss of moral complexity 
that supererogation requires makes monism the inadequate 
structure of morality for a proper justification of these peculiar 
moral acts. As we will see in some further detail in the following 
sections and in the next chapter, supererogation struggles to 
find its place in those systems that are not able to recreate the 
same complexity that gave origin to the concept in the Christian 
tradition.   
 
2. Maximizing Duties and the Space of Supererogation 
In order to highlight a possible failure to assign the proper 
space to supererogatory acts, we need to consider the relation 
between supererogation and duty. In this regard it helpful to 
recall Heyd’s conditions of continuity and correlativity between 
these two moral categories6. Supererogation and duty stand on 
a continuous scale of value and are both evaluated accordingly. 
Moreover, they are logically correlated since the former exists 
                                                          
5 This passage might give the impression that I am saying that 
supererogatory acts can be defined as “morally good, but not morally right”. 
This, I believe, would be a misunderstanding of the relation between the 
good and the right. Good and Right are not opposed categories. Rather, the 
Good fully includes the Right. The Right is a subset of the morally Good and, 
as such, while not all the good acts are part of the right (i.e. supererogation), 
all right acts are morally good. These two categories are not opposed, but 
part of a continuous scale of moral evaluation. 
6 See Heyd D., ibidem, p.5. See also chapter III of the present work, pp.106-
107.  
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only by being beyond the latter. Nevertheless, there is a specific 
kind of duties that represents a problem for both conditions, 
maximizing duties. A maximizing duty is a moral mandate of the 
sort ‘you ought to bring about x as much as possible’, where x 
is usually a value or ideal that the given theory aims at 
promoting. This is usually the case of consequentialist theories, 
which are structured around a certain value (utility, happiness, 
pleasure, etc.) considered to be morally good to maximize. 
Accordingly, a moral act is evaluated in regards of how much x 
it brings about. If act A is the one that brings about the most x, 
then A is obligatory. 
In the case of supererogation, this kind of duties becomes 
particularly problematic as it undermines the existence of 
supererogatory acts and also, as a side effect, both the 
conditions of correlativity and continuity. Since maximizing 
duties aim at the maximization of the good, the distinction 
necessary for supererogation between the right and the good 
vanishes. Maximizing duties (and consequently maximizing 
theories) have a tendency to fill the entire gamut of moral acts, 
leaving no space to some non-obligatory instances of the good. 
An act A that would bring about the best outcome, cannot but 
be obligatory under a ‘maximizing’ conception of morality, no 
matter if it would generally be considered beyond one’s duty 
according to common-sense morality. For example, sacrificing 
oneself in order to save many is considered a duty as long as 
the surviving of many is a morally better outcome than the 
surviving of myself. It is in these terms that maximizing duties 
cut off any possibility of a space for supererogation. The denial 
of the category of supererogatory acts makes its relations with 
duty useless and unnecessary. More generally, my claim is that 
a maximizing approach to morality does not take into account 
the distinction between the two levels of morality that, as I have 
underlined so far, are necessary to the concept of 
supererogation. This denial of the concept might serve as a 
general argument against the validity of a maximizing approach 
to morality7 since it would cut off a relevant and significant part 
of our moral experience.  
                                                          
7 Note that I am specifically referring to the moral point of view. I am not 
here claiming that ‘maximizing’ cannot be the proper approach to other 
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It is interesting to note that supererogation is not the only 
moral category negatively affected by a maximizing approach to 
morality. A similar criticism has been raised in relation to 
another (and more important) aspect of morality: moral 
integrity. Indeed, Bernard William’s ‘moral integrity’ argument 
is implicitly directed against the maximizing feature of Act-
utilitarianism8. Roughly, the argument reads as follows: (P.1) 
Act-utilitarianism is that moral theory that tells us what to do 
by evaluating an act according to the maximization of overall 
utility; (P.2) The overall utility is evaluated from the impartial 
point of view; (P.3) It is often the case that such an evaluation 
goes against one’s personal projects and ideals; (C.1) Act-
utilitarianism is a misunderstanding of true moral agency, 
since it provides the agent with acts that are not her acts; (C.2) 
Act-utilitarianism undermines the agent’s integrity 
(identification with one’s own acts). Thus, Williams’ argument 
is explicitly against the kind of impartiality that Utilitarianism 
requires. This moral theory expects an impartial and cold-
blooded agent who is ready to give up her most essential ideals 
in virtue of the moral dictate that comes from the “point of view 
of the universe”9. We can go on this line of argumentation and 
say that this misunderstanding of moral agency provides an 
indebted maximization, one that is not appropriately grounded 
on the agent’s personal beliefs. Implicitly, then, Williams is 
against a sort of moral maximization that is purely moral (in the 
sense has nothing to do with the agent’s inner beliefs)10. In his 
own words:  
                                                          
aspects of life. Think for example of maximizing one’s own physical condition 
in view of an athletic competition or maximizing one’s own financial 
condition in view of providing the proper education to one’s own children. 
8 The first formulation of the argument can be found in Williams B., Integrity, 
in Smart J. J. C., Williams B., Utilitarianism: for and against, Cambridge 
University Press, 1973, pp.108-118. 
9 This famous expression is taken from one of the most influential 
utilitarians, Henry Sidgwick. See Sidgwick H., The Method of Ethics, 
Macmillan, 1874. Williams, with the ‘moral integrity argument’ intends to 
attack specifically this impersonal understanding of moral agency. 
10 The debate around Williams’ integrity argument is quite articulated. For 
a good hint of it see Chappell S. G., Bernard Williams, in “The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy” (Spring 2015 Edition), Zalta E. N. (ed. by), URL 
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“It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the 
source of his action in his own convictions. It is to make him into 
a channel between the input of everyone's projects, including his 
own, and an output of optimific decision; but this is to neglect the 
extent to which his projects and his decisions have to be seen as 
the actions and decisions which flow from the projects and 
attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in 
the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity”11.  
Such an understanding of morality as being the result of an 
external point of view gives rise to an indebted authority over 
the agent. In a similar way, I believe that the failure to recognize 
a category of the supererogatory within a maximizing system is 
the result of an indebted maximization. The reason why I claim 
this is that a maximizing approach misses to focus on the 
distinction between the right and the good, and it fails to 
recognize that, rather than the good, it is the right that needs 
to be maximized. The good is too open-ended to be required of 
all moral agents as it includes, among the others, all those acts 
that are performed out of gratuity, self-sacrifice and 
benevolence that find in the evasion from the boundaries of the 
obligatory their morally praiseworthy nature. This is the main 
feature of the acts typically considered as supererogatory. 
Making this special category of acts obligatory (in virtue of their 
morally desirable consequences) will undermine its intrinsic 
value. Moreover, considering supererogatory acts obligatory 
would mean to conceive them as universalizable and expected 
from all moral agents. Quite interestingly, the phenomenology 
of these acts reveals how their agents aim at some extra-good 
when they personally endorse a given end12. Agents of this sort 
do not necessarily think to have performed the right thing 
(whose performance would be considered wrong), but they have 
simply aimed at something considered extra. The only way of 
                                                          
= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/williams-bernard/. 
See also Cox D., La Caze M., Levine M., Integrity, in “The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy” (Spring 2015 Edition), Zalta E. N. (ed. by), URL 
= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/integrity/.   
11 Smart J. J. C., Williams B., ibidem, p.116-117. 
12 See Chapter V, pp.129-130. 
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making sense of supererogation, then, is to outline an approach 
to morality that aims at the maximizing the right, rather than 
the good. All that lies beyond the boundary of the moral right is 
the moral good that would be good to bring about, but not 
wrong to omit. 
This understanding of morality, far from being free from 
possible criticism, relies on the conceptual distinction between 
maximizing and satisficing. This specification, particularly 
interesting for ethical theory, distinguishes between two levels 
of achievement of a given good. Roughly speaking, maximizing 
means, as we have seen, ‘doing as much x as possible’, while 
satisficing means ‘doing x up to a satisfactory point’. This 
distinction becomes particularly important when it comes to 
explaining the way supererogation works. As we have seen 
above, a maximizing understanding of morality does not allow 
any space to the concept, rather, as I will outline now, a 
satisficing understanding of morality is what makes 
supererogation theoretically conceivable. To this regard, Jamie 
Dreier’s paper on the issue is particularly helpful13. Dreier tries 
to show how the rational and the ethical domain differ in 
regards to the question of whether or not to maximize the 
outcome of a given act. It seems that they differ in a way that 
ethical satisficing makes sense, while rational satisficing does 
not. The reason why it seems that ethical satisficing does make 
sense is the intuitive plausibility of acts of supererogation. Here 
we are presented with the so-called paradox of supererogation: 
if supererogatory acts are morally better, why is that they are 
not obligatory? In other terms, why does it seem plausible to 
allow a satisficing account of morality? One that aims at certain 
level of satisfactory achievement and does not require to go on 
and foster the morally best? One way to explain this is to say 
that we might have moral reasons to do the morally best, but 
at the same time, we hold stronger non-moral reasons that 
                                                          
13 Dreier J., Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing 
Doesn’t in Byron M. (ed. by), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theories on 
Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.131-154. I will 
further talk about Dreier’s account of supererogation in the following 
chapter when I will try to outline my own account of supererogatory acts. 
See pp.171-172. 
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outweigh the others. This excuses the omission of the 
supererogatory. However, this justification misses an important 
point of supererogatory acts: in this way, supererogation would 
only be optional from the all-things-considered (rational) point 
of view, but not from a moral point of view. If this were true, the 
agent who refrains from doing some supererogatory act would 
be considered to be doing something wrong from the moral 
point of view14. Nonetheless, what intuitively strikes about this 
kind of acts is that they are morally excusable. This conclusion 
seems counterintuitive and we are apparently led back to face 
the paradox. 
The way Dreier tries to avoid this is by appealing to the 
existence of two (at least) different moral points of view: the 
point of view of beneficence and the point of view of justice15. 
The former is a more ambitious moral point of view that ranks 
every act on a scale in terms of the morally worse and morally 
better. Accordingly, there are good reasons to always do the 
best act. In a sense, it is a point of view that maximizes the 
good. The latter moral point of view, that of justice, evaluates 
moral acts in terms of their moral wrongness and avoids that 
the agent brings about something morally wrong. Following the 
above terminology, we could add that this is a moral point of 
view that grants a satisfactory level of the right. Most 
importantly, then, Dreier underlines that, normally, reasons 
derived from the point of view of justice are particularly 
stringent and strong, as it is difficult for an agent to do 
something plainly unjust. On the other hand, reasons that 
spring from the point of view of beneficence appear less forceful 
and binding, as it might be reasonable (given some relevant 
opposing non-moral reasons) not to do the morally best thing 
(i.e. the supererogatory)16. What Dreier explicitly leaves as an 
open question it is why is that the point of view of justice 
happens to be in this favored position over the other moral point 
of view. My take on this important issue is that reasons of 
justice disclose a stronger influence because it would be 
impossible to live in a society that openly allows instances of 
                                                          
14 Dreier J., ibidem, p.149. 
15 Dreier J., ibidem. 
16 Dreier J., ibidem, p.150. 
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moral wrongness. This appears as the minimal standard 
required for conceiving the social dimension of human beings 
that want to live together. Differently it is possible (even if 
undesirable) to think of a society that lives without any 
actualization of moral beneficence. One that is less (if not at all) 
concerned with living according to better moral standards than 
those strictly required by sufficient coexistence with the others. 
This is what makes the moral point of view of beneficence less 
stringent than the moral point of view of justice. 
Furthermore, the moral points of view have to be confronted 
within the bigger picture of the point of view of all-thigs-
considered. In this regard, the agents considers the relevance 
and the stringency of all the moral reasons together with the 
non-moral reasons there are for acting in way or another. This 
is ultimately the rational point of view; the one that envisions 
and combines all the pulls for action to which the agent 
withstands. Since the rational point of view is the all-things-
considered point of view, it would be impossible to claim that 
we do not always identify the rationally best thing. Regardless 
to fact that we actually perform that act, it would impossible to 
claim that we approach the rational point of view in a satisficing 
way. It is in this situation, however, that reasons for 
supererogation can be silenced and outweigh by some more 
rationally stringent non-moral reason for its omission. For 
example, it would be the morally best option to jump into a 
burning car trying to rescue the people trapped inside, but, at 
the same time, it might not be the case that John puts his life 
in great danger given that his wife and his five children all rely 
on his job to scrape out a living. But what if John finally does 
jump into the burning car? Would his action be considered 
irrational, since the non-moral reasons that originally 
outweighed the reasons for supererogation are just left 
unheard? I believe so. While supererogatory acts are always 
morally praiseworthy, sometimes they are not rationally 
justified. It remains an open question if it is specifically this 
willingness to pursue that extra-good no matter what that 
assigns to these actions their special value. 
An interesting example of the problematic nature of 
maximizing duties is that provided by the case of special 
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obligations. These are those peculiar obligations that we usually 
have in virtue of our relationship with the beneficiary of our 
acts. In this sense, the relational proximity to the beneficiary of 
the act grounds specific duties17. Take for example the 
parent\children relationship: I am required to do as much as 
possible to care for my daughter’s needs in a way that is 
completely different from my caring for the needs of a stranger. 
This reveals that a certain degree of relational proximity can 
involve maximizing duties. If this is the case, then, the 
possibility of performing a supererogatory act is affected and 
eventually undermined by the presence of such special 
obligations. The bigger conceptual space maximizing duties 
take, the smaller is left to supererogatory acts18. 
Summing up again Dreier’s position, we can highlight how 
the existence of the two moral points of view is what makes 
supererogation possible and not paradoxical. Dreier’s strategy 
(which seems to me fully plausible) is to show that the only way 
to solve the paradox of supererogation is to acknowledge (at 
least) the two necessary levels of morality that, as I have 
highlighted above, happen to be fundamental to the concept. 
As a matter of fact, this distinction stands for the two faces of 
morality: the evaluative dimension and the deontic dimension 
or, according to my understanding of them, that between the 
Good and the Right. Committing to a unidimensional 
understanding of morality results in the loss of the typical 
complexity of this human domain. One of the consequences of 
this choice would be that of denying any space to the concept 
of supererogation. 
 
3. Utilitarianism and the Denial of Supererogation 
Following the conclusion of the General Argument against 
the accountability of supererogation in monist theories, I will 
try to highlight more specifically how the most famous moral 
approaches might fail to accommodate the concept. In this 
                                                          
17 See Jeske D., Fumerton R., Relatives and Relativism, in “Philosophical 
Studies”, 87(1997), pp.143−157. 
18 I have dedicated some more in pages to this issue in Grigoletto S., Why 
Proximity Matters for the Concept of Supererogation?, manuscript. 
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section I will deal with consequentialism mostly in the 
specification offered by Act-utilitarianism. Traditionally 
Utilitarianism has been specified in many different ways, each 
of which tries to answer to a particular criticism that has been 
raised against the classic version of the theory. It is mostly to 
the classic (and less artificial) version of Act-utilitarianism that 
I will here refer19. Roughly, this (original) version of 
Utilitarianism is the theory that, evaluating the agent’s act by 
its consequences claims that the morally right thing to do is the 
one that brings about the most happiness overall (generally 
conceived as the promotion of pleasure and the absence of 
pain). Using the famous words of Jeremy Bentham we can sum 
up this position we the motto “the greatest good for the greatest 
number”, also known as the principle of utility20. 
As it appears clear from these words, classical Utilitarianism 
aims at the maximization of the good. Bentham claimed that the 
right act, the one that ought to be performed, is the act that 
represents the optimal promotion of happiness of those 
interested by the act. I think that we can already acknowledge 
from this claim how keeping the two levels of morality well 
distinguished becomes more problematic in such a moral 
structure. From a utilitarian point of view the right (what ought 
to be done) is intended as the morally best action available, the 
one that maximizes the good. As underlined in the previous 
sections this represents a major problem for supererogation, a 
problem that James O. Urmson, in his seminal article on the 
status of supererogatory acts, was already well aware of: 
                                                          
19 It is interesting to see how different versions of consequentialism can 
greatly differ in dealing with the concept of supererogation. For good 
examples of this matter see Vessel J. P., Supererogation For Utilitarianism, 
in “American Philosophical Quarterly”, 47(2010), no.4, pp.299-319. 
20 While Bentham is acknowledged to be the father of this expression, 
conceptually he has been greatly influenced by the previous work of Francis 
Hutcheson, David Hume and Cesare Beccaria. Beccaria himself claimed: “La 
massima felicità divisa nel maggior numero” in Beccaria C., Dei delitti e delle 
pene, Francioni G. (ed. by), Mediobanca, 1984, p.23. See Bentham J., An 
Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Hafner Press, 1948. 
In particular refer to Chapter I. 
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“If for Moore, and for most utilitarians, any action is a duty that 
will produce the greatest possible good in the circumstances, for 
them the most heroic self-sacrifice or saintly self-forgetfulness 
will be duties on all fours with truth-telling and promise-
keeping”21. 
This is the main problem of Utilitarianism: the maximization 
of the good elevates the right to the highest standard, a 
standard that is intuitively unreasonable to ask of everyone. 
Consequently, a moral approach of this kind ends up holding 
an open denial of the class of supererogatory acts. If the alleged 
act of supererogation is the one that brings about the best 
outcome, then it makes no sense not to consider it a moral 
requirement. This denial of the two faces of morality and of its 
multileveled nature is well expressed by the motto “good ought 
tie up”. What is good needs to be done22. Nevertheless, this 
criticism only works with the specific interpretation of ought as 
personal and prescriptive. The former of these two connotations 
refers to a use of ought as in ‘you ought to do x’, different from 
the impersonal use, as in ‘x ought to be done’. This personal 
understanding of ought is troublesome because it casts a 
requirement directly on a specific agent to do something no 
matter how costly the performance of the act is. However, I 
think that the aspect of ought that tends to generate the most 
substantial ambiguity is the commendatory versus the 
prescriptive use of ought. ‘You ought to see that movie if you 
want to spend an enjoyable night’ does not necessarily entail a 
requirement, but a suggestion to do something given the fact 
                                                          
21 Urmson J. O., Saints and Heroes, in Melden A. I. (ed. by), Essays in Moral 
Philosophy, University of Washington Press, 1958, p.206. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the second part of Urmson’s paper reveals a strong belief 
in the possibility that Utilitarianism, upon some refinement, would be able 
to accommodate the concept. 
22 “The denial of supererogation is basically associated with the rejection of 
the idea of the two faces of morality. Normativity is one and cannot be split 
into two levels, that of the good (the desirable, the ideal, the recommended) 
and that of the required (the obligatory, the prescribed). What ‘ought to be the 
case’ also ‘ought to be done’ ” in Heyd D., Supererogation, in “The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy” (Winter 2015 Edition), Zalta E. N. (ed. by), 
forthcoming, URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/supererogation/>. 
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that there are some reasons to act accordingly. Contrary, the 
prescriptive use of ought generally entails a strong requirement 
to do x given some alleged decisive reason to do it23. ‘You ought 
to finish your homework if you want go out and play with your 
friends’ says the mother to her child. In this second 
understanding of ought the very idea of supererogation is 
denied since any good, as long as it is the best option, requires 
performance. The reason for this denial is a ‘good-ought tie up’ 
conception of ethics. 
A criticism of the concept of supererogation that follows this 
conception of ethics is that given by Christopher New24. He 
holds that we need to abandon the intuitive belief that 
supererogatory acts exist, rather than rejecting the founding 
idea of Utilitarianism that whatever maximizes the good needs 
to be done. New recognizes a sort of distinction between basic 
duties (those necessary for a tolerable civilized life) and non-
basic ones (those that enrich our everyday life) and he holds 
that both categories are part of one’s moral requirements. He 
directly addresses Urmson’s attack of Utilitarianism when he 
points out how morality would become high and unattainable 
for most moral agents if the duty of maximizing the good were 
true. To this New answers that morality is regulated by the 
‘ought implies can’ principle, thus duties are commensurate to 
the agent’s capacities. If a particular agent would be perfectly 
able to perform a saintly or heroic act we cannot fail to consider 
it one of her duties. It is here, I believe, that his argument 
against the existence of supererogation becomes faulty:  
“It may be retorted that the alcoholic and the kleptomaniac […] 
have at least a duty to try to be temperate and honest. But this 
argument can be applied to saintliness and heroism too – have 
we not all a duty to try to become saintly and heroic, to resist the 
pull of selfishness and fear as much as we can?”25. 
                                                          
23 Heyd D., Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p.79. 
24 New C., Saints, Heroes and Utilitarians, in “Philosophy”, 49(1974), pp.179-
189. 
25 New C., ibidem, p.181. 
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In order to confute this position we need to point out how 
sometimes supererogatory acts put the agent in front of a clear-
cut decision. Think for example of the case of a stranger who is 
drowning into rushing white waters. The best thing to do in that 
situation would be jumping into the water and try to save the 
stranger. Still, due to the conditions of the water, there is no 
certainty of a successful rescue. First, if I cannot swim very well 
the ‘ought implies can’ principle prevents me from having this 
action among the options that can be performed. There is no 
non-basic duty to “at least try” to save the stranger. Either I can 
(and ought to) do it or not. Second, what if I am a good swimmer 
indeed? What kind of ought is that presented in this moral pull? 
I think it remains a commendatory use of ought rather than a 
prescriptive ought. Given the high risk of the operation that 
would lead to the best outcome in terms of happiness, the 
performance of the supererogatory act maintains its optionality, 
no matter the fact that it represents the act that would generate 
the best outcome. Moreover, in real life it is plenty of cases 
where the calculus of utility is far from being easy to achieve. 
Uncertainty about the success of the act undermines the status 
of a duty, no matter how good its consequences are. The same 
can be said when the act entails a possible self-sacrifice by the 
agent. It is usually the case that supererogatory acts, even if 
they let imagine the best possible outcome, they are far from 
giving the certainty of achieving these desirable results. This, I 
believe, undermines the status of their alleged obligatoriness 
even from a utilitarian perspective. Claiming that they would be 
obligatory, no matter any evaluation of their consequences, 
leads to an idea of morality that tends to freely violate the 
agent’s autonomy. This, I believe, is not the happy society where 
it would be desirable to live. In order to avoid this, I think that 
the optionality of performance of these peculiar acts takes the 
precedence over the theoretical needs of a given theory; the 
choice to always perform the morally best is left to the 
commitment of the individual agent of bringing about the good. 
Cases like this show how one thing is to think of beneficence 
and altruism as something highly desirable that needs to be 
promoted as much as possible, another is to consider this sort 
of maximization mandatory at any cost. The “higher flies of 
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morality”26 cannot be considered altogether duties. As I have 
underlined above, the concept of supererogation benefits from 
the fact that the categories of the good and the bad are not 
perfectly symmetrical within a reasonable moral system. While 
the rejection and the prevention of the bad is the first object of 
moral theorizing, the good is desirable and open-ended. While 
there if often a precise prescription of how not to bring about 
the bad, the opposite is not true when it comes to the 
performance of the good. Negative theorizing (of the kind of ‘do 
not do x’, ‘never forget to x’, etc.) is what grounds the level of 
the morally right. The reason for this is the necessity of laying 
down that minimum level of morality that makes civilized life 
possible and enjoyable for everyone. Thus, it makes no sense, 
as New does, to say that the kleptomaniac is not doing 
something wrong as long as he tries not to steal and be honest. 
Using New’s terminology27, it is very different to fail to act in 
compliance with a basic duty than failing in regards to a non-
basic one. Basic duties ultimately are what grounds the 
civilized life of a society and, as such, they have a different 
degree of obligatoriness. Anyone should be able to live 
according to basic duties and that is what makes them of a 
different moral character. The same cannot be said of what New 
calls “non-basic duties”: moral agents greatly differ in the way 
they can contribute to the establishment of a better world and 
this difference explains why it makes no sense to consider 
beneficence a duty in a specific way. The achievement of the 
good is desirable and needs to be promoted by any moral agent. 
The specific way to do it, though, is left to the moral imagination 
of every single self. New’s general argument for the 
obligatoriness of supererogatory acts misses this important 
aspect of morality. His argument says roughly the following: P1. 
We do not want a civilized life for its own sake, but because it 
is a happy life to live, thus it is reasonable to want a civilized 
life as happy as possible; P.2 Basic duties are obligatory 
because they increase the happiness of life; C.1 Since alleged 
supererogatory acts greatly increase happiness too, they are 
                                                          
26 As Urmson calls the performance of acts beyond the call of duty. 
27 A terminology that I nevertheless refuse to accept given the fact that 
morality goes far beyond the basic and non-basic distinction of duties. 
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obligatory indeed. This argument, as it appears clear, fails to 
consider any non-utilitarian consideration of morality28. As a 
consequence the only moral purpose is the maximization of the 
good even at the expenses of the agent’s autonomy. Moreover, 
New claims that, according to the general argument, if someone 
has the capacity to perform a heroic or saintly act she has duty 
to do so. I think it would be very unlikely (if not impossible) to 
discern the morally relevant capacities of an agent and infer the 
degree of duty she is expected to conform to. Again, this is what 
discriminates the obligatory from the non-obligatory: the 
obligatory can regularly be required of any moral agent, the 
non-obligatory cannot. Many cases of supererogatory acts (as 
that of the rescue of the drowning stranger) are acts that it 
would be irrational to ask of anyone no matter the degree of 
self-sacrifice involved. The concept of supererogation 
traditionally refers to the ‘higher flies of morality’ and even if it 
is true that some moral agents are perfectly capable of these 
desirable achievements, it is preferable to maintain their 
optional moral status. A society that allows the requirement of 
sacrificing someone to benefit the others in virtue of the 
calculus of utility would not ultimately be the expression of the 
civilized life that New holds dear. A society of this sort, while 
morally perfect for utilitarian standards, would not be a 
desirable one. According to Heyd, New’s anti-supererogationism 
originates from the misunderstanding of the commendatory use 
of ought with the prescriptive29. It is true that sometimes we 
tend to promote the performance of supererogatory acts, but if 
we keep in mind the commendatory use of ought, we realize how 
this promotion of the good does not necessarily entail a moral 
requirement. In these terms, Utilitarianism, in its less 
articulated versions30, introduces an indebted 
oversimplification of morality.    
                                                          
28 Heyd D., ibidem, p.79. 
29 Heyd D., ibidem. 
30 A criticism of this sort does not necessarily apply to other more articulated 
versions of Utilitarianism. See Vessel J. P., Supererogation for Utilitarianism, 
in ‘American Philosophical Quarterly’, 47(2010), pp.299-317.  
It is nevertheless true that these other forms of Utilitarianism present other 
related problems for accounting the concept of supererogation. Non-
maximizing or satisficing versions of Utilitarianism tend to struggle to 
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Generally, classical Act-utilitarianism seems to fail to 
consider those supererogatory acts, which, while maintaining a 
high moral status, do not necessarily increase the general 
amount of utility. For example, think of the self-sacrifice of two 
parents, who are trying to save their only child. Losing two lives 
in order to save one might be considered a loss in terms of the 
calculus of utility. Still, we do not fail to appreciate from the 
moral point of view what they have done. Many supererogatory 
acts that involve self-sacrifice are considered morally good no 
matter the result in terms of utility31. As I have underlined in 
the previous chapter, what really assigns the moral value to this 
particular category of acts is its optionality and its altruistic 
nature. Both of these features are not concerned with the 
maximization of any given good and this is something in open 
disagreement with the utilitarian doctrine. These lines by John 
Stuart Mill reveal how cases of non-maximizing self-sacrifice 
are not considered morally worthy:  
“The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the 
power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of 
others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. 
A sacrifice which does not increase or tend to increase the sum 
total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-
renunciation which it applauds is devotion to the happiness, or 
to some of the means of happiness, of others, either mankind 
collectively or of individuals within the limits imposed by the 
collective interests of mankind”32. 
Utilitarianism is usually widely influenced by a line of 
argumentation of this sort. 
                                                          
identify the level of the “good enough” that can be surpassed by 
supererogatory acts. 
31 In truth, even the failure of performance of a supererogatory act does not 
affect its moral status. I have already dedicated some pages to this matter 
here, see pp.105-106. See Heyd D., Supererogation: Its Moral Status in 
Ethical Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.133. I concede, 
however, that the agent of a supererogatory act needs at least to aim at some 
good consequences (even if not necessarily the best ones). 
32 Mill J. S., Utilitarianism, Hackett Publishing Company, 2001, pp.16-17. 
Chapter IV: 
Why Monist Theories Struggle With The Justification Of The 
Concept? 
138 
 
The evaluation of the entire moral gamut according to a 
single and unique scale that goes from the morally worst to the 
morally best33 is a moral approach that presents an 
indisputable theoretical loss. In this way, the morally right 
simply identifies with the morally good and the deontic level of 
morality becomes the same thing as the evaluative one. In other 
terms, the role of the deontic is delegated to the evaluative. 
Everything that is evaluated as morally good is, at the same 
time, morally required. Moreover, according to the maximizing 
conception of morality, something is morally good only as long 
as there is no other morally better option. This, in light of the 
importance of Moral Complexity underlined in the first part of 
the present work, represents the loss of an important 
dimension of morality in favor of a theoretical oversimplification 
that does not take into account the complexity of our moral life. 
As a consequence, the utilitarian “good-ought tie up” 
conception of morality leads to the denial of the concept of the 
supererogation. The very existence of the concept relies on the 
distinction of the multiple levels of morality. If we deny this, we 
deny the concept altogether. Then, Utilitarianism, in its 
maximizing and less articulated versions implicates the 
following: 
(Evaluative → Deontic) ⇒ ¬Supererogation 
in other terms 
(Good → Right) ⇒ ¬Supererogation 
If the good and the right are domains that do not maintain a 
certain degree of independence, we will lose the possibility of 
explaining those aspects of morality that appear so intuitively 
agreeable (and supererogatory acts are clearly of this sort). 
Deriving one level entirely from the other will make lose that 
theoretical complexity that makes the concept of 
supererogation explicable. The utilitarian denial of 
supererogation is a consequence of considering obligatory 
everything that is morally good (“good-ought tie up”). As we will 
                                                          
33 And remember that it is a morally best that ultimately becomes the 
morally obligatory. 
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see in the following section, a very similar (even if not identical) 
claim can be said of Kantian Ethics. 
 
4. Kantian Ethics and the Denial of Supererogation 
In the contemporary debate, the classification of “Kantian 
Ethics” has different understandings. First, we could refer with 
that name to the moral philosophy explicitly developed by 
Immanuel Kant in the later part of the eighteenth century. In 
these terms Kantian Ethics is precisely Kant’s ethics. At the 
same time, Kantian Ethics might refer to a sort of ethics that, 
while not attributable to Kant himself, has been developed 
under an evident Kantian insight. The contemporary debate is 
plenty of examples of this latter understanding of the term. 
Nonetheless, the present section aims at showing the denial of 
supererogation according to the former understanding of 
Kantian Ethics. I will try to refer, as much as possible, to Kant’s 
original position34. As it will become clear the sort of criticism 
that I intend to raise against the possibility of a Kantian 
account of supererogation is similar (while not identical) to the 
one raised against Utilitarianism. I hold that, both these 
criticisms are directly derived from the General Argument as 
expressed above. 
Generally, the argument for the denial of supererogation 
within the Kantian moral theory follows this pattern: P.1 For 
Kant the moral good of an act directly derives from its being 
motivated by the moral law; P.2 Alleged acts of supererogation 
are morally good, while merely optional and thus neither 
universalizable nor derived from duty; C.1 For Kant there 
cannot be some moral goodness beyond the call of duty, 
therefore, supererogatory acts do not exist. However, as we will 
see in what follows, this argument cannot be taken as the 
Kantian position par excellence without further qualifications. 
                                                          
34 This leaves as an open question whether or not a Kantian Ethics (intended 
in its second understanding) might be able to account for the concept of 
supererogation. Possibly, a good example of an attempt to interpret Kant’s 
theory and expand it in order to fit new questions is Hill T., Kant on Imperfect 
Duty and Supererogation, in ‘Kant-Studien’, 62(1971), pp.55-76. In 
particular, see pp.71ff.  
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A study of Kant’s moral theory cannot fail to acknowledge 
that the entire Kantian production of ethical writings does not 
represent a unitary and coherent position. It has been often 
underlined how Kant’s claims in his earlier works on morality 
(namely the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the 
Critique of Practical Reason) slightly differ from those in his later 
works (most notably The Metaphysics of Morals). A study of a 
possible account of supererogation clearly shows these 
differences within Kant’s production35. Let us analyze, then, 
some passages of Kant’s works that might cast some light on 
the question of supererogation within his moral theory. 
The less rigorous position contained in the Metaphysics of 
Moral seems to allow for some space to the category of 
supererogatory acts. Specifically, when Kant talks about the 
distiction between perfect and imperfect duties36 he seems to 
offer that understanding of morality, as characterized by 
different levels of accomplishment, that makes supererogation 
possible. A perfect duty is a rigorous and strict moral duty (such 
as ‘do not kill’). An imperfect duty is a moral duty that allows 
for a certain freedom of choice in regards of how and when to 
be performed (i.e. ‘be generous with the others’). As it is usually 
underlined, imperfect duties leaves a sort of play-room 
(latitudo37) to the agent, whose role is to understand how and 
when to fulfill them. In regards to the wider and less demanding 
category of imperfect duties Kant claims the following: 
“Imperfect duties are, accordingly, only duties of virtue. 
Fulfillment of them is merit (meritum) =+a; but failure to fullfil 
them is not in itself culpability (demeritum) =-a, but rather mere 
deficiency in moral worth =0, unless the subject should make it 
his principle not to comply with such duties. It is only the strenght 
of one’s resolution, in the first case, that is properly  called  virtue 
(virtus); one’s weakness, in the second case, is not so much vice 
                                                          
35 For a more detailed analysis of this sort see chapter III in Heyd’s 
Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, pp.49-72. 
36 A distinction he had already introduced earlier in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. 
37 Kant I., The Metaphysics of Morals, Gregor M. (ed. by), Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, p.153 
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(vitium) as rather mere want of virtue, lack of moral strenght 
(defectus moralis)”38 
Passages as this one make us think that supererogation is, at 
least, logically possible within the Kantian system. An imperfect 
duty so explained is almost identical to the contemporary idea 
of supererogation. An act whose performance is good and whose 
non-performance does not constitute a moral loss39. Whether 
or not Kant himself had in mind something like the concept of 
supererogation (a term that he never adopted) is hard to tell. 
Less rigorous interpretations of what an imperfect duty is for 
Kant tend to highlight this similarity between supererogation 
and this kind of duties. The focal point at issue is the 
permissibility to refrain from doing what a given imperfect duty 
tells me to do. If we would be able to do this without further 
qualification, supererogation and imperfect duties will finally be 
the same thing. The problem is that for Kant we cannot dismiss 
a duty without qualification, as this passage clearly highlights: 
“[…] but a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make 
exceptions to the maxim of actions, but only as permission to limit 
one maxim of duty by another (e.g. love of one’s neighbor in 
general by love of one’s parents), by which in fact the field for the 
practice of virtue is widened”40 
A wide duty cannot be dismissed for no reasons (for an 
inclination not to do so we might say), but only insofar as there 
is another wide duty that undermines its demandingness. I 
                                                          
38 Kant I., ibidem. 
39 Similarly, other passages seem to make an implicit reference to the idea 
of supererogation: “That man is worthy of positive honour, whose actions are 
meritorious, and contain more than they are due to contain” in Kant I., Lecture 
on Ethics, Heath P., Schneewind J. B. (ed. by), Cambridge University Press, 
1997, p.75. Also: “If someone does more in the way of duty than he can be 
constrained by law to do, what he does is meritorious (meritum); if what he 
does is just exactly what the law requires, he does what is owed (debitum); 
finally, if what he does is less than the law requires, it is morally culpable 
(demeritum)” in Kant I., The Metaphysics of Morals, p.19. As Heyd pointed 
out, when Kant deals with these subjects, he is apparently using ‘the 
language of supererogation’, Heyd, ibidem, p.65. 
40 Kant I., ibidem. 
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believe that this highlights the major difference between wide 
duties and supererogation and thus it rules out any possible 
identification of one with the other. Supererogatory acts can be 
abandoned without qualification and permission. This is what 
grounds their optionality and what assings great value to their 
potential performance. No matter how ‘wide’ our understanding 
of Kant’s imperfect duties, they will never match that level of 
optionality typical of supererogatory acts. 
Another interesting attempt to accommodate supererogatory 
acts within a Kantian framework is that of the conjunctive 
performance of imperfect duties41. Roughly, this is what 
happens when the agent has the possibility of fulfilling an 
imperfect duty by either x or y and decides to do both. In other 
terms, this means that imperfect duties, in a Kantian sense, 
entail the performance of at least one of the possible options 
that would fulfil the duty (call this a disjunctive fulfillment). In 
the case of supererogatory performance instead, the agent, 
rather than picking one of the alternatives that would fulfil a 
given imperfect duty, decides to go beyond the morally required 
(given that she has the possibility to do so) by performing more 
than one satisficing option42 (call this conjunctive performance 
of imperfect duties). If the duty of beneficence might be fulfilled 
either by donating money to a charitable organization or by 
donating 2 hours of my free time to the same organization and 
I decide to do both, I am exceeding the requirements of the 
imperfect duty in the given circumstances. The freedom of 
choice that Kant allows for the fulfillment of the imperfect duty 
in one way or the other is the same freedom of choice that allows 
for the agent to perform both of them, when possible. 
Nonetheless, even if this understanding of imperfect duties 
pairs the performance of the good that is expected of a 
supererogatory act, I believe that it fails to match another 
important aspect of supererogation: its permissible non-
                                                          
41 It remains an open question whether this attempt is faithful to Kant’s 
original doctrine or it relies on the second understanding of Kantian Ethics 
intended as a moral approach that shares the original spirit of Kant’s Ethics 
while looking to revise it in some regards.   
42 Thomas Hill has suggested a possibility of a category of supererogation of 
this sort. See Hill T., ibidem, p.71. 
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performance. Let me sum up the conjunctive performance of 
imperfect duties that allude to a possibility for explaining 
supererogation in Kantian terms43: 
a) Imperfect duty: O(a ˅ b) 
b) Supererogatory act: (a ˄ b) 
c) Supererogatory omissibility: ¬O(a ˄ b) 
It follows from c) that the omission of a supererogatory act 
can be expressed as P¬(a ˄ b). From this I derive44 P(¬a ˅ ¬b). 
This claim can be true in the following cases: 
d) (a ˄ ¬b)  
e) (¬a ˄ b) 
f) ¬(a ˄ b) 
However, claim f) seems to be a case of omission of 
supererogatory act that Kantian Ethics fails to account. 
Specifically claim f) ¬(a ˄ b) contradicts the Kantian definition 
of an imperfect duty as in claim a) O(a ˅ b).  A theory of 
supererogation, instead, has no difficulties of considering claim 
f) as morally permissible. The optionality of supererogatory acts 
makes it perfectly acceptable to entirely refrain from the 
performance of that extra good. The same cannot be said of a 
typically Kantian theory where, in regards to imperfect duties, 
claim f) is not morally permissible (or, in other terms, it is 
considered morally bad). While there is a certain latitudo in 
terms of how to fulfil the imperfect duty, not fulfilling that duty 
at all is simply morally wrong. Claim f) represents the case of 
the omission of a supererogatory act (or series of acts) that 
entails the infringement of an imperfect duty. In other terms 
claim f) represents a case where supererogation and imperfect 
duties ultimately differ, since a theory of supererogation would 
be perfectly ok with this sort of omission, while the Kantian 
                                                          
43 For the mere explicative purposes I adopt here the terminology of Deontic 
Logic. Take O as obligatory and P as permissible. It is implicit in the use of 
“a” as a given act that we refer to the “performance of a”.  
44 According to the De Morgan’s Law the negation of a conjunction is the 
disjunction of the negations. As such, the omission (or non-performance) of 
supererogation can be expressed as: (¬a ˅ ¬b). Claims d, e, f represent the 
three ways in which P(¬a ˅ ¬b) can be true. 
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theory of imperfect duties does not allow the same omission. 
This, I believe, reveals how a Kantian account of supererogation 
in terms of a conjunctive use of imperfect duties, fails to give a 
complete account of the optionality typical of supererogation.  
The case of the omission of imperfect duties reveals how these 
duties are notwithstanding duties and, as such, they entail 
some degree of moral loss in at least one specific case of non-
performance. This, I believe, is the primary difference with the 
concept of supererogation understood in non-Kantian terms45. 
The impossibility to account for supererogation in Kantian 
Ethics relies on to the fact that no matter which interpretation 
we provide of imperfect duties, they essentially remain duties46. 
As I have briefly claimed above, supererogation represents a 
category of acts that can be omitted without qualification and 
with no occurrence of moral loss. The same cannot always be 
said of the widest imperfect duty as expressed by Kant. This 
difference suggests that supererogation and imperfect duties 
differ in a way that makes it problematic to consider this as a 
viable way for a Kantian account of supererogation. 
                                                          
45 It has also been noted that wide imperfect duties do not always offer such 
a clear-cut distinction between the viable options. This means that the 
analogy between wide imperfect duties and disjunctive duties is not always 
possible, as an account of supererogation would require. See Guevara D., 
The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kant’s Moral Theory, in ‘Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research’, 59(1999), no.3, pp.601-603. Others have 
underlined how this possibility of drawing a line in the fulfillment of 
imperfect duties is ‘alien’ to Kant’s ethics. If so, this makes impossible a 
conjunctive understanding of supererogation in Kantian terms: if there are 
no degrees of fulfillments, it is impossible to go beyond a certain moral 
requirement. “This is all quite alien to Kant’s ethics. There is no clear line of 
demarcation between what I must do, morally, and what is nice but morally 
optional. Nor does Kant attempt to trace such a line of demarcation. To do so 
he would have to give up a central thesis: that we have a duty to strive to 
perfect ourselves morally” see Baron M., Kantian Ethics Almost Without 
Apology, Cornell University Press, 1995, p.41.   
46 According to Hill this claim relies on a too rigorous interpretation of the 
Kantian use of the word ‘duty’. Although this term is an ‘old label’ that Kant 
derives from a legalistic (and hence reductionist) conception of morality, the 
passages from the Metaphysics of Morals reveals how he was well aware of 
the fact that morality goes far beyond the legalistic level of the morally right. 
See Hill T., ibidem, p.74. 
Part II: 
Supererogation in Normative Ethics:  
Definition, Justification and New Perspectives 
 
145 
 
This leaves us with the only option to accept the rigorous 
theory within Kant’s production and, as such, to deny the 
possibility of proper supererogation in his moral system. In 
particular, some passages of Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals seem to rule out the possibility of non 
duty-based and morally good acts. For example: 
“To be beneficent where one can is one’s duty, and besides there 
are many souls so attuned to compassion that, even without 
another motivating ground of vanity, or self-interest, they find an 
inner gratification in spreading joy around them, and can relish 
the contentment of others, in so far as it is their work. But I assert 
that in such a case an action of this kind – however much it 
conforms with duty, however amiable it may be – still has no true 
moral worth, but stands on the same footing as other 
inclinations, e.g. the inclination to honor, which if it fortunately 
lights upon what is in fact in the general interest and in 
comformity with duty, and hence honorable, deserves praise and 
encouragement, but not high esteem; for the maxim lacks moral 
content, namely to do such actions not from inclination, but from 
duty”47 
The main problem that these claims represent for 
supererogation is that, no matter the content of one’s acts, the 
only thing that makes acts moral is their being motivated by 
duty. The reason of Kant’s attachement to duty is that he 
wanted to distinguish the moral realm from that of inclinations. 
We can concede to Kant that supererogation (and in general the 
category of the optional) relies on the agent’s inclination to 
pursue the good of others more than one is required to do. As 
such, the willingness to go go beyond the call of duty might be 
temporary, fleeting or driven by the circumstances. While all 
these features are compatible with a theory of supererogation, 
they are stanger to Kant’s moral philosphy, whose intent was 
that of developing a rational, a priori and universalizable theory 
for practical action. One time an agent might be willing to 
sacrife a certain good for the others and another she might be 
                                                          
47 Kant I., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Gregor M., 
Timmermann J. (ed. by), Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp.13-14. 
Chapter IV: 
Why Monist Theories Struggle With The Justification Of The 
Concept? 
146 
 
unwilling to do the same. This, from a Kantian perspective, 
undermines the moral character of these acts. It is not 
surprising, then, that any instance of supererogaton would fail 
the universalizability test of the Categorical Imperative in all its 
versions. Since supererogatory acts spring from an inclination 
to bring about some extra-good (while supporters of 
supererogation consider it a specifically moral inclination), for 
Kant this makes them no different from choosing strawberry 
over vanilla ice cream (i.e. they lose their moral character). 
Certainly, as Kant would be willing to concede, the content of a 
supererogatory act and that of choosing ice-cream tastes 
greatly diverges (with the supererogatory one being distinctively 
praiseworthy). Still both of them lack the true moral character 
given by the acting in conformity with the moral law. The ‘duty 
as a motive’ feature of a moral act within the Kantian framework 
is what ultimately grounds the other hallmarks of this theory: 
the universalizability of the maxim and the obligatoriness of a 
moral act48. All these three features are incompatible with the 
intuitively appealing definition of supererogatory acts as 
‘morally good, but not required’. 
It is important to underline how Kant was well aware of the 
existence of acts of heroism. However, his understanding of 
heroism greatly differs from what the contemporary debate on 
supererogation takes as paradigmatic examples of it. In the 
Critique of Practical Reason Kant offers the following example: 
“But I do wish that educators would spare their pupils examples 
of so-called noble (supermeritorious) actions, with which our 
sentimental writings so abound, and would expose them all only 
to duty and to the worth that a human being can and must give 
himself in his own eyes by consciousness of not having 
transgressed it; for, whatever runs up into empty wishes and 
longings for inaccessible perfection produces more heroes of 
                                                          
48 Although Heyd does not ground, as I do, universalizability and 
obligatoriness in the “duty as a motive” feature of Kantian Ethics, his 
analysis of a Kantian anti-supererogationism is almost identical to mine. 
See Heyd, D., ibidem, p.53. Nevertheless, Heyd seems to be more willing to 
concede a peculiar understanding of the Kantian theory that leaves room to 
some instances of supererogation. See Heyd, D., ibidem, p.54f.  
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romance who, while they pride themselves on their feeling for 
extravagant greatness, release themselves in return from the 
observance of common and everyday obligation, which then 
seems to them insignificant and petty”49 
In the passage that follows this quotation, Kant considers the 
example of an honest man who is ordered by a powerful lord to 
commit an immoral deed. No matter the degree of the threats of 
the lord against the unfortunate powerless man, he decides to 
adhere firmly to his moral obligations at the cost of his life. This 
is the sort of noble acts that can inspire the youngsters and 
provide them a glimpse of what a moral character really is. 
The attention to this particular example of heroism explains 
why Kant was generally suspicious about this category of acts. 
He was worried that within the ‘high flies of morality’ can hide 
an implicit approval of sentimental acting based on a temporary 
and evanescent inclination. Actual heroism, for Kant, is 
something very different (if not opposite) to these sentimental 
‘high flies’ of morality. In fact, it corresponds to the strict 
adherence to a perfect duty in cases where acting morally would 
entail a big sacrifice. It is the ultimate triumph of the sense of 
duty in cases where the circumstances would suggest to the 
negligent agent to discharge her strict moral obligations. 
Heroism is for Kant a further occasion to talk about the 
adherence to the sense of duty, rather than a case to investigate 
what lies beyond duty50. Taken in Kantian terms, heroism is 
much more similar to the deeds of the rescuer of the victims of 
9\11 tragedy than to those of the bighearted volunteer. Think 
of the clear examples of heroism expressed by the firefighters 
who adhered to their duty to rescue people no matter how costly 
such a rescue would have been. This is the sort of moral 
integrity that Kant holds dear; their being motivated by duty is 
what made them heroes in a morally relevant way (and 
specifically so in Kantian terms). Passages of this sort in the 
Kantian work make us think that he was less inclined to 
                                                          
49 Kant I., Critique of Practical Reason, Gregor M. (ed. by), Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, p.127-128, [5:155]. 
50 Guevara D., ibidem, p.609. Similar remarks about these passages of the 
Critique of Practical Reason have been made by Baron M., ibidem, p.36f. 
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concede a moral status to the instances of heroism that are 
taken as paradigmatic examples in the contemporary debate on 
supererogation. Kantian heroism differs from heroism broadly 
conceived as it takes the sense of duty (rather than mere 
optionality) as a starting point. Kant was highly suspicious of 
any form of moral sentimentalism as this might make us lose 
sight of the ordinary dimension of morality. Rather than taking 
the supermeritorious (überverdienstlicher) as a paradigmatic 
example of morality, we need to keep to the focus on the aspects 
of an ordinary moral life. This, as Kant believes, cannot but be 
the attention on the sense of duty. 
It should be clear from this brief analysis of a possible 
Kantian account of supererogation that followers of Kant’s 
theory cannot but endorse an anti-supererogationist 
orientation. However, as Marcia Baron has underlined, this 
does not mean that Kantians cannot give an account of the 
phenomenon of supererogation51. Claiming that there is no 
theoretical category of supererogation does not mean that those 
acts that supererogationists try to explain cannot be accounted 
otherwise. According to Baron, Kantians have no theoretical 
need of this category of acts. Specifically, a Kantian should rely 
on the more efficient category of imperfect duties and on some 
further evaluation of the virtuous character of the agent. 
According to this view, morally exceptional acts cannot be 
evaluated in themselves without a further evaluation of the 
moral status of the character of the agent52. Open-ended duties 
(such as imperfect ones) leave plenty of room to the expression 
of a good character given the more or less ample fulfillment of 
the relevant duty. The example of Mother Teresa’s abundant 
fulfillment of the imperfect duty of beneficence well explains the 
sort of appreciation of moral character that a fulfillment of this 
kind entails. We consider her a moral saint because of the 
virtue of character she expresses by her commitment to the 
                                                          
51 “The absence of a special category for the supererogatory poses no serious 
problem, given his understanding of ‘duty’ and his category of imperfect 
duties” in Baron M., ibidem, p.23. 
52 Baron M., ibidem, p.57-58. 
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fulfillment of the imperfect duty of beneficence53. This way of 
explaining alleged acts of supererogation within the realm of 
moral obligations involves a bigger explanatory role for the 
category of duty. Duty in typical Kantian terms is the sole 
indicator of moral worth of acts. Moreover, note that Baron’s 
point relies on a different question than mere anti-
supererogationism: it is not that she is against supererogation 
in itself. Rather, she asks whether or not we theoretically need 
a category of supererogation to explain the phenomenon it is 
intended to define. It is not a critique of the existence of 
supererogatory acts; it is a critique of the authentic necessity 
of having a dedicated category to give an account of them. In 
other terms, those acts that can be accounted by the category 
of the supererogatory should be accounted by some other less 
problematic moral category54. 
Generally, due to the different levels of understanding that 
the Kantian theory offers, it is hard to have a clear opinion on 
the possibility of supererogation in this system. My take on this 
particular question is that Kant was not directly concerned to 
give an account of the concept. The reason for this is that if we 
take seriously Kant’s aversion for moral inclination and his 
attention for the moral law, we derive that the concept of 
supererogation, which, by definition, exceeds the constrains of 
the law, is not a coherent theoretical option. As such, from the 
impossibility of recognizing the moral worth of acts that are not 
derived by the sense of duty follows that a supererogatory act 
cannot be considered morally worthy. Contrary to the case of 
Utilitarianism, this means identifying the evaluative level with 
the deontic one. Better, this moral framework assigns to the 
deontic level of morality also the role typical of the evaluative 
one (the interpretation of what constitutes the moral goodness 
of an act). From this we obtain the following denial of 
                                                          
53 Baron M., ibidem, p.53-54. Quite similarly to Kant’s example of the moral 
integrity of the powerless man threatened by the lord, the moral value of 
Mother Teresa relies on her extraordinary ability to follow an obligation no 
matter the sacrifice it involves.   
54 I have already tried to explain the necessity of such a category of moral 
acts in the third chapter. See pp.87-94. 
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supererogation within Kantian Ethics (at least in its original 
understanding): 
(Deontic → Evaluative) ⇒ ¬Supererogation 
in other terms 
(Right → Good) ⇒ ¬Supererogation 
The Kantian denial of supererogation relies on the fact that 
something can be morally good only insofar as it is the result of 
a duty. Similarly to the case of the Utilitarian denial, deriving 
one level of morality entirely from the other will make lose that 
theoretical complexity that makes the concept of 
supererogation explicable. In this sense the Kantian and the 
Utilitarian denial of supererogation do not differ in the general 
structure of their arguments (although, as we have seen, the 
content of their arguments is opposite). This acknowledgement 
is already expressed, in more general terms, in Heyd’s work: 
“One implication of this basic difference is that while deontology 
tends to be too strict in its definition of ‘moral’ (considering only 
obligatory actions as having moral value), utilitarianism is 
inclined to provide a definition of ‘moral’ which is too wide (taking 
every ‘useful’ action as morally good). Both theories – in their 
pure but crude forms – are, therefore, anti-supererogationist, but 
for opposite reasons: in a deontological doctrine no action which 
is beyond duty can be morally good. In a utilitarian doctrine no 
action which is morally good can be non-obligatory”55. 
 
5. What to Learn from Anti-supererogationism 
There is no question that an analysis of the contrast between 
anti-supererogationism and our intuitive assertions about acts 
of supererogation can provide both an improvement of our 
moral systems and a refinement of our moral intuitions. As 
usual, revision and improvement comes with new questions. 
Does a phenomenological approach to morality reveal a too vast 
and manifold moral panorama to be handle by our moral 
theories? Is moral monism apt for this task? Part of the 
contemporary debate answers to this latter question with a 
                                                          
55 Heyd D., Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p.73. 
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negative answer56. I think that acts of supererogation exactly 
represent that overabundance of the moral gamut that theories 
have failed to account. On the other hand, anti-
supererogationists claim that we need to refine our intuitions 
instead. They claim that, although acts of supererogation 
express a strong intuitive appeal, we can explain them away 
without the use of a special and dedicate moral category. 
Depending on which side of the debate we uphold, it is worth 
asking then: is it ever possible to give an exhaustive theoretical 
account of all moral phenomenon? Are moral intuitions always 
to be trustworthy? Although I think I will fail in the present 
work to give an adequate answer to either question, I do not 
want to fail to recognize the importance of, at least, trying to 
provide such an answer. If moral philosophy wants to remain 
faithful to its original task of being the subject that investigates 
how to conduct a life lived well, these questions acquire a 
fundamental role.     
The side I will embrace in the following chapter is that of the 
supporters, in this given subject, of the relevance of our moral 
intuitions. In particular, I will try to theorize positively in favor 
of an autonomous category of supererogatory acts. As I have 
tried to underline in the present chapter, the problems of 
justification of the concept generally arise as the manifestation 
of the loss of that moral complexity that makes supererogation 
possible. Both Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics share the 
same maximizing impulse that makes supererogation harder to 
theorize. Utilitarianism generally aims at the maximization of 
the Good; similarly, Kantian Ethics is grounded on the duty to 
strive for the moral perfection of the self (a sort of maximization 
of the Right). Consequently, the category of supererogatory acts 
is ignored by moral systems driven by a maximizing inclination. 
In the third chapter I have underlined how the concept of 
supererogation has been originated in a complex system, which 
recognized a somewhat clear distinction between the realm of 
the Right (characterized by moral requirements) and that of the 
Good (the broader domain of the possible ways of fulfilling our 
moral ideals and values). This distinction opens up for the 
                                                          
56 In this regard see the interesting reconstruction provided in Gill M., 
Humean Moral Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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possibility to pursue certain courses of action that cannot be 
induced by the mere adherence to our moral requirements 
(pace Kant). The concept of supererogation identifies those acts 
that pursue the morally good that lies beyond the morally right. 
In order to maintain this complex structure intact I will 
propose the endorsement of a moral theory characterized by a 
pluralist (non-monistic) and satisfycing (non-maximizing) 
structure. Analyzing the nature of moral complexity in the 
second chapter, I have tried to identify two sorts of pluralism: 
pluralism of values (axiological pluralism) and pluralism of the 
ways of moral deliberation (methodological pluralism). As the 
contemporary debate shows, it appears clear to many authors 
that, in the moral domain, we deal with a set of 
incommensurable values, which eventually come into conflict. 
As some other authors have underlined we do not obtain moral 
justification for our acts by following a unique and fixed moral 
principle57. There is not only a plurality of values, but also a 
plurality of ways in which we deliberate morally58. If this claim 
is correct, when moral conflicts arise, rather than trying to 
confute one of the opposing positions, it becomes more fruitful 
to consider which of the moral principles involved and which of 
the moral values at issue has the precedence over the other. 
Morality, taken in these terms, rather than being concerned 
with the morally correct and incorrect, becomes the realm of 
the varying relevance of principles and values according to the 
given circumstances. A moral structure that allows for different 
levels and ways of actualization can describe the 
phenomenologically evident complex status of moral 
experience. Moreover, I believe that both these categorizations 
of pluralism will become functional to give an account of those 
                                                          
57 I consider a principle as a way of reasoning in order to bring about a given 
end, to ground a certain duty or to fulfil the aspiration towards a preferred 
value. 
58 Let me recall, once again, the words of Charles Larmore: “Finally, instead 
of supposing that the structure of morality must be in the end either 
deontological or consequentialist, and instead of assuming that either all or 
none of our moral obligations are categorical, we should recognize that the 
ultimate sources of moral value are not one, but many” in Larmore C., 
Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.151. 
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different levels of moral achievement that make supererogation 
theoretically conceivable. 
It is for these reasons that I will try to endorse a pluralist 
system of morality in order to explain the phenomenon of 
supererogation. The widespread diffusion of the major 
deontological and consequentialist theories in the ethical 
debate glimpses the plausibility of both systems59. Their equally 
convincing theoretical status suggests that we need to focus on 
the given situation in order to understand what the priority to 
grant to the systems is. Therefore, if this analysis is correct, a 
double conclusion will be obtained. Both supererogation and 
moral experience can be better explained by a pluralist system 
that allows multiple sources of the good and different levels of 
achievement. In particular, being supererogation a complex 
concept (one that requires more than a single level of the moral 
framework in order to be explained), pluralism seems to be the 
system that best satisfies the theoretical needs of the concept. 
The next chapter, then, will try to deal with the decision-making 
process (the normative level) that leads to a supererogatory act. 
The tentative conclusion would be the following: supererogation 
is better accounted by a pluralist moral system that provides, 
at the normative stage, a clear distinction between the Good 
and Right. 
 
                                                          
59 Such a plausibility is testified by their large diffusion indeed. I exclude 
from this remark the (somehow) classic third member of the major systems 
of morality: Virtue Ethics (see Baron M., Petit P., Slote M., Three Methods of 
Ethics, Wiley-Blackwell, 1997). The main reason for excluding it is that 
Virtue Ethics deals primarily with the agent’s character and only at a later 
stage with moral acts. Being the debate on supererogation a debate on a 
peculiar category of acts, it addresses directly the other two moral systems. 
Nevertheless, I do not want to rule out the possibility of an account of 
supererogation within this system. For a detailed treatise of this issue see 
Heyd D., Can Virtue Ethics Account for Supererogation?, in Cowley C. (ed. by), 
Supererogation, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015. 
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CHAPTER V: 
A NEW PERSPECTIVE:  
A PLURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF SUPEREROGATION 
 
This chapter represents an attempt to answer the issues 
regarding the justification of the concept of supererogation by 
endorsing a pluralist moral system. This attempt of justification 
will be valuable, I think, regardless of the fact that monistic 
theories can somehow give an account of the concept or not. In 
fact, even if we allow monist theories to provide a possible 
explanation of the concept (not without major revisions of the 
original positions in my opinion), I hope that the pluralist take 
will appear a more suitable and straightforward option for 
accounting supererogatory acts. Pluralism is a kind of moral 
theory that allows for multiple (but not infinite) sources of the 
good. The following tentative resolution of the problem of 
supererogation relies on the conviction that supererogatory acts 
spring from the interaction of different sources of the good. This 
is what I mean by Multiple Sources Dynamics (MSD): the 
phenomenon that allows for a plurality of sources among which 
the agents identifies (at least) two relevant ones. Namely, one 
that fulfills a moral obligation relevant to the contest and the 
other that expresses how to go beyond such obligation. This 
second source of value, if fulfilled by the performance of an 
optional act, is the supererogatory achievement. The grounding 
belief of the chapter is that a pluralist system is the one that can 
better satisfy the theoretical needs of this dynamics. 
 
1. The Multiple Sources Dynamics 
I have so far analyzed the question of moral pluralism and that 
of the concept of supererogation as apparently separated issues. 
While, as I have claimed, they are both expressions of the Moral 
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Complexity that characterizes our moral experiences, the two 
issues have never been so far part of the same problem. The 
Multiple Sources Dynamics (MSD) is exactly this: the possibility of 
going beyond what is morally required by dealing with multiple 
sources of the good. Usually, the different sources of the good are 
promoted by use of a specific moral principle. Relatively to this 
contest, I take a moral principle to be a way of moral reasoning. 
As I have sketched in the second chapter, according to Charles 
Larmore, one understanding of Moral Complexity is 
acknowledging that we have three different moral principles, 
which provide the agent with moral reasons to act accordingly1. 
These three principles favor three independent sources of moral 
value, which introduce independent claims upon the moral 
agent2. According to the given circumstances, one principle can 
gain priority over the others. In particular, we can distinguish 
the following principles3: 
a) The principle of partiality outlines particularistic duties, i.e. 
obligations that arise in virtue of some “empirically 
conditioned desire” or of some special relation we have with 
the beneficiary of our act; 
b) The principle of consequentialism, as traditionally intended, 
focuses on the consequences of our acts so as they will bring 
about the most good overall (or the “least evil”, as taken in 
the  negative form); 
                                                          
1 This is a suitable expression of what I have earlier called methodological 
pluralism: a variety of way of moral reasoning. Larmore’s understanding of a 
moral principle is almost identical to mine: “If we think of a principle of 
practical reason as a rule for organizing and ranking particular desires or 
courses of action in the light of some general kind of practical value, then we 
seem to find ourselves subject to not one, but three such principles, and these 
principles seem to make contrary demands of us in various situations” in 
Larmore C., Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University Press, 1987, 
pp.131-132. 
2 Larmore C., ibidem, p.133.  
3 Larmore C., ibidem, p.132. 
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c) The principle of deontology requires that we never break 
certain moral guidelines no matter the consequences.  
All three principles, says Larmore, express their conflicting 
authority when it comes to moral decisions. They provide moral 
reasons of different sort and independent one from the other. 
Taken in this term, Larmore’s methodological pluralism (since we 
are not referring to the content of these reasons yet) is a 
consistent example of moral pluralism. It provides multiple, yet 
not infinite, ways of being engaged in a moral decision. Moreover, 
it is important to remind his distinction between partial and 
impartial principles. The principle of consequentialism and the 
principle of deontology are both principles of the latter sort. They 
are considered impartial (or categorical), that is, they offer 
binding reasons for action independently from empirical facts 
about the agent (her desires and relationships)4. On the contrary, 
the principle of partiality is not, by definition, compatible with 
this category of reasons. Rather, such a principle is always 
partial, or related to the particular agent, being it concerned with 
personal commitments that produce reasons for action 
accordingly. This also explains why we experience the greatest 
degree of moral complexity in the personal (first-person) 
dimension of moral agency, where partial commitments can be 
eventually overcome by impartial ones (deontology and 
consequentialism). In the political and public sphere, this is 
never the case; impartial commitments take always precedence 
over particular ones5. 
Let us return now to the original task of this chapter. How is a 
supererogatory act possible within this theoretical framework? I 
have extensively underlined so far how supererogation benefits 
from a moral structure that acknowledges different levels of 
                                                          
4 This is different from saying that categorical reasons for action do not 
consider any empirical fact about the situation. Think, for example, of the 
consequentialist consideration on which course of action brings about the 
best outcome. I am thankful for this specific comment to Charles Larmore.  
5 Larmore C., ibidem, p.133. 
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achievement. In these terms, a clear distinction between the 
Right and the Good is necessary to explain why something can 
be morally praiseworthy and, at the same time, morally optional 
(i.e. it does not produce blame in case of its omission). My 
suggestion is that a pluralist system that endorses a variety of 
moral principles is favored to provide the multileved structure 
that makes supererogation possible. The prevailing principle in 
the given circumstances sets the moral obligation that the agent 
has. Nevertheless, it might be the case that once the agent has 
fulfilled these binding reasons, she is able to recognize additional 
ways of bringing about some good. From a pluralist perspective, 
the particularly virtuous agent is able, once she has fulfilled the 
prevailing reasons for action, to concede that something more 
can be done. Choosing to follow the prevailing reasons for action 
means, also, to let it go some other (less binding) options to bring 
about the good. Supererogation means deciding to follow these 
discarded options. Although non-prevailing principles have lost 
their priority in favor of the prevailing principle, they are 
nonetheless able to provide reasons for bringing about some 
extra good. When this extra good is compatible with the agent’s 
obligations, the possibility to perform a supererogatory act arises. 
Clearly, the possibility of supererogation is not available as long 
as the agent has not fulfilled her obligations. Following a non-
prevailing reason in spite of the prevailing reasons one has is 
simply immoral. Following a non-prevailing reason when one has 
already fulfilled her obligations is supererogatory. Making an 
economic donation when you do not have enough money to buy 
food for your child is not only immoral, but also an irrational 
sacrifice. Making a donation, when you have enough money to 
provide for the basic needs of your family, is supererogatory. The 
supererogatory option arises only when you have fulfilled the 
prevailing binding reasons you have. 
Specifically, once we allow the coexistence of multiple 
principles we will have the tools both for setting our moral 
obligations and for understanding how to pursue the good that 
lies beyond them, namely, supererogatory acts. Allowing a variety 
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of principles of morality also means to be willing to acknowledge 
the existence of multiple ways of fostering the good other than 
the way that merely fulfils moral obligation. MSD is the 
phenomenon that originates supererogatory acts in a pluralist 
system. It entails that according to some particular interactions 
of the three principles, we can have two different ways of 
performing supererogatory acts: 1. the interaction between two 
impartial principles; 2. the impartial use of a partial principle. Let 
us refer to these two possible occurrences of supererogation as 
the exceeding instance (supererogation by the exceeding of an 
impersonal principle over another impersonal principle) and the 
proximity instance (supererogation by considering proximate a 
moral stranger). In what follows I will try to explain in some 
detail this two possible ways of bringing about a supererogatory 
act through a Multiple Sources Dynamics. 
 
2. The Exceeding Instance of MSD   
The exceeding instance of the Multiple Sources Dynamics tries 
to explain the performance of a supererogatory act through the 
the interaction of two impartial principles. Accordingly, 
supererogation consists in the fact that the moral requirements 
set by a given impartial principle can be surpassed by the 
optional performance of another impartial principle. A pluralistic 
moral account is the one that allows for many principles, which 
compete, in a given circumstance, to gain priority over the others 
by offering compelling reasons to act in certain way. In what 
follows, I will call the prevailing principle the active principle (i.e. 
the one that offers the most compelling reasons). The other 
principles will be then indicated as the inactive principles. What 
is important for this view of supererogation is to notice that for a 
principle to be inactive does not mean to lose its ability to provide 
reasons to bring about some instance of the good. Generally, the 
reasons provided by inactive principles are considered less 
compelling than those provided by the active principles. Recall 
that the active principle is the one providing prevailing reasons 
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(having priority over the others) and the inactive principles are 
those providing non-prevailing reasons (less compelling). I believe 
that supererogation in a pluralist account can be conceived as 
the performance of the course of actions that can be produced by 
following both kinds of reasons (given that the circumstances 
allow for this superabundant attainment of the good). This is 
what I call Multiple Sources Dynamics: it means following reasons 
provided by different sources in the same situation. This plentiful 
achievement is what I consider supererogatory.    
In order to clarify this point, let me analyze some more detailed 
examples of this interaction between principles. In particular, 
since I decided to take Larmore’s account as a starting point, we 
can distinguish two different impartial principles. Consequently 
we will have two possible interactions that can generate a 
supererogatory act: 1. the principle of deontology (active) 
overtaken by the principle of consequentialism (inactive); 2. the 
principle of consequentialism (active) overtaken by the principle 
of deontology (inactive). I will start to analyze the first kind of 
interaction. It is helpful, in this regard, to sketch a brief scenario 
of the performance of a supererogatory act. 
EXAMPLE#1: Let us suppose that you are walking in the main 
square of your hometown. The city is a famous destination for 
tourists due to its many attractions. One of the tourists approaches 
you asking for directions to the beautiful Cathedral that makes 
your city so famous. Therefore, you know that telling her a lie and 
giving her wrong directions would be morally wrong and so you 
tell her exactly where the Cathedral is. At the same time, you are 
aware of the fact that getting there could be tricky since the 
medieval city center makes orientation troublesome. Since you 
have some free time, you realize that you could bring about the 
most good overall by walking with the tourist in front of the 
Cathedral, so as to prevent her from getting lost for the whole 
afternoon. Even though you are not required to do so (after all she 
was just asking for directions), you decide to accompany her to 
where she wants to go. 
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It this scenario the moral obligation is to answer truthfully to 
the request for directions. At this point, the agent would have 
already fulfilled all her moral obligations in regards to the tourist. 
By endorsing a pluralist system, we are not necessarily required 
to accompany the stranger knowing that orientation can be 
troublesome. We can rightfully consider a truthful answer to the 
tourist’s question enough for satisfying our moral requirements. 
After all, given the circumstances, these are the most compelling 
moral reasons. Nevertheless, if I acknowledge that accompanying 
the stranger can be a morally better option, nothing prevents me 
from doing so. This is a clear example of a supererogatory act, 
since I would be doing something morally good that exceeds what 
it is morally required in the given circumstances. Supererogation 
so understood (in the exceeding instance of MSD) is brought 
about by the interaction between a principle that defines a 
satisfactory level of moral requirement (in this case the principle 
of deontology) that is exceeded by the further application of a 
maximizing principle (such as the principle of consequentialism). 
The principle of deontology is the active principle, which, for the 
purpose of supererogation, is supplemented by the performance 
of an inactive principle, the principle of consequentialism. Not 
only I decide to tell the tourist where the Cathedral is (moral 
requirement), but also I decide to accompany the tourist to the 
Cathedral (supererogatory act). What if I am late for a 
professional appointment when the tourist stops me asking for 
directions? The moral requirement to answer truthfully remains, 
but the omission of the supererogatory act will not generate any 
sort of moral criticism.   
What is important to underline here is that the active principle 
plays an essential role since, having a priority over the others, it 
defines the level of moral requirement that could optionally be 
exceeded by the further application of an inactive6 principle. The 
inactive principle, plays a necessary, but not sufficient role for 
the performance of the supererogatory act. The active principle 
                                                          
6 And maximizing principle in this case. 
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has a priority over the others when it comes to identify the moral 
requirement. Nevertheless, it plays an essential role for the 
performance of supererogation too: the active principles defines 
the level of moral requirement that can be exceeded7. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to recall here how monist 
consequentialist theories are often criticized for being too 
demanding. Maximizing principles alone can originate moral 
obligations so demanding as to be considered, according to our 
moral intuitions, supererogatory instead8. The same 
demandingness of maximizing principles can be said to be true 
in pluralist systems as well. However, the maximizing principle is 
making possible the achievement of the praiseworthy extra-good 
no matter its possible demandingness. The difference, here, relies 
on the fact that we do not feel it to be too demanding since, 
rather than considering it a mere requirement, we have 
voluntarily chosen to pursue it. Only the interaction with a non-
maximizing principle that limits moral requirements, allows 
maximizing principles to bring about a good that is understood 
as supererogatory without also being considered too exacting. In 
the present example, we can say that the active non-maximizing 
principle is what limits the reach of the inactive maximizing 
principle. 
A second kind of interaction between impartial principles is 
that of the principle of consequentialism exceeded by the further 
                                                          
7 Generally, the moral source that constitutes the level of obligation is always 
one. Differently, a supererogatory act may be suggested by more than a one 
secondary moral source. After all, given a specific moral requirement, there 
are many different supererogatory things than one can do. When I give you 
back the money that I borrowed from you, I might decide to express gratitude 
simply by saying thank you or by buying you a present or by giving you back 
more than you owed and so on. Nevertheless, the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the performance of a supererogatory act remains the existence of 
a least two moral levels. 
8 This is the case raised by the demandingness objection to Act-Utilitarianism. 
See Mulgan T., The Demands of Consequentialism, Oxford University Press, 
2001, p.25. I have dedicate some pages to the question of maximizing duties 
in a previous chapter. See pp.123-130. 
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performance of the principle of deontology. At first sight, this is a 
more difficult one to explain. Difficulties arise because the 
principle of consequentialism is usually understood to be a 
maximizing principle. Therefore, before giving an example of this 
interaction, it is worthwhile wondering if supererogatory acts are 
ever possible when the principle of consequentialism takes 
priority as the active principle. According to its definition, the 
principle requires us to: 
“[…] do whatever will produce the most good or the least evil 
overall, with regard to all those touched by our action”9. 
Apparently, it seems that the principle so understood tends to 
maximize the good and so there is no possible way to exceed the 
level of accomplishment of the good achieved by the endorsement 
of this principle. When maximizing obligations take priority over 
the rest, they tend to leave no room for supererogation10. At this 
point, this question arises: is it ever possible to exceed the 
requirements of consequentialist reasons when they take priority 
over the others? One tentative answer to problem might be the 
case of the dutiful hero so dear to Immanuel Kant11. In this 
regard, we might suggest that the heroic deeds of the rescuers of 
9\11 tragedy (who for the most part were professionals) have 
performed acts of supererogation by fulfilling the principle of 
deontology (“one professionally ought to attain his\her job”), 
exceeding the requirement of the principle of consequentialism12. 
Still, I would maintain that their deeds do not represent the sort 
of heroism that springs from an instance of supererogation. 
                                                          
9 Larmore C., ibidem, p.132. 
10 See pp.129-130 of the present work. See also S. Grigoletto, Why Proximity 
Matters For the Concept of Supererogation, manuscript. 
11 I have already analyzed in the previous chapter (p.147) the case of the man 
who refuses to lie at all costs. See Kant I., Critique of Practical Reason, Gregor 
M. (ed. by), Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.128, [5:156]. 
12 We might imagine, in fact, that in those harsh circumstances the best 
possible outcome (the most lives saved) would have been obtained by giving 
up any sort of rescuing operation. 
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Dutiful heroism derives its praiseworthiness13 from its being an 
example of moral integrity. Such integrity is expressed by the 
ability to stick with one’s own duty, rather one’s capacity to go 
beyond duty. Recall that, in Kantian terms, the sort of heroism 
expressed by 9\11 rescuers is an especially praiseworthy 
example of perfect duty. Dutiful heroism has a lot to do with the 
concept of duty and thus, its praiseworthiness might not derive 
from its being beyond. This means that claiming that this sort of 
heroism is not a proper example of supererogation does not 
entail that it is not equally praiseworthy. Nevertheless, I concede 
that there happen to cases that present some circumstances that 
make it perfectly reasonable to withdraw from someone’s duties. 
If in this cases, the agent who decides to stick with her duties 
and perform a certain act no matter how costly the consequences 
are, she is achieving a praiseworthy extra good. Notice, however, 
that the harsh circumstances have greatly affected the status of 
her duties to the point that deciding not to follow them is 
perfectly reasonable. It is an open question if we can still 
properly call them her duties.    
Let us go back to the question of how to perform a 
supererogatory act when the principle of consequentialism gains 
priority over the others. How it is then possible to overtake a 
maximizing principle (such as consequentialism) to perform a 
supererogatory act? I think that a tentative answer might be the 
following: the conjunctive performance of non-conflicting values. 
To explain this point let me recall the second understanding of 
pluralism that that I have sketched in the first chapter. 
Axiological pluralism holds that we try to live a good life according 
to a set of incommensurable values that we recognize to be all 
equally valid. To use Nagel’s expression, the nature of value is 
‘fragmented’. Moreover, I have claimed that moral principles are 
different ways of moral reasoning. We might add that principles 
always endorse and bear a specific moral value. For example, the 
                                                          
13 A praiseworthiness that is no less important than that expressed by 
supererogatory heroism. 
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principle of consequentialism usually tries to maximize the good, 
because it holds that happiness is good; the principle of 
deontology is usually concerned with the respect of moral agents’ 
autonomy, and so on. In such a scenario then, the maximization 
of the principle of consequentialism is still the maximization of a 
single value. Moral pluralism entails that we can count on a set 
of equally important moral values. From this we can conclude 
that supererogation, in this second instance of MSD, can be 
brought about by the conjunctive performance of two non-
conflicting values. First, the agent recognizes the priority of the 
principle of consequentialism (the active principle) which requires 
the maximization of the given value a. Moreover, she recognizes 
that she has the possibility to foster the given value b, by doing 
something else. If she is able to do either a (requirement) and b 
(optional), she is performing something supererogatory. Notice 
that this is not always possible, since we need to be in a 
situation where the performance of two non-conflicting values is 
possible. Contrary, in the case of the performance of two 
conflicting values, the agent will possibly undermine the 
achievement of the moral requirement by performing the 
supererogatory act. This option is not only problematic, but also 
morally impermissible14. 
In order to explain this second kind of the exceeding instance 
of MSD, let me introduce the following example: 
EXAMPLE#2: It is Mary’s birthday and she is organizing a 
birthday party at her home. She is inviting friends for dinner and 
                                                          
14 One might wonder what differentiate this from Hill’s conjunctive 
performance of two imperfect duties analyzed in the previous chapter (pp.142-
150). Note that here, differently from Hill’s case, we have a precise priority of 
the moral requirement originated by the active principle. Only then, the 
performance of the supererogatory act is possible. Remember that my 
criticism of the supererogatory conjunctive performance of imperfect duties 
relies on the possibility to refrain from performing both duties. In the scenario 
explained above this criticism does not apply, since one of the two conjuncts 
is clearly obligatory and the other is clearly not.      
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she definitely wants to be a good host. She knows that her guests 
would greatly enjoy having a birthday cake. Once she enters the 
pastry shop, she is undecided on whether to buy a strawberry 
cake or a chocolate cake. After a few minutes, she cannot come up 
with a choice between the two. Considering that she really wants 
to make her guests happy, she concludes the following: “I will buy 
them both!”. 
A case like this presents us with a clear moral requirement. If 
you want to make your guests happy and be a good host, you will 
need to provide a birthday cake for them. Obviously, you can 
fulfil this requirement by either buying a strawberry cake or a 
chocolate cake. It is equally clear that, if you buy them both, you 
achieve more than you ought to have done. This superabundant 
achievement of the good is then supererogatory and it is brought 
about by the performance of two equally reasonable (and non-
conflicting) ways to fulfil the given moral requirement. 
The conjunctive performance of non-conflicting values 
highlights how supererogation is, in a certain sense, the opposite 
of a moral dilemma. A moral dilemma is a situation where you 
are in presence of various sources of value and you cannot 
satisfy either of them without incurring in a moral loss. 
Supererogatory acts, instead, are possible when you have 
multiple sources of the good (at least two) and you can satisfy all 
of them, producing a superabundant moral achievement. In 
other terms, supererogation means following secondary moral 
reasons (the moral requirement being grounded on the primary 
and prevailing reasons there are). The most decisive moral 
reasons represent the level of obligation, but once we decide to 
follow some other non-decisive (secondary) reasons for action, we 
enter the sphere of the supererogatory. From all these assertions 
appears clear how supererogation is a phenomenon that 
represents the distinctively dual nature of morality as divided 
between the right and the good. 
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I want now to offer another example of supererogation. One 
that clearly presents a case of a consequentialist requirement 
that is exceeded by typically deontological reasons:  
EXAMPLE#3: It is Mary’s birthday and she is organizing a 
birthday party at her home. She is inviting friends for dinner and 
she definitely wants to be a good host. After the dinner has been 
served, it is time for the birthday cake. She knows that she would 
need to cut the cake in a number of slices equal to the number of 
her guests plus one for herself. Therefore, she does so. Mike, one 
of her guests, happens to enjoy the cake very much. Mary, 
considering that she really wants to be a good host, gives to Mike 
her slice of the cake.  
I take Mary’s act to be supererogatory. Here the situation is 
the following: if the agent wants to distribute a certain good 
equally, the morally right thing to do is to divide it by the number 
of the beneficiaries. I take this to be a moral requirement 
typically consequentialist in kind as it deals with the 
maximization of the happiness of beneficiaries equally capable to 
enjoy the good. Still, the interesting thing about Mary’s act is 
that she gives up her share of the good (something that would be 
her right to hold considering that it is her birthday), in virtue of 
some other kind of moral reason. Specifically, she really wants to 
be a good host and this entails that she might be ready to 
sacrifice a little part of her own good to benefit the others. In this 
case, the morally right thing has a consequentialist connotation, 
while the way the moral agent decides to exceed the level of the 
right has a deontological nature. Mary acts according to a 
commendatory understanding15 of the claim “if you want to be a 
good host you ought to act in a way that benefits your guests”. 
Once again, this represents a case where the supererogatory acts 
has been performed by the exceeding of a moral requirement of 
certain kind by the performance of an act originated by 
                                                          
15 See pp.132-133 for an explanation of the commendatory versus the 
prescriptive use of “ought”. 
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secondary moral reasons of a different kind. I take this to be 
another good example of how the exceeding instance of MSD 
works. 
Let me try to sum up the common features of all these 
instances of MSD. How can we generally define supererogation 
within such a moral system? Supererogation means following the 
reasons provided by the principle that does not obtain priority in 
the given circumstances without denying the reasons provided by 
the prevailing principle. The agent applies a principle that has no 
priority on the others (non-obligatory) in order to generate that 
extra good that is considered especially praiseworthy 
(supererogatory). After all, for a principle to have no priority on 
the others does not mean to lose its ability to see possible ways 
to achieve the good. If the principle without priority is compatible 
with the one with priority and the agent decides to apply both of 
them, she produces an extra good. Nonetheless, supererogation 
is not an option always available. Sometimes the moral pulls of 
the different principles are simply not compatible and so the 
interactions that we have analyzed before are not feasible. For 
example, when it comes to urgent consequentialist reasons to 
relieve someone from a consistent amount of pain, there seems to 
be no room left for supererogation. In cases like this, doing what 
is morally required fulfills all the possible goods that can be 
brought about in that given circumstance, making it impossible 
to exceed them in order to achieve the extra good. For example, 
you have a moral requirement to provide first aid to someone 
who has suffered a car accident in from of your eyes16. Cases like 
this, granted that the agent does not incur in any sort of sacrifice 
and loss, offer a scenario where the mere moral obligation 
satisfies all the possible instances of the good. There is simply 
nothing we can do to make it morally better. 
                                                          
16 Interestingly, it is hard to tell, in my opinion, if this moral obligation is 
grounded on consequentialist or deontological reasons. It seems to me that 
both principles would lead to the same moral requirement.  
Part II: 
Supererogation in Normative Ethics:  
Definition, Justification and New Perspectives 
 
169 
 
It is important to notice that, according to my account, 
supererogation is a moral phenomenon that relies on many 
different factors: 1. a moral system that provides different 
sources of the good; 2. the compatibility of the different reasons 
for action; 3. the circumstances that allow for the possible 
achievement of the extra-good. All these features primarily focus 
on the relevant aspects of a supererogation as a moral act. Much 
more can be said about the sort of character traits that the 
virtuous agent expresses when she performs this specific sort of 
moral act. Nevertheless, in the present section (and generally in 
the present work) I have tried to focus on the first point, 
stressing how moral pluralism can provide a satisfactory 
explanation of supererogation. I have here tried two highlight the 
role that both methodological pluralism and axiological pluralism 
play in providing theoretical room for the concept. Without the 
two levels of morality, supererogation is not conceivable. 
However, I am aware of the fact that much more can be said 
about the second and the third point.  
 
3. The Proximity Instance of MSD 
Let me now briefly focus on the instance of supererogation 
that originates from the interaction of partial principles. A partial 
principle is one that grounds particularistic duties and reasons 
for action as part of our particular desires or commitments 
towards those who are close and proximate to us. Usually, 
specific relationships or goals in life raise what have been also 
called special obligations. If I want to climb Mount Bianco, I will 
have to train consistently. Also, if I care about my daughter’s 
future, I will provide her with all the necessary to give her the 
possibility to study. It appears clear how these reasons for action 
rely on proximity. This is not intended as mere physical 
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closeness, but as relational closeness17. This is why I call this 
instance of MSD the proximity instance. It refers to the 
performance of a supererogatory act through the impartial use of 
a partial principle. In other terms, this happens when the agent 
uses impersonally the principle of partiality so as to benefit a 
stranger in a supererogatory way. For example, acting in a way 
that would entail a special obligation, even if it is not so, leads 
the agent to perform an optional and morally good act. Let me 
sketch another example to explain the point: 
EXAMPLE #4: Let us suppose that your little daughter is playing 
basketball in the school’s team. You know that, in virtue of your 
caring for your daughter you have a particularistic duty to provide 
her with new basketball shoes if needed. One day, while you are 
attending one of your daughter’s game, you realize that one of her 
teammates would need some new basketball shoes. You also 
know that she belongs to a very poor family that would probably 
not be able to afford the purchase of new basketball shoes for 
their kid. Moved by willingness to help this family, you decide to 
buy the shoes for your daughter’s teammate. You do so as if she 
was your own daughter. 
I consider this a relevant and consistent instance of  
supererogation. Providing for basketball shoes to somebody else’s 
daughter seems to be something morally good, but not morally 
required.  What defines this special moral status is the absence 
of the actual special obligation that would morally require buying 
the new shoes for someone who needs them. Moreover, the 
absence of the special obligation explains why the omission of 
this morally praiseworthy act is not morally blameworthy. If you 
refrain from buying the shoes, you are not breaking any moral 
requirement that tells you to do otherwise. Specifically, you are 
not taking care of someone’s basic needs, nor you are relieving 
                                                          
17 See pp.129-130 of the present work. On the issue of proximity as the 
ground for special obligations see Jeske D., Fumerton R., Relatives and 
Relativism, in “Philosophical Studies”, 87(1997), pp.143−157. 
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her from pain (so that there is no principle of consequentialism 
that provides reasons for you to do so). Simply you are acting as 
if you had a particularistic duty to provide the other family’s kid 
with new shoes, even if you do not have such a duty. There is no 
principle of partiality that justifies your act, but still you decide 
to act if there were one.  This is why you are doing something 
supererogatory. The way you realize how to bring about the 
supererogatory act is by the application of the principle of 
partiality to someone who is not supposed to benefit from your 
particularistic duties. Morally speaking, treating a stranger as if 
she were my daughter or sister is an act of supererogation. This 
is why I call this the proximity instance of MSD: it means acting 
so as to benefit the others by expanding the reach of our 
particularistic duties in a way that makes them supererogatory. 
We might also add that the agent who performs this sort of 
supererogatory acts makes an unconventional use of a moral 
source. A special obligation, which is conventionally applied to 
those “near and dear”, is here performed so as to benefit a 
stranger. 
The Proximity Instance of MSD reveals how supererogation can 
be possible when we have multiple understandings of the moral 
source of particularistic duties. The two levels of morality 
necessary for this category of acts are here expressed by two 
‘areas of competence’ of the same duties: 1. the proper 
understanding of particularistic duties towards those who are 
relationally proximate to us; 2. a broadening of the reach of 
particularistic duties towards those who are not relationally 
proximate to us. When the agent decides to go beyond the first 
understanding aiming for a broader way to benefit the others, 
she performs a supererogatory act. In other terms, it means 
setting a moral ought when one does not necessarily have 
conclusive and decisive reasons to do so. It is not surprising, 
then, that Jamie Dreier has proposed a similar explanation of the 
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concept of supererogation18. Specifically, as I have underlined in 
the previous chapter, he argues that supererogation is possible 
as long as we entail the existence of two moral points of view: the 
point of view of beneficence (which analyzes everything in terms 
of the morally better and worse) and the point of view of justice 
(which focuses on the moral wrongness of an act)19. For example, 
the particularistic duty to care for one’s own child is especially 
binding because it would be wrong to do otherwise. Caring for 
the needs of somebody else’s child (provided that we are not in a 
situation of relief from physical pain) is certainly morally better 
than doing otherwise, but not morally wrong. Buying the 
basketball shoes for your daughter’s teammate means evaluating 
a particularistic duty from the moral point of view of beneficence. 
It is correct to think that, morally speaking, we would live in a 
better world if this were the only moral point of view20. Still, 
moral reasons that spring from the point of view of justice remain 
more binding on us because they represent the minimal level of 
morality that makes living together as human beings possible. It 
would be impossible to live in a world that does not (at least) 
blame moral wrongness and this is the role of the point of view of 
justice. Sad enough, for this reason the point of view of 
beneficence will always play a secondary (and optional) role. This 
entails that the morally best cannot be required of us as the 
morally right is. In other terms, the point of view of justice will 
always have precedence over the point of view of beneficence. 
Supererogation is a moral category that reminds us to praise all 
those acts where human beings foster the morally good that lies 
beyond the morally right. 
Generally, as I have already claimed, supererogation is 
possible because the good is broader than the right. In the case 
                                                          
18 Dreier J., Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing 
Doesn’t in Byron M. (ed. by), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theories on 
Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.131-154. 
19 Dreier J., ibidem, p.149. 
20 A moral point of view that would bring about many alleged supererogatory 
acts indeed. 
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of the interaction of two impartial principles, we can say that this 
distinction is granted as long as we use a principle to determine 
what is the right thing to do and we use another principle to 
understand what would be the extra-good (and thus 
praiseworthy) thing to do. The two levels of morality are 
grounded on different moral principles. This is what I have 
defined the exceeding instance of MSD. Likewise, in the case of 
supererogatory acts done by the impartial use of a partial 
principle we are aiming at achieving the good beyond the reach of 
what our particularistic duties require. The two levels of morality 
are here expressed by different ways of applying the same kind of 
moral reason. This is what I have defined the proximity instance 
of MSD. We can summarize, then, that performing a 
supererogatory act requires looking at the bigger moral picture, 
knowing that the moral domain is not limited to the dimension of 
requirements. This means being able to pursue the good that we 
glimpse beyond the requirements of the right. 
 
4. The Phenomenology of Supererogation 
In this final section, I would like to go back to the issue by 
which I have started this work: the moral phenomenological 
aspects of a moral experience. In particular, I want to focus on 
how it is like to experience the performance of a supererogatory 
act. It can be helpful to recall here Mandelbaum’s considerations 
in regards to the experience of moral obligation. As I have 
outlined in the first chapter, Mandelbaum mainly focused on the 
phenomenology of moral obligations. It would constitute a mere 
supposition to sketch a possible understanding of supererogation 
within his system. Nevertheless, I would like to draw from him 
some useful terminology in order to explain the phenomenon of 
supererogation. Mandelbaum’s account of the phenomenological 
analysis of moral judgments21 entails the relation of fittingness of 
                                                          
21 Remember that these judgments are divided between direct and removed 
ones. The former identify those judgments that we make in first person when 
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a certain course of action in order to achieve a given end22. The 
experience of this relation is particularly important when it 
comes to the fulfillment of a moral obligation. If I have promised 
to return the book you borrowed, the fact that we are going to 
meet tonight counts in favor of (it is a reason that favors we 
might also say) bringing your book with me and give it back to 
you. Bringing the book with me fits the moral demands that the 
situation casts upon me, fulfilling the related moral obligation (I 
ought to keep my word). In these regards, we realize how 
supererogation deals with a different sort of fittingness. Without 
any doubt, the given situation plays a role in the definition of 
what the agent can do in order to achieve some extra good. In 
other terms, the situation tells what course of action fits the 
agent’s willingness to do the supererogatory act. Nevertheless, 
this sort of fittingness does not derive from a moral demand as in 
the case of moral obligation. Still, from a phenomenological point 
of view, even supererogation presumes that the agent performs a 
specific given act. If I want to be kind with you while we are 
chatting at the bar, I will recognize that buying you a coffee fits 
my desire to be friendly. From a phenomenological point of view, 
the performance of a supererogatory act means accepting a new 
moral task with all the conditions it entails. The achievement of 
the supererogatory calls for the endorsement of an additional set 
of acts that bring about the good. While this further set of acts 
does not originate a moral requirement (or moral demand), the 
same teleological character of moral obligations remains. If I 
want to bring about a certain supererogatory end, I will need to 
acknowledge those acts that fit my willingness to do so. This 
uncommon and additional moral endorsement is what generates 
the praiseworthiness typical of these acts. 
                                                                                                                                                          
we actually face the given moral scenario. They are to be distinguished from 
the latter kind of moral judgments, which are those that we make from a 
perspective removed from the situation considering past or future situations. 
22 Mandelbaum M., The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, The Free Press, 
1955, p.64.  
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Once again, the reference to the parable of the Young Rich 
Man can help us understanding this point. When the young man 
asks what he needs to do in order to get eternal life other than 
the fulfilment of the law of the Decalogue, Jesus answered as 
follows: 
“If you want to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give to the 
poor, and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come, follow 
me”23. 
It is interesting to note that the Gospel of Matthew (differently 
from Mark) reports this answer as an if-clause. We can interpret 
this as the fact that the way of moral perfection entails the 
endorsement of new set of acts that fit the new moral scenario. If 
the young man wants to achieve moral perfection (and not just 
moral righteousness), selling all his goods would fit the condition 
of achievement of the supererogatory. From a phenomenological 
point of view, the performance of supererogation is able to 
recreate, at another level, the same relation of fittingness of 
Mandelbaum’s understanding of moral obligations24. It has been 
underlined, however, that what differentiate the two is the fact 
that in the case of moral obligation the relation of fittingness is 
grounded on a “felt demand” to act in a certain way25. The same 
cannot be said of supererogation. Fittingness, in this case, is 
grounded on the agent’s espousal of the supererogatory end, 
rather than on some external moral demand26. Interestingly, the 
experience of the fittingness of a supererogatory act is provided 
by the agent’s willingness to bring about some extra good. 
Supererogation grounds the fittingness of the act internally 
                                                          
23 Matthew, 19:21. 
24 Horgan T. Timmons M., Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: Reflections on 
the “Paradox” of Supererogation, in ‘Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation’ 
27(2010), no.2, p.48-49. 
25Horgan T. Timmons M., ibidem, p.44. 
26 ‘External’ here means that this sort of moral demand holds true no matter 
of the agent’s particularistic desires. Horgan T. Timmons M., ibidem, p.45. 
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rather than externally. This explains why the non-performance of 
an act required by a moral obligation generates public blame and 
criticism, while the non-performance of a supererogatory does 
not bring about the same reactive attitude. For example, if I 
happen to be very late at a business appointment, I simply do 
not have time to stop and buy a lunch for the very good friend of 
mine I have just run into. This kind of non-performance explains 
the sort of regret that the agent might feel when she fails to do 
the extra good. The agent might regret (at most) a situation 
where she recognizes that there is a possibility to do some extra 
good, but she simply cannot follow the reasons to act 
accordingly. Moreover, it is never the case that the non-
performance of a supererogatory act generates any sort of moral 
criticism by the others or by the agent herself. As a matter of 
fact, this is not the case when it comes to the non-performance of 
moral obligations. The failure to conform to a perfect duty 
usually generates guilty feelings and blame27. Conversely, in the 
case of the non-performance of an act that would fulfil an 
imperfect duty the agent will generally feel shame or some sort of 
disappointment in oneself28. It is very important for the definition 
of supererogation that we do not confuse the possible regret that 
comes with the non-performance of a supererogatory act with 
any sort of moral criticism to the agent. Otherwise, we would 
undermine the optionality of this category of acts and 
consequently affect the source of its moral praiseworthiness. 
Before moving on to consider some features of the 
phenomenology of supererogatory acts, it is worthwhile to recall 
that, from a theoretical point of view, the most convincing 
accounts of supererogation rely on the acknowledgement of the 
different levels of morality29. I hold that supererogation can be 
                                                          
27 Horgan T. Timmons M., ibidem, p.46. 
28 Sinnot-Amstrong W., You Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself (When You 
Violate an Imperfect Obligation), in ‘Philosophical Issues’, 15(2005), pp.192-
208. 
29 Being this account based on the outlining of different moral points of view 
(as in Dreier J., Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing 
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accounted only by means of the acknowledgment of Moral 
Complexity. It is reasonable to think, then, that the very 
phenomenological experience of a supererogatory act needs to be 
similarly complex. Once we recognize the need of complexity on a 
theoretical level, we cannot but concede that the 
phenomenological experience of a supererogatory act entails the 
combination of different factors. Roughly, it needs to be an 
equally complex experience. Let us focus on the following 
example to clarify the issue: 
Mary enters a bar and asks for a coffee at the bar counter. While 
she is there, another person enters and asks for a coffee. He looks 
to be in hurry and right after having gulped down the coffee ask 
the bartender to pay his bill. The stranger suddenly looks very 
embarrassed as he realizes that he forgot his wallet in the car. 
Mary, moved by her altruistic and virtuous character, steps in the 
conversation between the bartender and the stranger and she 
offers to buy the coffee for him. The stranger, surprised by Mary’s 
behavior, expresses gratitude and runs out of the bar to the 
business meeting he has to attend. 
What it is like to be in Mary’s shoes in this situation? What sort 
of phenomenological experience has she undergone? Certainly, 
she decided to do what she has done because she has seen the 
possibility to bring about some instance of the good. However, 
this feature is not only typical of supererogatory acts. Moral 
deeds generally share this phenomenological experience, 
                                                                                                                                                          
Doesn’t, in Byron M. (ed. by), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theories on 
Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.131-154) or by 
specifying the different roles of moral reasons (as in Portmore D., Are Moral 
Reasons Morally Overriding?, in ‘Ethical Theory and Moral Practice’ 11(2008), 
pp.369-388, and Horgan T. Timmons M., Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: 
Reflections on the “Paradox” of  Supererogation, in ‘Social Philosophy & Policy 
Foundation’, 27(2010), no.2, pp.29-63, or, more implicitly, Gert J., Requiring 
and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength, in ‘Erkenntnis’ 
59(2003), pp.5-36). 
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especially when it comes to benefit the others. What 
distinguishes supererogation from other moral instances is a 
further phenomenological experience that accompanies the 
widespread experience of the achievement of the good that 
generally characterizes the moral domain. Remember that 
supererogatory acts are fully optional and do not entail any sort 
of criticism in the case of omission. In the example above, if Mary 
decided to omit her altruistic act, we cannot imagine any sort of 
moral consequence. For her, after all, consider the following: a) 
the person she has benefitted is a complete stranger, so she is 
not bound by any special obligation in virtue of her relationship 
with him; b) the bartender would have probably allowed the 
customer to go outside to get his wallet in the car; c) she is not 
facing a situation where someone is experiencing a great amount 
of pain so as consequentialist reasons would require her to act. 
From all this derives that, from a phenomenological point of view, 
she is experiencing a situation where her acting is optional to the 
point where in case of omission nothing would have happened to 
her. Consider how this phenomenological experience differs from 
that of a perfect or imperfect duty. As I have underlined above, 
the possible omission of a moral obligation (be it perfect or 
imperfect) comes with a related degree of moral disapproval. The 
omission of a perfect duty generates moral blame, while the 
omission of an imperfect duty generates self-reproach. 
Supererogation phenomenologically differs from this as it entails 
the combination of two experiences: 1. the possibility to bring 
about some instance of the good; 2. the prevision that the 
possible omission will not entail any actual moral criticism or 
reactive attitude by the others. This second feature explains why 
this category of acts differs from perfect and imperfect duties; its 
omission generates a different phenomenological experience. As 
matter of fact, supererogatory acts are characterized by such a 
double and compound experience. In other terms, supererogation 
entails a complex phenomenological experience. This, however, 
should not be a surprising conclusion, since, as we have seen in 
the previous chapters, supererogation, from a theoretical point of 
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view, is a complex concept. It is a moral category that requires 
more than a single level of morality in order to be justified. 
The phenomenological analysis of the concept not only reveals 
what it is like to perform a supererogatory act, but also tells us 
some characteristics of the moral agent who performs it. The 
phenomenology of the first person experience discloses what 
makes supererogation possible from the point of view of the 
agent. In other terms, it explains what sort of psychological state 
the agent experiences when it comes to perform a supererogatory 
act. I hold, as I have tried to show in the previous chapters30, 
that supererogation entails an altruistic behavior; one that aims 
at benefitting the others. How is it then possible to do that? The 
influential work by moral psychologist Daniel Batson introduces 
the so-called Empathy-Altruism hypothesis31. Briefly, this thesis 
holds that empathic concern (other-oriented emotions originated 
by the perception of someone else in need32) gives rise to an 
altruistic motivation (having as ultimate goal that of increasing 
another’s welfare33). The more empathic concern a given agent 
feels, the more she would be willing to bring about the state of 
affairs that would reduce the need of the related subject or group 
of subjects34. The empathic capacity of a moral agent is helpful to 
understand what triggers a supererogatory act. If I were not in an 
empathic state, it would be impossible to find a motivation to act 
and to do the costs-benefit analysis that guides the instances of 
supererogation. Moreover, feeling concerned for those in need will 
also justify those cases where a supererogatory act entails a 
considerable degree of self-sacrifice35. If I am eating a sandwich 
                                                          
30 See Chapter III, pp.107-109. 
31 Batson D., Altruism in Humans, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
32 Batson D., ibidem, p.11f. 
33 Batson D., ibidem, p.20f. 
34 Batson D., ibidem, p.29. 
35 Remember, however, that self-sacrifice is not a necessary condition for a 
consistent actualization of a supererogatory act. See Archer A., 
Supererogation, Sacrifice, and the Limits of Duty, in “Southern Journal of 
Philosophy”, forthcoming. 
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on a bench shared by a starving stranger, I would be willing to 
give him part of or my entire sandwich (depending on the degree 
of perception of his discomfort). I will take this psychological 
evidence of altruistic behavior as a further demonstration of what 
it is the relevant understanding of the moral point of view in 
regards to this category of acts. From a phenomenological point 
of view, what makes supererogation possible is the ability to take 
somebody else’s good as a reason for action in itself. Charles 
Larmore’s understanding of the moral point of view suits the 
explanatory needs of this specific regard of supererogatory acts:    
“Morality consists in seeing in another’s good a demand on our 
attention that is as direct, as unmediated by ulterior 
considerations, as the concern we naturally feel for our own. The 
ability to look beyond our own interests, whatever they may be, 
and to take an interest in another’s good simply because it is his 
or hers – that is the essence of moral thinking.”36 
I believe that this understanding of morality is not only 
functional, but also ultimately fundamental to the achievement 
of the moral good that lies beyond the call of duty. Moreover, it 
explains something about the phenomenological experience that 
the moral agent undergoes when she deals with supererogatory 
acts. Morality, in this specific regard, is a matter of 
understanding the others and embracing the task of benefitting 
them.  
                                                          
36 Larmore C., The Autonomy of Morality, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
pp.73-74. 
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CONCLUSION:  
THE MANY DIMENSIONS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 
 
The dimensions of Moral Complexity are many and they can 
be notice on different levels of the moral domain. Certainly 
enough, the present work cannot represent a comprehensive 
and exhaustive treatise of complexity. I have focused on at least 
two aspects of Moral Complexity and I have tried to show how 
this feature of morality holds true in both aspects: the nature 
of moral experience and the possibility to give an account of the 
concept of supererogation. 
To the first issue I have dedicated chapters I and II. The 
starting point has been that of endorsing a phenomenological 
approach to the subject. The reason of this choice is the belief 
that morality deals with acts that find their ultimate expression 
in the everyday life. The first-person analysis of the moral agent 
aims at understanding what it is like to do x, allowing a more 
precise appreciation of the moral reasons for action. It appears 
clear how an analysis of this sort reveals the manifold nature 
of the moral sphere. This acknowledgement comes with a first 
theoretical conclusion: the preferable normative theory is a 
pluralist system. In this regards I have tried to show how the 
understanding of moral pluralism offered by Charles Larmore 
represents a good starting point for handling Moral Complexity 
at a normative level. The adoption of heterogeneous principles 
of morality (consequentialism, deontology and partiality) helps 
us understanding how different moral reasons can be disclosed 
by endorsing different ways of moral reasoning. In this 
particular regard, I have tried to show how pluralism is 
articulated in at least two district ways.  We can distinguish 
between a methodological pluralism (different and equally valid 
ways of moral reasoning) and an axiological pluralism (different 
moral values that we consider incommensurable and of 
ultimate importance). These features of our moral experience 
(and of the normative system that I take to explain such 
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experience) are expression of the complexity that characterizes 
morality. This, in a certain degree, explains the motto contained 
in the title of the dissertation: only through moral complexity. In 
other terms, we would be able to understand morality only 
through a proper appreciation of its complexities.  
In the third chapter, I have tried to show how these 
metaethical (or, in a certain sense, meta-theoretical) claims 
about the nature of morality come with some repercussions on 
the normative level too. I take the concept of supererogation to 
be a clear example of this matter. If we want to acknowledge the 
complex nature of morality, we need to concede the existence 
of supererogatory acts. This claim requires further 
specification. Morality, it has often been underlined, has two 
faces: the Right and the Good. They stand as the two 
dimensions of the normative level, dimensions to which 
different authors have referred differently: the deontic and the 
evaluative, a minimal ethics and a maximal ethics, duties and 
values and so on. This distinction, which acknowledges the 
different levels of morality, is the one that gives rise to the 
theoretical need of a category of supererogatory acts. This 
resembles the distinction between precepts and counsels that 
gave birth to the concept in the Christian tradition. There are 
different ways and levels of achievement of the good and this is 
what makes possible to conceive the “higher flies of morality”; 
the morally good that lies beyond the call of duty. It is not 
surprising, then, that many attempts to solve the problem of 
supererogation1 rely on the identification of different sources of 
morality. 
The contemporary debate on the concept of supererogation 
is plenty of examples of this way of giving an account of the 
concept. Think, for example, of the position held by Portmore, 
                                                          
1 These terms usually refer to the following quandary: if supererogatory acts 
often represent the morally best option, why is that they are not morally 
required? This aspect of supererogation goes against the ‘good-ought tie up’ 
motto, the idea that morality should always prescribe the morally best. See 
pp.123-130. 
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Gert and Dreier2. In the present work, I adopt a similar strategy, 
providing an account of supererogation by endorsing a pluralist 
moral system. As I have tried to show in chapter IV, monist 
theories usually fail (or at least struggle) to give a proper 
explanation of supererogatory acts in virtue of their tendency to 
merge the two faces of morality into one. Therefore, these 
theories cannot recreate that manifold and multileveled 
structure that makes supererogation theoretically conceivable. 
As David Heyd highlights when he underlines what constitutes 
supererogation’s moral value: 
“This dual source of moral value explains why supererogation 
requires a theory which blends both axiological and deontological 
elements. Neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism alone is 
sufficient to account for supererogation […]”3. 
The only way to solve the justificatory problem of the concept is 
to acknowledge the different levels that constitute morality and 
provide, accordingly, a normative system that grants the 
appropriate distinctions. 
For this reason, in chapter V, I have decided to provide an 
account of supererogatory acts from a pluralist perspective. A 
moral system that acknowledges many sources of morality is 
able to identify a level of the Right that remains well 
distinguished from the level of the Good. This important 
distinction recreates the theoretical needs that make 
supererogation conceivable. In this regard, I have tried to 
explain the performance of a supererogatory act by the Multiple 
Sources Dynamics. Supererogation is better explained when the 
                                                          
2 Portmore D., Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?, in “Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice”, 11(2008), pp.369-388; Gert J., Moral Worth, Supererogation, 
and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction, in “Philosophical Review”, 
121(2012), no.4, pp.611-618; Dreier J., Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense 
and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t, in Byron M. (ed. by), Satisficing and 
Maximizing: Moral Theories on Practical Reason, Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, pp.131-154. 
3 Heyd D., Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982, p.131. 
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moral agent is able to distinguish different moral sources that 
make clear, on one hand, one’s own moral requirements and, 
on the other, a way to exceed these obligations by aiming for 
some extra good. While this explanation of supererogatory acts 
is not meant in itself to exclude any possible monist account of 
supererogation, it makes clear how the pluralist’s take offers 
some advantages over the other justificatory options. 
Finally, it worth asking why is pluralism taken to be, in the 
present work, the key to interpret both moral experience and 
supererogation? I hold that pluralism represents a sort of 
inference to the best explanation4 of many relevant questions of 
ethics. As I have tried to show, pluralism can both handle the 
complexity typical of our moral experience and give an account 
of the existence of complex moral concepts such as 
supererogation5. If this normative theory can adequately 
explain more questions relevant to ethics than other possible 
suitors can, it is the moral theory to be preferred. Again, this 
justifies the adoption of the moral approach that I have labeled 
“Moral Complexity”. I take this to be an approach that is 
primarily concerned with the acknowledgement of the different 
dimensions of the complexity typical of morality: the moral 
experience of the moral agent, the need of a pluralist moral 
system and the existence of complex moral concept6. The 
founding belief of this approach is the avoidance of any sort of 
indebted theoretical oversimplification. Moral phenomenon has 
always precedence over moral theorizing. The explanatory 
potential of this approach ultimately explains the title of work: 
Only Through Moral Complexity: the Case of Supererogation. 
                                                          
4 Harman G., The Inference to the Best Explanation, in “Philosophical 
Review”, 74(1965), pp.88-95. 
5 Moreover, it is important to highlight that pluralism explains the existence 
of moral dilemmas (even if it does not necessarily solve them) as the clashing 
of equally relevant moral sources. 
6 I have defined a complex moral concept as one that requires more than a 
single level of morality in order to be justified. I take supererogation to be a 
clear example of this sort of moral concept.  
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